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Globalization is a double-edged sword for innovation. It can give innovative companies 
the opportunity to go beyond national boundaries, but at the same time can jeopardize their 
innovations without proper protection. In order to solve the problem of costs, delay, uncertainty, 
and unpredictability that fragmented patent system has caused, it has been argued that the 
harmonization of domestic patent laws is necessary. Countries have responded this by 
successfully concluding Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). International communities have particularly focused on harmonizing 
procedural issues to share administrative works of search and examination. This work-sharing 
mechanism is effective in alleviating works of patent offices and reducing application costs, 
which can consequentially contribute to improving patent quality. 
However, there have been growing conflicts around substantive harmonization. 
Developing countries argue that the benefits of patent harmonization was unevenly distributed, 
and resist further development of international patent laws. Historically, patent harmonization 
was discussed on the foundation of utilitarian theory. As a result, it was negotiated within the 
trade forum where countries can discuss compensation for Kaldor-Hicks improvement. However, 
the compensation mechanism of trade concession has not worked properly, and the relationship 
between trade and intellectual property (IP) is vague and tenuous at best. Thus, there is growing 
belief among developing countries that the international patent system is a coerced agreement 
that should be resisted rather than embraced. 
In this situation, it is necessary to consider delinking patent harmonization from trade 
negotiation. Rather than depending on utilitarian calculation, it is worth adopting property 
theories as a normative justification for further harmonization. Among many property theories, 
Locke’s labor theory can deliver balanced guidance by highlighting the natural-rights aspects of 
property, as well as recognizing a role of government. This fundamental paradigm shift of patent 
harmonization from the trade theory to property theories can provide a normative guidance to 
confront current issues in international intellectual property laws, such as biotechnology, 
traditional knowledge, and biodiversity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Patent systems are designed to “incentivize innovations, encourage development, and 
commercialize inventions.”1  Initially, the effectiveness of patent law was restricted to national 
boundaries so as to encourage inventive and innovative local activities.2  Later, the concern 
grew beyond national territories paralleling the globalization and expansion of international 
trade.3  At this stage, proposals to further harmonize domestic patent laws at the international 
level4 have understandably attracted considerable attention.5  As intellectual property (IP) 
                                                          
1 Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. 
ECON. ISSUE. 1031, 1033 (1998). 
2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
SYSTEM ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id 
= 17556 (last visited Feb 02, 2016). 
3 Id. 
4 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Report, at 1–2, 
WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, Information on Certain 
Recent Developments in Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2–3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 
(Mar. 17, 2004); WIPO, Standing Comm. On the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 2, 
WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2 (Sept. 30, 2003). 
5 Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections On 
Drafting A Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 87.; Also See generally WIPO, Open Forum on the 
Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), Geneva, Switz., Mar. 1–3, 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum], 
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continues to grow as a component of global trade, the cost expended in worldwide protection and 
enforcement have soared.6   Those involved in this process also have to bear increasing 
frustration because of the need to pursue multiple actions concerning infringement in cross-
border disputes.7   
Thus, it had been widely recognized that territorial patent rights may have significant 
limitations in ensuring the economic benefits and incentives for inventors in the age of 
globalization.  In this situation, it seemed reasonable for several industrialized countries to 
consider trans-national patent rights that are effective beyond territorial boundaries.  They 
initiated international discussion for ‘patent harmonization’ to make the patent laws of each 
country similar or coherent.  
The 1883 Paris Convention on Industrial Property Protection was a reflection of the 
concerns of earlier days.8  The dramatic turning point in the recent phases of development 
concerning international patents came with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1995, which established substantive principles that apply 
to all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  TRIPs in fact had a substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (hosting the presentation 
of papers, lectures, and speeches on the international harmonization of patent law). 
6 See id.; Also See Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. The 
European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000); Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA 
473, 473 (1996). 
7 See id.; Also See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop. (AIPPI), Question Q174—Jurisdiction 
and Applicable Law in the Case of Cross-border Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2003/I Y.B. 827–28, 
Oct. 25–28, 2003, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/ resolutions/Q174_E.pdf (recognizing the need for a 
fairer and more efficient method of resolving cross-border controversies); European Max-Planck Group for Conflict 
of Laws in Intellectual Prop., Exclusive Jurisdiction and Cross-Border IP (Patent) Infringement: Suggestions for 
Amendment of the Brussels I Regulation, in 29(5) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 195, 195–96 (2007) (suggesting the need 
to amend the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
EC Regulation No 44/2001, to improve the efficiency of transnational dispute resolution). 
8 WIPO, supra Note 4, at 4. 
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international impact because it signaled the inevitability of a more harmonized and stronger 
global patent system.9 
Along its history throughout the 19th and 20th century, patent harmonization has been at 
the center of heated debate in the international community.  The business sectors of several 
developed countries strongly argue that patent harmonization is necessary to confront free 
movement of goods and ideas in the age of open economy.  They further argue that it is 
necessary to create the certainty of legal rights, enhance the value of a patent, and reduce legal 
fees.  However, many countries oppose this idea on the basis of the principle of national 
sovereignty and territoriality.  Specifically, they claim that patent law should be a very local 
matter reflecting the policy goals of each state and its particular economic and social situations. 
Patent harmonization, they claim, would undermine their autonomy.  These countries view 
patent harmonization as an instrument for certain countries to exert unjustified pressure for their 
own benefits.   
Especially in the post-TRIPs era since 1995, patent harmonization became increasingly 
problematic for many developing states,10 as the implementation of TRIPs has been increasingly 
slow and costly and a source of domestic opposition.  Developing countries became very 
suspicious that the economic benefits of the international patent system might be unevenly 
distributed in favor of certain developed countries.11 The United States and the European Union 
added to this perception by pressuring developing countries to sign ‘TRIPs-plus’ bilateral 
agreements containing higher standards than those found in TRIPs.12   
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 24. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
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In addition, in 2000, several industrialized states helped the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) initiate international discussions on the Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
(SPLT) to realize the adoption of identical rules granting and enforcing a patent.  As a result, a 
growing belief has been fostered among developing countries that “the international patent 
system is a coerced agreement that should be resisted rather than embraced.” 13  Supporting 
this opinion, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released a report in 2003 
asserting that the “relevance of TRIPS is highly questionable for large parts of the developing 
world.”14  The report urged developing countries to “begin dialogues to replace TRIPs . . . with 
alternative intellectual property paradigms” and, in the interim, to “modif[y] . . . the way the 
agreement is interpreted and implemented.”15   
 
 
II. TWO TYPES OF PATENT HARMONIZATION: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE 
 
In order to better understand and resolve these conflicts around patent harmonization, it is 
helpful to categorize it into two types: procedural and substantive harmonization.  First of all, 
procedural harmonization usually means a measure to harmonize the process necessary for 
granting patents.  It is targeted to reduce patent backlogs by implementing similar procedures 
                                                          
13 Id.   
14 Helfer, supra Note 10, at 3; See also UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, MAKING GLOBAL 
TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE 221, 222 (2003), available at http://www.undp.org/dpalpublications/globaltrade.pdf.  
15 Id. 
 5 
and criteria and to prevent duplicate works in the examination process, and does not necessarily 
require a change in domestic patent laws.  As a result, procedural harmonization has a strong 
possibility of less conflict and more cooperation among countries because it does not hurt their 
sovereign power or autonomy.  Patent Offices can voluntarily explore plausible ways to 
alleviate the administrative burdens, and eventually make the patent process cheaper and faster.  
In this sense, procedural harmonization can provide practical solutions to solve the problem of 
fragmented patent systems. 
On the other hand, substantive harmonization includes standards and rules for granting 
patents.  It also covers the scope and strength of patent rights, such as the duration of patent 
rights.16  It has been generally agreed that substantive harmonization is essential to resolve 
fundamental problems of a fragmented patent system that mere procedural harmonization cannot 
answer.17  However, progress toward substantive harmonization is slow, costly and noisy 
because it requires every country to adopt similar, or even uniform, model laws into its domestic 
legal system.  As countries have different views from their own economic situations, innovative 
capacities, and cultural environments, it is very hard to reach an agreement on this issue. 
For example, developed countries with high innovative capacity strongly support this 
idea of substantive harmonization, and they press developing countries to adopt stronger patent 
systems as a form of international agreements.  The international patent communities also have 
been supportive of the idea of uniformity, highlighting the value of creating a uniform patent law 
                                                          
16  Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 5 at 90; See also Karen M Hauda, “The Role of the United States in 
World-Wide Protection of Industrial Property” in Frank Gotzen, ed, The Future of Intellectual Property in the 
Global Market of the Information Society (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003) 89 at 97. 
17 See id. 
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on a global scale.18  As a result, participating countries in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have concluded a number of 
treaties and agreements in place that articulate the concept of substantive harmonization of patent 
laws.19  However, developing countries argue that the diversity of country-specific patent laws 
is natural and valuable in itself.  They oppose the idea of patent harmonization by arguing that a 
consolidation of existing patent systems into a single monolith would impoverish the field: it 
would be a mass extinction of legal species.20 
 
III. SUBSTANTIVE PATENT HARMONIZATION FROM A PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Substantive patent harmonization is difficult and complicated because it involves the 
essential issues of normative choice.  It has been witnessed that heated debate is growing 
around substantive patent harmonization, in particular concerning its justification and efficiency.  
In this situation, it is a meaningful task to seek guidance through revisiting the rationale and 
strategy for patent harmonization from a fresh angle – through the lens of property theories.  By 
looking into harmonization from the perspective of property, this paper investigates the source of 
conflicts among countries, and proposes normative justification and pragmatic solutions toward a 
new international patent system. 
                                                          
18 See id, at 687. 
19 Takashi Kinoshita, Strategy For Harmonization Of The Us Patent System With The International Norm 8, 
(2001), available at http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/pdf/ma_projects/kinoshita_takashi.pdf. 
20 See id, at 726. 
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It is true that much debate has surrounded the question of whether Intellectual Property 
(IP) is truly a kind of property.  Many theorists have attempted to establish consistent, basic 
norms to categorize knowledge as a type of property, and have addressed substantive issues such 
as ownership, priority, discipline, and stringency of protection.  For example, some scholars 
such as Richard Epstein maintain that knowledge deserves as much protection as tangible 
property such as real estate.21  These authors argue that defining IP as an analogy to tangible 
property has many advantages, including the ability to claim ownership.  In contrast, other 
scholars such as Peter Menell counter this theory by arguing that IP deserves its own edifice that 
is unrelated to property rights. 22   These scholars support Thomas Jefferson’s view that 
“inventions cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”23  Mark Lemley furthers this argument 
by claiming that we do not need an analogy for IP as a form of property at all.24 
Despite this debate, it seems to be a reality that a patent is considered property or at least 
like property.  As far back as the 1878 the Paris Convention, the idea of seeing patents as 
property has been both legally and practically supported and confirmed by businesses, domestic 
patent laws, and the international society.  Increasingly, companies are recognizing the 
importance of knowledge assets that are worth protecting, and governments are striving to ensure 
                                                          
21 Richard A. Epstein, The Structural Unity of Real and Intellectual Property, Periodic Commentaries on the 
Policy Debate, The Progress & Freedom Foundation (24 October 2006), available at 
http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/pops/pop13.24RAE_9_26.pdf. 
22 Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement: Should intellectual property be 
accorded the same protections as tangible forms of property? 30 REGULATION 1, 7 (CATO Institutes, 2007), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf. 
23 The Founders' Constitution, Volume 3, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, Document 12, THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh. (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 
1905), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html 
24 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, Discovery: Faculty Ideas, Publications, 
And Conversations, Stanford Law School (2005), at 34, available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/ 
stanford_lawyer/issues/73/sl73_Property.pdf; See also Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free 
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
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economic development by adhering to IP policies.  Thus, discussing patent harmonization from 
property theories’ perspective is not a new idea, but is firmly based on sound theories and 
practices. 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to revisit the rationale and theoretical justification for 
patent harmonization, especially substantive harmonization, from the perspective of property.  
Although the analogy between a patent and property is still controversial, an attempt to 
investigate patent harmonization from the property perspective is meaningful and beneficial for 
several reasons.  First, this approach well represents the current recognition of patents as 
property.  Much evidence reveals that the current trend is that patents are considered 
commodities, and governments want to protect them as property.  To provide reasonable and 
plausible strategies toward harmonization, the discussion has to be based on this reality.   
The property-based approach is also helpful in understanding the real origin of conflicts 
between countries.  The relationship between patents and property has been at the center of 
conflicts around patent harmonization.  Countries opposing harmonization claim that property 
law has long been considered a local matter and not a subject of international negotiation.  Even 
in the age of globalization, they argue, courts have depended on the principle of conflicts of law 
to confront current international issues in property cases, rather than calling for the 
harmonization of laws.  As a result, they claim that it is contradictory to argue for the patent-
property analogy and patent harmonization at the same time.  However, unlike other types of 
property, IP, which includes patents, has been the focus of harmonization discourse since the 
19th century.  Thus, to provide persuasive arguments for patent harmonization, it is necessary 
 9 
to scrutinize the definition and relationship between property and patents in an international 
context.   
Moreover, this property-based approach is necessary to analyze patent harmonization 
from a uniform analytical framework.  One of the fundamental problems is that arguments for 
or against harmonization suggested by various countries and their scholars have been formulated 
under different definitions or understanding of harmonization, property, patents, and legal rights.  
Because ‘harmonization’ is a very broad and vague term, many different and sometimes 
conflicting measures are used for different concepts under the same names.  Moreover, the term 
‘property’ has numerous definitions and applications.  As a result, some countries have 
sabotaged the entire discussion on harmonization due to different interpretations or analyses.  In 
this situation, applying well-established uniform property theories can help us propose an 
analytical framework and understand the scope and category of harmonization in a more 
reasonable and reliable manner.  Based on unified and consistent definitions, the international 
community can expect negotiations for practical and plausible solutions benefitting all 
participating countries. 
In this sense, discussing patent harmonization from a property point of view is necessary 
to provide reasonable justifications based on the current recognition of patents as property.  The 
analytical framework borrowed from property can provide theoretical and practical grounds for 
strategically achieving patent harmonization by doing what is possible first.  This analysis will 
help the international society devise a roadmap and realize incremental improvements toward a 
higher degree of harmonization.   
 10 
IV. RESEARCH OUTLINE 
 
Admitting that substantive harmonization is necessary but hard to achieve in the near 
term, it becomes necessary to consider alternative measures. As the problem of fragmented 
patent systems become more serious, it is imperative to find a practical and effective way to 
remedy the increasing number of multiple applications and unpredictable validity in this 
globalized world.  Thus, in this thesis, it is helpful to discuss the easier case of procedural 
harmonization first; then will proceed to later chapters that address more difficult but essential 
issues involved in substantive harmonization.  
First, Chapter 2 discusses the definition and rationale of patent harmonization. Starting 
from the problems that triggered the international discussion for patent harmonization, the 
definitions and characteristics of patent harmonization is explored based on the general 
understanding of harmonization.  
In Chapter 3, procedural harmonization is discussed as a practical solution to alleviate the 
problem of the fragmented patent system.  Several policy proposals are suggested based on the 
level and width of international cooperation.  This chapter also explains the limitation of 
procedural harmonization and highlights the role of substantive harmonization. 
Chapter 4 investigates substantive harmonization from utilitarian perspective.  As a 
dominant theory to justify both patent system and international trade, utilitarian theory has 
played an important role to explain substantive harmonization.  After discussing traditional 
 11 
utilitarian theories, this chapter focuses on criticizing the logical weakness of these utilitarian 
grounds.  This limitation calls for the further study based on other property theories.  
And, Chapter 5 discusses substantive harmonization from the property theory’s 
perspective.  Specifically, personhood theory and labor theory are suggested as normative 
choices.  By comparing patent harmonization with successful copyrights harmonization, this 
chapter highlights the role of a natural rights theory to justify international harmonization.   
In chapter 6, Locke’s theory and its implications are examined. This chapter focuses on 
applying Locke’s theory to justify patent harmonization.  The classic Locke’s theory is 
discussed to build the analytic framework that can explain international issues around the 
harmonization of patent laws.   
Chapter 7 discusses the actual application of a normative frame to real issues.  There are 
three important issues named as ‘triplets’ that have been the center of global conflicts: 
biotechnology, traditional knowledge, and biodiversity.  Based on Locke’s theory, this chapter 
investigates solutions and proposals of these problems. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this 
discussion of patent harmonization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE REASON AND NECESSITIES FOR PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
 
I. THE INHERENT DIVERSITY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
Patent laws are inherently diverse, or different from country to country for three reasons.  
The first reason is due to the centuries-old principle of territoriality.  The seventeenth century 
Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber identified three precepts of the modern territoriality doctrine: (1) a 
state’s laws have force within the state’s boundaries; (2) anyone found within the state’s 
boundaries is subject to the state’s authority; (3) comity will discipline one sovereign’s exercise 
of authority to respect the territorial competence of other sovereigns.25  As synthesized by 
Harold Maier, these precepts state that “acts of foreign sovereigns should, when appropriate, give 
effect within another state’s territory and that courts of all nations should indulge a presumption 
against the extraterritorial impact of law.”26   
Thus, given that the territoriality principle establishes the jurisdiction of a state’s laws, 
patent rights – which constitute a portion of a state’s laws – are protected only within and in 
                                                          
25 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (Fountain 
Press, 2008). 
26 Id. 
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accordance with the legal rules of the jurisdiction where they have been granted.27  For 
example, the Patent Act in the United States adopted in 1952 contains language suggesting that 
its scope is limited to U.S. territory.28  It provides that the granting of a patent confers a “right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States.”29  Thus, “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”30   
Even before the adoption of this language, U.S. courts consistently held that patent law 
was territorial in scope.31  In Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., the 
Court said that “[t]he right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States 
and its territories . . . and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a 
foreign country.”32  In short, as the legal rights and protection of patents are limited within their 
respective jurisdiction by territoriality, countries naturally develop and maintain their own unique 
patent laws. 
Second, the many ways in which patent law is manifested and practiced can be attributed 
to the governments’ use of patent law as a policy tool for economic growth.  Assuming the 
                                                          
27 Alexander von Mühlendahl and Dieter Stauder, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Economy 
– Transit and Other ‘Free Zones’, 6 MPI STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COMPETITION AND TAX LAW. 653 
653 (2009), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/n868652q8u47n1r5/fulltext.pdf. 
28 GOLDSTEIN, supra Note 25, at 183. 
29 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). 
30 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), 271(b), 271(c); Effective January 1, 1996, section 271(a) was amended to add "offering 
for sale" and "importing" to the exclusive rights conveyed by a U.S. patent. These rights were added to conform 
section 271 to Article 28 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. See Chisum on 
Patents § 16.02 (2006). 
31 Id. 
32 Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915). 
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existence of a stable set of preferences in economic policies within each jurisdiction, it is 
generally agreed that the domestic laws tailored to each jurisdiction would better accommodate 
those individual preferences than a uniform set of laws imposed across all jurisdictions.33  Thus, 
in making patent laws, each country decides for itself what intellectual assets to protect within its 
borders, 34  and subsequently adopts patent policies in connection with its respective 
preferences.35  In other words, the standard for patents should be intimately tied to a nation’s 
economic goals, and especially to its industries’ technological potential and the types of 
innovation it hopes to foster.36   
In this sense, patent law is established on the foundation of its national economic policy. 
In fact, patent law operates as an important policy tool that is closely related with the economic 
goals and strategic priorities of the government.  Thus, a government requires an applicant to 
incorporate administrative formalities that must be satisfied to create or perfect a patent.37  
Also, government officials determine whether the application is fit for a patent according to 
national standards.38   
Third, a nation’s cultural fabric makes each patent system unique.  According to Luigi, 
Paola, and Luigi, culture has a direct impact on expectations and preferences, which in turn have 
                                                          
33 GOLDSTEIN, supra Note 25, at 183. 
34 id. 
35 DAN L. BURK AND MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 37 (The 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
36 Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra Note 5, at 99; See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 
300–01 (1997). 
37 London Film Productions Ltd v. Intercontinental Commiunications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 223 U.S.P.Q. 381. 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
38 See id. 
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an impact on economic outcome.39  Although economists have been reluctant to rely on culture 
as a possible determinant of economic phenomena, 40  there are countervailing historical 
arguments.  Adam Smith viewed his “moral treaty” as an integral part to his “Wealth of 
Nations.”  And John Stuart Mill regarded cultural constraints as sometimes more important than 
even the pursuits of personal interest.41   
A powerful example of cultural impacts on the patent system is found in different 
approaches to the notion of “property.” Historically, western societies have conceived of the right 
to property as a natural right.  John Locke believed that every man has an inherent property 
interests and asserted that “life, liberty, and property” are the inalienable rights of a just society.42  
Consistent with this notion, intellectual property law has long been placed under the general 
heading of traditional private property.43  Richard Epstein furthers this argument by contending 
that patents deserve much the same protection as real estate.44  This historical and cultural 
backdrop treating intellectual property as the form of private property can have the effect of 
strengthening the patent regime.   
                                                          
39 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, 20 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 23, 23 (2006) (According to Luigi, Paola, and Luigi, in the context of identifying casual link between culture 
and economy, culture can be defined as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.). 
40 See id, at 23. 
41 See id, at 24.; See JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 484 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1956) 
42 Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, 30 REGULATION. 36, 38 (2007). 
43 See id. (The first use of the term “intellectual property” in a reported legal decision can be traced to an 1845 
patent case in which the court observed that “a liberal construction … given to a patent” will encourage “ingenuity 
and perseverance” and “only in this way can we protect intellectual property, the labors of the mind, productions and 
interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks 
he rears.”  Prof. Justin Hughes, in a recent Southern California Law Review article, notes that “the courts and 
legislatures had regularly discussed copyrighted works as ‘property’ throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
early nineteenth centuries, with the adjectival concepts of ‘artistic,’ ‘literary,’ and ‘intellectual’ orbiting around the 
property notion.”) 
44 id. 
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On the other hand, certain cultures emphasize the concept of commonality, or a 
communal property for ideas.  For example, the Chinese believed for centuries that inventions 
and creative works belonged to the community or the government and should be freely shared.45  
Because traditional Chinese culture did not generally apply the concept to private individuals, the 
entire concept of intellectual property protection is relatively new to Chinese society. 46  Many 
Chinese business entities, in reality, were not aware of their intellectual property rights and the 
need to seek protection; likewise, many infringers were unaware that their activities infringed 
upon the private rights of others.47  Many countries in Asia have similar traditions, so their 
reluctance to strengthen patent regimes is understandable.  This cultural issue is believed to 
substantially affect the development of patent regimes, nationally and transnationally.  
 
 
II. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
For the reasons discussed above, it can be argued that the patent system should be 
country-specific.  Clearly, each country has a unique national policy and cultural background.  
These country-specific patent laws did not pose serious problems through the 18th century 
                                                          
45 LEI FANG, CHINESE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 12 (2005), http://www.sutherland.com/files/ 
Publication/7d59443f-8187-4680-b24a34de34553642/Presentation/Publication/Attachment/ce106e5e-d8f4-496f-
a09bce892161dafb/Chinese%20Patent.doc. 
46 id. 
47 id. 
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because research and business activities were restricted to the domestic market, and international 
trade was not common practice.  Although inventors who sought protection beyond domestic 
boundaries could file patent applications in the respective jurisdiction, this was a rare practice.   
However, as the world increasingly became globalized, there was a corresponding rise in 
the movement of economic resources beyond domestic borders.  International trade exploded, 
and movements of capital and labor became more liberal.48  It was frustrating for inventors to 
realize that their patent rights were not enforceable in foreign countries.  For example, 
companies had to suffer from the movement of infringed products that were manufactured in 
foreign states and sold to the rest of the world.  To prevent this infringement, they needed to 
obtain patent protection in those countries.  However, obtaining foreign patents is not always 
guaranteed and sometimes even challenging because of the diverse patent laws in each country.  
For example, countries often have different criteria for patentability such as novelty, and filing a 
patent in one country often bars the applicant from obtaining a patent in others.  As the world 
economy has become more globalized and integrated, inventors have recognized that the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of diverse patent systems is a serious challenge that may 
jeopardize their patent rights. This uncertainty may severely reduce the incentive of private 
inventors to appropriate their knowledge for economic gain. 
Consequently, securing patent protection in foreign countries became a growing concern 
for businesses and governments.  Admitting the seriousness of the matter, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce commented that “delay, uncertainty, and poor quality at the front end ultimately 
make private investments in innovation less likely and undermine the potential for economic 
                                                          
48  WORLD TRADE ORGAINZATION (WTO), INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS (2008), available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_charts_e.htm 
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growth and job creation.”49  In this fast-changing technological world, the slow pace of the 
patent system and the low quality of patents can destroy the virtuous cycle of patents and 
innovations, and can eventually cause “a patent crisis.”50 
 From below, we are going to scrutinize the circumstances and reasons that raise the 
concern of “a patent crisis,” which consequentially triggered the argument for harmonizing 
patent laws.  These are: 1) limited patent protection, 2) application costs, 3) examination delay, 
and 4) uncertainty and unpredictability.  
 
1. Limited Patent Protection 
 
First and foremost, patent protection obtained in one country is not guaranteed in other 
countries because of different rules governing filing procedure and substantive rights.  For 
example, in the U.S., Congress intended patentable subject matter to "include anything under the 
sun that is made by man."51  However, in other countries, the scope of patentable subject matter 
was quite narrow.  According to Joseph Straus in 1988, pharmaceutical products were not 
patentable in 49 countries, animal species in 45, methods for the treatment of the human or 
                                                          
49 ARTI RAI, STUART GRAHAM, AND MARK DOMS, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING 
ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 5 (A White Paper from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
April 13, 2010), available at http://2001-2009.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/~doc/~os/~opa/documents/content/ 
prod01_009147.pdf  (The USPTO currently has an unexamined patent application backlog of over 750,000. Patent 
application pendency – the time between when an application is filed and when it receives a final disposition – 
currently stands at 34 months on average). 
50  BURK & LEMLEY, supra Note 35, at 1. 
51 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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animal body in 44, plant varieties in 44, biological processes for the production of plant varieties 
or animal species in 42, food products in 35, computer programs in 32, chemical products in 22, 
pharmaceutical processes in 10, processes for the manufacture of food in 9, and microorganisms 
in 9, from a total of 92 states in the Paris Convention.52  In these circumstances, the companies 
that invented the above-mentioned products not only failed to obtain patent protection in 
countries that declared the subject matter unpatentable, but also had to suffer from the 
importation of copied products which were manufactured in those countries where the products 
were not protected by patents.   
Moreover, as countries may have different criteria for novelty, filing a patent in one 
country often bars the applicant from obtaining a patent in others. In certain countries which 
institute a rule of ‘absolute novelty,’ any public disclosure of the invention, including those by 
the inventor, generally bars the obtainment of patent protection.53  In other words, those 
countries, unlike the U.S. and Canada, rejected the argument for a grace period, and the inventor 
could not secure his or her patent protection.  In short, different domestic patent laws might 
prevent inventors from maximizing opportunities – both domestic and international – through 
their patents. 
 
 
                                                          
52 Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in From GATT to TRIPs: 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 170-175 (Friedrich-Karl beier and Gerhard 
Schricker, 1996). 
53  CHRISTOPHER B. KILNER , U.S. “NOVELTY” VS. INTERNATIONAL “ABSOLUTE NOVELTY”, available at 
http://ram.timberlakepublishing.com/files/usnoveltyvsinternationalabsolutenovelty.pdf. 
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2. Application Costs 
 
Given the disparate patent laws in each jurisdiction, obtaining patents can result in 
substantial costs for multi-national corporations that have business operations throughout the 
world.  Today, with the growing trend of globalization, the activities of multinational 
corporations are increasing in volume and importance.  The Top 500 multi-national 
corporations account for nearly 70 percent of worldwide trade, and this percentage has steadily 
increased over the past twenty years.54  For such corporations, having and maintaining patents 
in every jurisdiction is a crucial but costly investment.  
 A survey by the Korea Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) revealed that 63% of Korean 
businesses identified the obtainment of foreign patents as one of the most serious burdens to 
conducting business in foreign countries.55  This notion is strongly evidenced by the empirical 
data of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  WIPO roughly estimated that 
patenting in 2 major countries (US and Japan) costs approximately $16,000 to $19,000. 56  If a 
company wants to obtain and maintain patents in 7 major countries,57 it must pay approximately 
                                                          
54 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade liberalisation statistics: Poverty, available at http://www.gatt.org/ 
trastat_e.html. 
55 KOREA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (KIPO), THE SURVEY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RELATED 
ACTIVITIES IN KOREA  84-85 (KIPO, 2009) 
56 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), WORLD PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW 
51-58 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_931.pdf 
(The patenting costs are based on estimates sourced from Global IP Estimator (http://www.globalip.com/). They 
include filing, examining, prosecution, granting costs and the international phase for PCT scenarios. They do not 
include in-house and pre-filing costs. The figures shown above are based on typical cost schedules which are 
indicative only; actual costs will vary widely depending on the many options that are available to applicants and the 
many differences in costs and fees (including legal and translation costs) around the world. The last maintenance 
year is 10 years from filing. See appendix B for further details regarding the methodology used.). 
57 See id. (China, European Patent Office (validation in France, Germany and United Kingdom), Japan, United 
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$60,000.  If the company wants to have broader protection by obtaining patents in 15 
countries,58 it should be prepared to pay around $120,000.  Considering that this is the 
estimated cost for a single patent, one can imagine the enormous expenditures required of multi-
national companies to obtain and maintain hundreds or thousands of patent pools.  Similarly, 
one study shows that one of the world’s major research-based pharmaceutical companies is 
estimated to spend between $750,000 and $1,000,000 to obtain comprehensive world-wide 
patent protection for an important chemical compound; furthermore, the figure is continually 
growing at a rate of 10% each year.59 
 
3. Examination Delay 
 
The globalization of commercial activity has triggered striking internationalization in the 
world of patent protection.60  Consequentially, the growing number of patent applications 
beyond domestic borders has led to increased workloads and backlogs in patent offices.  In 
1985, there were 1.2 million patent applications filed worldwide.61  The number of patent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
States of America, Republic of Korea). 
58 See id. (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Patent Office (validation in, France, Germany and 
United Kingdom), Israel, India, Japan, Mexico, United States of America, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, 
Singapore). 
59  RAYMOND J. KEATING, PATENT REFORM: PROTECTING IP, ENABLING INNOVATION, & BOLSTERING 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 18 (The Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council, February 2008), available at 
http://www.sbecouncil.org/uploads/SBEC%20polseries%20IPPatents02081.pdf (Gerald J. Mossinghoff, former 
assistant secretary of commerce and commissioner of patents and trademarks, noted in testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Judiciary Committee on July 26, 2005). 
60  HISAMITSU ARAI, WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 13 (WIPO 
Publication No.489 (E)), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/publications/wipo_pub_489/. 
61 id. 
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applications more than doubled in only a decade, such that it reached 2.79 million in 1995.62   
The increasing number of patent applications may not be a serious concern as itself, but 
the real problem is that many of these applications are actually duplicates.  Nearly 242,000 
applications were duplicates among the three major offices (U.S, EU, and Japan) in 2006.63  
These duplicate applications have been subjected to all the required steps of obtaining a patent, 
including searches and examination,64 which substantially contribute to the patent backlog and 
depreciation of patent quality.65  For example, the US Patent and Trademark Office has a 
backlog of more than 750,000 patents,66 forcing an applicant to wait more than three years to be 
notified of the result.   
The expansion of non-residential filing is major reason for this increase.  In the U.S., 
domestic patent applicants stayed relatively stable at about 0.72 million over the course of the 
decade.67  By contrast, applications by foreign inventors rose fourfold during the same period, 
from 0.5 million in 1985 to 2.07 million in 1995.68  Many of the non-residential filings, 
however, were also duplicates, which – in their subjection to all the required steps of obtaining a 
patent including search and examination69 – substantially contributed to patent backlog and 
depreciation of patent quality.70   
                                                          
62 id. 
63 id.  
64 id. 
65 RAI, GRAHAM & DOMS, supra Note 49, at 4. 
66 See id. 
67 id. 
68 id. 
69 id. 
70 BRUCE BERMAN, THE PUZZLE THAT IS PATENT QUALITY (WIPO Magazine, Aug 2015), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2015/04/article_0004.html (last visited Feb 3, 2017) (The legal definition of 
patent quality is “a valid invention right that permits the holder to sue in order to exclude an alleged infringer from 
practicing the invention”); RAI, GRAHAM & DOMS, supra Note 49, at 5. (The USPTO currently has an unexamined 
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As a result, the total number of pending patent applications, i.e. patent backlogs across 
the world, is estimated to be around 4.2 million in 2007.71  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) not only had the largest backlog (28.4% of the world total) in 2007, 
but also a backlog which has been increasing at a faster rate than that of any other comparably 
sized patent office.72  According to a study by London Economics released on behalf of the 
United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), the cost to the global economy by the 
delay in processing patent applications may amount to as much as £7.65 ($11.4) billion each 
year.   
 
4. Uncertainties and Unpredictability 
 
A fragmented patent system that leads to uncertainty in the form of delays and 
unpredictability with regard to enforcement can be a grave concern for societies engaged in 
business.  Delays, which heighten uncertainty, may be particularly problematic for startups with 
high growth potential73 because they can lead to difficulty in securing patents and venture 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
patent application backlog of over 750,000. Patent application pendency – the time between when an application is 
filed and when it receives a final disposition – currently stands at 34 months on average).; See also WIPO, supra 
Note 13, at 44 (In Japan, there were 888,198 pending patent application in 2007, and it has 32.4 month of average 
pendency time.). 
71 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS 44 (2009), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941.pdf 
72 See id. (The number of pending applications by patent office in 2007: US (1,178,090), Japan (888,198), 
EU(550,079), Republic of Korea (445,944)); WIPO, supra Note 13, at 45 (between 2006 and 2007, examination 
pendency time also increased from 43.9 to 45.3 months at the European Patent Office (EPO), 31.8 to 32.4 months at 
the patent office of Japan, and 31.3 to 32.0 months at the patent office of the US). 
73 id. 
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funding in a timely fashion.74  Moreover, the uncertainty associated with patent delay imposes 
significant costs not only to patent applicants but also to potential competitors.75  Competitors 
will have less guidance with regard to research and development investments until the bounds of 
a patent applicant’s claim to inventive territory are known.76  Accordingly, companies in this 
situation may not only make fewer investments in innovation, but also make those which are 
potentially misdirected and wasteful.77 
Another pressing concern for multi-national corporations is the unpredictability in patent 
enforcement or validity.  In fact, costly infringement suits on parallel patents have become 
frequent.78  If a patent office grants a patent that is subsequently invalidated or subject to 
invalidation proceedings, not only does the office waste its own time, the time and money of the 
applicant, and that of the applicant’s competitors, but such a later-invalidated patent also distorts 
the market.79  And, patent litigation in a fragmented system with large institutional and cost 
differences can lead to a proliferation of litigation tactics and strategies that cause hold-up 
problems and wasteful duplication.80   
                                                          
74 id. 
75 RAI, GRAHAM & DOMS, supra Note 49, at 5. 
76 id. 
77 id. 
78 Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra Note 5, at 124; See John R. Thomas, Litigation beyond the Technological 
Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 291 
(1996). 
79  ICC COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (HEREINAFTER ICC), COOPERATION BETWEEN PATENT 
OFFICES: PRIOR ART SEARCHING OF PATENT APPLICATIONS 2 (Jun. 2010), 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/ intellectual_property/pages/ICC% 
20Statement_Patent%20Work% 20Sharing_28%2006%2010.pdf 
80 DIETMAR HARHOFF, ECONOMIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A UNIFIED AND INTEGRATED EUROPEAN PATENT 
LITIGATION SYSTEM 14-18 (Institute for Innovation Research, Technology Management and Entrepreneurship, 
2009), available at http://convenzioni.confindustria.it/Aree/DocumentiPINT.nsf/ 
B79578C0259E50E5C12576D2003B5C8F/$File/litigation_system_en_Harhoff.pdf (Harhoff points out three kinds 
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Although different results are technically possible considering that national patent laws 
are independent of one another,81 inconsistent outcomes in which different parties win in 
different locations can complicate global marketing efforts.82  Furthermore, legal uncertainty 
also generates indirect transaction costs, such as the cost of collecting information, the cost of 
legal disputes, and the cost of setting incentives for pushing through legal claims.83 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of problems in fragmented system: 1) wasteful duplication: whenever multiple litigation is undertaken, resources are 
wasted on duplication without generating concomitant benefits; 2) raising the cost for appropriating returns from 
patented inventions in Europe: leaving aside the cost of litigation, cross-border commerce is made more difficult and 
costly when diverging outcomes (patent protection in some, no patent protection in other EU Members States) 
prevail; 3) delay and hold-up: the system can be used to delay decisions in infringement cases or to raise the costs of 
entrants seeking access to the market; this may either reduce innovation incentives or the level of competition in a 
way that is welfare-reducing) 
81 Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra Note 5, at 124. 
82 See id. 
83 Helmut Wagner, Legal Uncertainty – Is Harmonization of Law the Right Answer? A Short Overview 4 
(Discussion Paper No. 444, January 2009), available at http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/FBWIWI/forschung/ 
beitraege/pdf/db444.pdf (On (a): Lack of knowledge of foreign statutes prevents international purchases or leads to 
the necessity of more or less expensive information collection.  On (b): In the event of international legal disputes 
the costs are much greater than in the case of a domestic legal dispute (cf. Freyhold, Gessner, Vial and Wagner (eds.) 
1995, Part II).  On (c): This includes private attempts to speed up approval procedures, and legal procedures in the 
broadest meaning of the term. As is known, “beneficial charges”, which include bribes or pay-offs, represent an 
important cost factor for multinational corporations. (This applies in particular in developing countries.) No small 
part of this is probably the result of having to deal with legal uncertainty or legal instability.  On (d): The 
difficulties involved in complaining about goods, in making warranty claims, and in exchanging goods, should 
probably prove to be much greater in the case of international purchases in comparison with domestic purchases. 
The associated costs, including travel expenses, time spent (opportunity costs), and annoyance (negative utility), are 
then correspondingly higher, in particular if law suits are the consequence.) 
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III. THE DEFINITION OF PATENT LAW HARMONIZATION 
 
  In order to solve these problems caused by diverse patent systems, the harmonization of 
domestic patent laws at the international level84 has understandably attracted considerable 
attention.85  To further examine and explore possible normative grounds for this issue, it is 
necessary first to clarify the meaning and scope of ‘patent law harmonization.’  To this end, it is 
reasonable to commence with the dictionary definition and, subsequently examine other usages 
of the term ‘harmonization.’ 
 
1. Harmonization in General 
 
 Harmonization is not a strictly legal word. ‘Harmonize’ generally means “to be suitable 
together, or to make different people, plans, situations, etc. suitable for each other.”86  For 
example, in the technological field, ‘tariff harmonization’ in customs practice and ‘protocol 
harmonization’ are non-legal examples of usage.  Basically, harmonization, which refers to a 
process, is a movement away from a total diversity of practice.87  Harmony, a type of state, 
                                                          
84 WIPO, supra note 4, at at 1–2. 
85 Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra Note 5, at 87; See generally WIPO, Open Forum on the Draft Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty (SPLT),Geneva, Switz., Mar. 1–3, 2006 [hereinafter WIPO Open Forum], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/scp_of_ge_06_inf1.html (hosting the presentation of papers, 
lectures, and speeches on the international harmonization of patent law). 
86  Meaning of “harmonize” in the English Dictionary, available at 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/harmonize?q=harmonization  
87 J. S. W. Tay & R. H. Parker, Measuring International Harmonization And Standardization, 26 ABACUS 71, 
73 (1990). 
 27 
embodies the associated ‘clustering’ of companies around one or a few of the available 
methods,88 and implicates a reduction in the number of these available methods.89 
 Therefore, harmony and uniformity are not dichotomous.  The former is any point on 
the continuum between the two polar states of total diversity and uniformity, excluding these 
extreme states.90  In other words, uniformity is the final goal of harmonization, and harmony is 
any stage in the process of realizing uniformity.  Harmonization is a process of ascertaining the 
limits of unification, but it does not necessarily amount to a vision of total uniformity.91  These 
ideas can be expressed in the following schematic drawing: 
 
< Figure 1: The Concept of Harmonization92 > 
 
                                                          
88 id. 
89 id. 
90 id. 
91 WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 39 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
(2005). 
92 Tay & Parker, supra note 87, at 73. 
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In this sense, patent law harmonization is the process toward unification. Unifying patent 
law was the old dream and the final goal of patent law harmonization.  This idea of 
harmonization is based on the concept that the creation of uniform patent laws would solve the 
problem caused by fragmented patent systems completely.  Sherwood argues that “a uniform 
intellectual property system makes sense for the world.”93  This idea is further supported by 
Radack who states “the phrase [patent harmonization] refers to efforts to make individual 
national patent laws around the world more uniform.”94   
This idea of a uniform patent system is more clearly characterized by the term “true 
harmonization,” a label which was introduced in 1993 by the United States Assistant Secretary 
of Commerce Bruce Lehman.  Under “true harmonization,” patent applicants would complete 
one prosecution in one patent office for global protection.95  
Former Japanese Patent Office Commissioner, Hisamitsu Arai supported this idea, by 
arguing, “Might it not be possible . . . for a patent granted by the Japanese Patent Office in 
response to an application filed in Japan to be recognized internationally as well?”96  The 
advocates of true harmonization believe that it will create a uniform patent law system that 
simplifies the law, making it easier to receive and enforce patents in many jurisdictions while 
reducing administrative costs.97   For example, the United States’ uniform patent system, 
                                                          
93 ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, WHY A UNIFORM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM MAKES SENSE FOR THE WORLD 
68 (Wallerstein et. al., National Academy Press, 1993) 
94 David V. Radack, Patent Harmonization: Creating uniform patent laws, 49 JOURNAL OF THE MINERALS, 
METALS AND MATERIALS SOCIETY. 66, 66 (1997), available at http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/ 
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95 HAROLD WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION ON THE PACIFIC RIM 20 (Asia Pacific Legal Institute, May 
1995) 
96 ARAI, supra Note 60, at 59. 
97 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH L J. 685, 686 (2002). 
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successfully maintained since 1790, is a testament to this effect.  Before having a single federal 
system, patentees who wanted to use their invention in more than one state had to apply 
separately for patents in each state, which was expensive and time-consuming.98  Thus, a 
standardized national patent law was needed for more efficient patent granting process,99 and it 
was realized by the Patent Act of 1790. 
 
2. Patent Law Harmonization as a Positive Harmonization 
 
In the legal field, the term “harmonization” was widely used in the conflict-of-laws 
context.  Geographically, harmonization of laws is widely discussed in the European Union as it 
moves forward toward greater economic integration.100  The history of European Union can be 
said to be the process of harmonization of laws.101  At first, under founding Treaty of Rome, the 
harmonization of national laws could be done by unanimity.102    Afterwards, the Single 
European Act from 1987 introduced qualified majority voting for most harmonization in the 
internal market.103  From 2009, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the possibility of a qualified 
majority harmonizing EU Law, even in sensitive political areas.104 
                                                          
98 THE ORIGINS OF PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW. BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION (WINTER) 23 (Constitutional 
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99 See id. 
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On the other hand, the legal field where harmonization is successfully achieved is 
international private law – especially commercial and contract law.  Exemplified by the efforts 
of Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, Italy’s Minister of Justice who sought to convene a conference 
for the harmonization of private international law, projects for the unification or harmonization 
of international laws in general have been pursued since the middle of the 19th century.105 It is 
notable that international efforts to harmonize commercial laws have achieved some fruits, such 
as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in 1970.  
To better understand legal harmonization, it is helpful to think two types of 
harmonization using the concepts of liberty articulated by political philosopher Isaiah Berlin.  
In his famous lecture titled “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Berlin differentiated between ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ liberty.  He stated, “[i]f negative liberty is concerned with the freedom to pursue 
one’s interests according to one’s own free will and without ‘interference from external bodies,’ 
then positive liberty takes up the ‘degree to which individuals or groups’ are able to ‘act 
autonomously’ in the first place.” 106 
Specifically, according to Berlin, negative liberty is implicated in responding to this 
question: “What is the area within which the subject . . . is or should be left to do or be what he is 
able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” On the other hand, positive liberty is 
involved in answering “[w]hat, or who, is the source of control . . . that can determine someone 
to do, or be, this rather than that?” 107   
                                                          
105  Britannica Encyclopedia, conflicts of laws, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/333023/ conflict-of-laws/276352/The-nature-of-conflicts-law, last 
visited 10/3/2010. 
106 ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 2 (Oxford University Press 1958) (1969). 
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This classification of liberty can be applied in the categorization of rights: ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ rights.  For example, negative rights are ‘negative’ in the sense that they claim for 
each person a zone of non-interference from others.108  Negative rights can be characterized as a 
claim by one person that imposes a ‘negative’ duty on all others – the duty not to interfere with a 
person's activities in a certain area.109  Negative rights are invoked to protect some form of 
human freedom or liberty, including the right to privacy, the right not to be killed, or the right to 
do what one wants with one's property.110 
On the other hand, positive rights are ‘positive’ in the sense that they claim for each 
person the positive assistance of others in fulfilling basic elements of human well-being such as 
health and education.111 In moral and political philosophy, these basic human needs are often 
referred to as ‘welfare’ concerns.112  Positive rights, therefore, provide a basis for people to 
secure their well-being, such as the right to an education, food, medical care, housing, or job.113  
In addition, positive rights impose a positive duty on us – the duty to actively help a person to 
have or do something.114 
These ideas are useful in categorizing legal harmonization into two types: ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ harmonization.  “Negative-type harmonization” attempts to free private commercial 
activity from government intervention, which is interpreted as an outside force. Harmonization 
of commercial law, as mentioned above, is a good example of harmonization of a ‘negative type.’ 
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As David Kennedy explains, these internationally uniform commercial laws were designed for 
private traders to be disassociated from the messy politics of inter-sovereign negotiations and 
national parliamentary ideological conflicts.115  Another such example is the harmonization of 
copyright law, as copyrights exist when they are created regardless of the government. 
On the other hand, “positive type” harmonization involves an active role from 
governments.  The achievement of positive harmonization requires more than merely not 
acting; just as positive rights impose on us the duty to help sustain the welfare of those who are 
in need of help, positive harmonization requires the government to act in a way that makes laws 
work in harmony.116  Because this type of harmonization requires action from the government 
for the protection of one’s “positive rights,” it can be characterized as positive in nature. 
Harmonization of patent, competition, and public procurement laws serve as examples of 
positive type harmonization.  As these rights are at least tied to the government’s economic goal 
for greater economic prosperity,117 the rights protected by these laws are related to welfare 
rights.  As a result, the effort to harmonize these rights and laws can be explained under the 
name of ‘positive-type’ harmonization. 
Although remarkable achievements have been made in the field of negative law 
harmonization, there has been little overall progress in the field of positive law harmonization.   
This can be attributed to the fact that although it would be relatively easier for countries to agree 
on fundamental rights, and refrain from interfering with these rights.  Rather, it would be 
                                                          
115 David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 
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relatively hard for countries to agree on their economic goals and policies and act in a uniform or 
harmonized way.  Because positive rights are based on a country’s specific economic situations 
and goals which merit protections by law, positive type harmonization can be very difficult to 
achieve. 
 
< Table 1: Positive and Negative Harmonization > 
Type Negative Harmonization Positive Harmonization 
Origin Negative Liberty / Rights Positive Liberty / Rights 
Theoretic 
Foundation 
Natural Rights / Human Rights Economic Rights / Welfare Rights 
Government’s 
Role 
No Interference of Government Active Role of Government 
Example Contract law, Copyright law 
Competition law, 
Public Procurement law 
Evaluation Relatively Easy and Successful Very hard to achieve 
 
As observed above, patent harmonization is one example of positive harmonization.  It 
can potentially include every measure of governments that enables the diverse patent system to 
work in harmony, and require the government to change laws to protect one’s positive rights, or 
patent rights.  Thus, patent harmonization requires the active role of governments, by legislator, 
executives, or courts, which is a typical feature of ‘positive-type’ harmonization. 
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3. Patent Law Harmonization focusing on the Acquisition of Rights 
 
It is undeniable that enforcement is critical to securing patent rights throughout the world.  
There is little value in developing substantive standards of patent protection, if the rights holder 
cannot enforce them effectively through fair and expeditious procedures. This is especially true 
in light of an environment in which modern technologies have significantly facilitated the 
infringement of patents.118  It must be possible for patent owners to stop current infringements, 
prevent future ones, as well as recover losses incurred from such infringements.119  This is why 
the Preamble to the TRIPs Agreement recognizes the need to make available effective and 
appropriate means for the enforcement of such rights.120 
However, it is notable that enforcement has not been the main issue in the history of 
patent harmonization. The scope of patent harmonization to date is limited to the acquisition of 
one’s patent rights, rather than to enforcement. It is because the harmonization of patent 
enforcement necessarily requires the essential harmonization of two main legal traditions – 
common law and civil law – that are differ considerably on some key points, including the value 
of judicial precedents.121  For this reason, TRIPs Preamble merely says that 'differences in 
national legal systems' will be taken into account.122  Rather than attempting to harmonize 
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substantive enforcement rules.123  TRIPs sets certain minimum standards (article 1.1) such that 
the enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement can be compatible with both systems.124  
Whereas, for instance, Part II of TRIPs about the substantive standards for the protection of 
patent rights draws upon the existing body of international intellectual property law extensively, 
Part III of TRIPs – about patent enforcement – incorporates only a few relevant provisions from 
earlier treaties. 125   This reflects an attitude that enforcement issues cannot be solved 
independently, but should be discussed within a bigger frame of legal system harmonization.  
 
 
IV. TWO TYPES OF PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
Based on these characteristics of patent harmonization, this section focuses on analyzing 
several issues and strategies in detail. To do this, it is worth referring to the Korea Intellectual 
Property Office (KIPO)’s categorization that divides the measures for patent law harmonization 
into four categories (Figure 4):126  
                                                          
123 id. at 138 
124 id. at 135 
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126  KOREA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (KIPO), A STUDY ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF PATENT 
EXAMINATION 5 (2008). 
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< Figure 2: The Four Categories of Patent Harmonization127> 
 
(*Patent Prosecution Highway128, **Strategic Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination,129 ***Triway130 ) 
                                                          
127 See id, at 5. 
128 United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) - Fast Track 
Examination of Applications, available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-
protection/patent-prosecution-highway-pph-fast-track. (The Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) speeds up the 
examination process for corresponding applications filed in participating intellectual property offices.  Under PPH, 
participating patent offices have agreed that when an applicant receives a final ruling from a first patent office that at 
least one claim is allowed, the applicant may request fast track examination of corresponding claim(s) in a 
corresponding patent application that is pending in a second patent office. PPH leverages fast-track examination 
procedures already in place among participating patent offices to allow applicants to reach final disposition of a 
patent application more quickly and efficiently than standard examination processing.) 
129 Trilateral Cooperation, Strategic Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination – SHARE, available at 
http://www.trilateral.net/projects/worksharing/share.html (Strategic Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination 
(SHARE) is a USPTO proposed concept in which each office will give priority to examining applications for which 
it is the office of first filing.  This arrangement will maximize work sharing by eliminating timing imbalances that 
currently affect the availability of search and examination results from other offices, in turn reducing redundancy. 
The Office of Second filing will use the search and examination results from the Office of First Filing " to the 
maximum extent practicable", a concept endorsed by the Trilateral Offices.   The Offices will explore approaches 
for a pilot project, including the incorporation into the pilot of the EPO's FOCUS project.). 
130  Trilateral Cooperation, Triway, available at http://www.trilateral.net/projects/worksharing/triway.html 
(Triway is a USPTO "search sharing proposal" in which a corresponding application must be filed in each of the 
Trilateral Offices and each application must be ready for examination (e.g. a request for examination must be filed, 
if one is necessary).  This must include any required request for expedited examination, if appropriate. Searches 
will be conducted prior to substantive examination and shared among the offices and applicant, who will have an 
opportunity to amend or withdraw.  The Trilateral Offices agreed at the November 2007 Trilateral Pre-conference 
to undertake a limited pilot programme.). 
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First, patent law harmonization can be classified as “procedural” or “substantive.” 
Procedural issues deal with the forms and processes for the filing of applications. Procedural 
harmonization focuses on providing a filing tool for applicants to file foreign patents, and also 
suggesting a route for other patent offices to effectively process patent applications if they are 
willing to exploit work done by other patent offices.131 In short, procedural harmonization 
addresses requirements relating to the form and method of patent applications. It does not deal 
with the requirements of patentability in substantive patent law; rather, it focuses on providing 
tools which allow many countries to effectively deal with the requirements of their substantive 
patent laws. The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is an example of a treaty which focuses on 
procedural harmonization. 
On the other hand, substantive cooperation covers standards and rules for the granting 
patents. Substantive harmonization is often called “deep harmonization,” which not only entails 
the drafting, filing, and examination of patent applications, but also the cornerstone requirements 
of patentability.132  The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPs) is a representative 
treaty based on the idea of substantive harmonization. 
In addition, one can categorize a certain kind of cooperation based on whether it is of a 
“legal” or “administrative” nature.  This describes whether the particular kind of cooperation 
requires a change in patent law, or not.  For example, the patentability requirement is a 
legislative or legal element because it should be clearly written in the patent laws.  On the other 
                                                          
131  WIPO, The Need For Improving The Functioning Of The PCT System, PCT/WG/3/2 (2010), at 19, 
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World-Wide Protection of Industrial Property” in Frank Gotzen, ed, The Future of Intellectual Property in the 
Global Market of the Information Society (Bruylant, 2003) 89 at 97. 
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hand, decision made by examiners, and the process of search and examination, are administrative 
functions, which the patent office generally has much discretion within its legal framework.  
The administrative aspects of a patent system can also be an important issue for harmonization, 
because a Patent Office’s rulemaking, adjudication, or enforcement of a specific regulatory 
agenda can strongly influence the actual operation of patent laws.133 
 
 
V. ISSUES AROUND TWO TYPES OF PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, widely accepted and fundamental assumption is that 
patent harmonization is a necessary and urgent matter.  In order to solve the problems of 
fragmented patent systems fundamentally, arguments have been made that we need substantive 
harmonization.  It is because the problems of application cost, examination delay, uncertainty 
and unpredictability can be solved only when countries have similar, or harmonized, patent laws.  
Based on this recognition, two notable international agreements were concluded with 
regard to substantive harmonization: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
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Property Rights (TRIPS).134  First, the Paris Convention, concluded in 1883 and amended in 
1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 1956, 1967 and 1993, is considered to be the first multilateral 
agreement in the field of patent law harmonization.135   It guarantees national treatment, 
allowing the inventors from any signatory nation to claim priority in other nations based on the 
filing date of its first application, as embodied in Article 4. 136  Specifically, Article 4(A) (2) of 
the Paris Convention ties its requirement of patent priority to an “application for a patent … in 
one of the countries of the Union.”137  Article 4(A) (2) also provides that “[a]ny filing that is 
equivalent to a regular national filing under the domestic legislation of any country of the Union 
or under bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between countries of the Union shall be 
recognized as giving rise to the right of priority.”   
On the basis of the Paris Convention, the TRIPS agreement established a set of minimum 
international standards of protection in some 150 participating countries within the WTO 
frame.138  Particularly, the TRIPS Agreement sweeps away national limitations on patents 
protection by stating in the first sentence of Article 27(1) that “patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”139  Unlike prior Intellectual 
Property conventions, The TRIPs Agreement provided an effective dispute settlement 
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mechanism.140  Countries failing to comply with the TRIPS Agreement standards could be 
subjected to trade retaliation if WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism determined the existence 
of a case of non-compliance with the Agreement.141 
However, substantive harmonization is not an easily attainable goal because it requires 
too much time and effort.  It has been proven by long history that the harmonization of 
substantive law will necessarily result in high financial and social costs in order to modify 
domestic legal systems, and would cause a serious political issue in national congress, resulting 
in heated debates and conflicting interests among various lobbying groups.  
Moreover, suggestions for substantive harmonization are not easily acceptable to 
countries that lack competitive systems for patent protection, which are mainly developing 
countries.  It is apparent that the implementation of substantive harmonization, such as the 
TRIPS Agreement, involves the amendment of existing legislation, the adoption of new 
legislation, the strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights administration, and the development 
of enforcement capacity.142  All of these entail huge financial cost, especially for developing 
countries.  For example, a UNCTAD’s study in table 2 demonstrates the required reform and 
the estimated cost in selected countries.143   
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< Table 2: UNCTAD Case study related to estimated costs for reform and capacity building144> 
Country Reforms Needed Costs in US $ 
Bangladesh Draft new laws, improve enforcement 
$250,000 one-time plus 
$1.1 million annually 
Chile 
Draft new laws, train staff administering IPR 
laws 
$718,000 one-time plus 
$837,000 annually 
Egypt Train staff administering IPR laws $1.8 million 
India Modernize Patent Office $5.9 million 
Tanzania Draft new laws, develop enforcement capability $1.0 ~ 1.5 million 
 
In addition, developing countries are often opposed to an international obligation for 
substantive harmonization, because it would limit their discretion and policy tools.  Because 
developing countries do not have much in the way of patent backlogs or innovative industries, 
they want their patent policies to be as flexible as possible to encourage economic development.  
They believe that every country must design its patent system according to its level of industrial 
development; and that global substantive harmonization will constrain their governments from 
using patents as tools to devise particular economic and industrial policies.145   
For example, it has been reported by the WIPO that the TRIPS Agreement in fact 
restricts the freedom of developing countries from fine-tuning their patent systems in line with 
their level of techno-economic development.146  In this sense, Reichman and Dreyfuss argue 
that “it is unwise to move to deep substantive harmonization [because] these standards challenge 
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the technological catch-up strategies of all the developing countries and saddle them with social 
costs [that] they are struggling to absorb.”147  
 It is clear that developed countries and international societies think that it is imperative 
to deliver meaningful outcomes of substantive harmonization in a very near-term timeframe, 
considering the frustration of business sectors and the increasing number of patent backlogs.148  
If too much delay occurs, the fragmented patent system could jeopardize the patent system itself 
and continue a vicious cycle of uncertainty and economic waste.  However, there are strong 
oppositions from developing countries for economic and political reasons, as discussed above. 
In this situation, it is worth discussing procedural harmonization first as a practical and 
effective solution that can bear fruits in the near term.  Procedural harmonization can lead to 
practical benefits by providing a uniform filing tool for foreign applicants, and by suggesting a 
route for effective processing of applications if Patent Offices involve the exploitation of work 
done by others.149  As procedural harmonization does not deal with the requirements of 
patentability in substantive patent law, but focuses on providing administrative tools that many 
countries can easily cooperate with, it can help relieve the problem of fragmented patent systems 
without causing serious conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PROCEDURAL HARMONIZATION 
 
 
I. THE VALUE OF PROCEDURAL HARMONIZATION 
 
It is widely accepted that a uniform patent procedure can benefit inventors throughout the 
world.  In fact, there is not much opposition to procedural harmonization, as it does not discuss 
substantive legal issues regarding patent rights. 150   In other words, because procedural 
harmonization mainly focuses on administrative measures that do not necessarily require the 
changing of laws, they can be attained much more easily with relatively low costs.  Procedural 
harmonization can focus on the patent prosecution process, and exclude questions of rights, 
enforcement or infringement, which necessarily require legal bases.  Thus, they usually do not 
require concluding treaties or conventions which are accompanied by political debate or legal 
rectification; rather, they can be implemented by cooperation among some interested Patent 
Offices.  This chapter investigates the possibility, costs, benefits, and limitations of this 
practical cooperation that can help the obtaining of a patent faster and cheaper. 
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II. STRATEGIES FOR WORK-SHARING 
 
Procedural harmonization is often known as “work-sharing.”151  Work-sharing can be an 
important part of patent harmonization as it helps Patent Offices to better understand each other’s 
work methods,152 and gradually makes each country cooperate with others through rulemaking, 
adjudication, and implementation, without the amendment of patent laws.  Therefore, the 
director of the USPTO David Kappos affirms that harmonization through work-sharing “allows 
us to [both] reduce pendency and improve quality.”153 
 
1. The Stage of Work-Sharing 
 
The purpose of work-sharing is simple but strong: “to eliminate unnecessary duplication 
of work among the offices, and enhance patent examination efficiency and quality.”154  If an 
applicant files a patent application to a patent office, the application will be examined through 
the following procedure: filing, prior-art search, office action, and patent decision.155  If the 
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applicant files the application with multiple patent offices, each patent office will examine the 
application independently by following its own patent laws and administrative rules to determine 
patentability.  Apparently, it is inefficient and wasteful for patent granting authorities to do 
virtually the same work day after day on thousands of duplicated patent applications.156   
Thus, in order to secure efficient and reliable examination, it is necessary to share the 
information in each and every stage of this examination procedure.  This includes search 
strategies, search results, and examination results for applications directed to the same 
invention.157  Technically, as a process of sharing information, patent work-sharing necessarily 
implicates deferred examination for a significant percentage of patent applications.  For patent 
applications with a foreign origin, this means a “second office” must await information 
processed and provided by a “first office.”158   
One can think of three kinds of work-sharing based on the kinds of information that is 
shared between the first and second offices.159  First, Patent Offices can share and mutually 
exploit the information of searching prior arts.  This process can be called “search-sharing.”  
By using information from other offices, a particular office can reduce search time and reinforce 
the search result of prior art. As explained below, the “Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)” and the 
“Triway Project” suggested by USPTO is a good example of this type of sharing. 
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Second, it is possible for offices to share the examination information including office 
action in the process of examination.  This is called “action-sharing.”  Through action-sharing, 
a second office can use it as a basis for decision making, or construct other points of view, or 
anticipate the result of patent decision or office action.  The “New Route” suggested by JPO or 
the “SHARE” project proposed by USTPO, as described below, are examples of action-sharing.   
Finally, it is possible for an office to cooperate with other offices by sharing its final 
decision.  This is called “decision-sharing.”  The second office can use the decision of the first 
office as a basis for deciding whether to grant a patent.  From the applicant’s point of view, 
decision-sharing allows him to anticipate the decision of the patent application.  The Patent 
Prosecution Highway (PPH), described below, is a typical example of this process.  The three 
types of work-sharing are shown in figure 3: 
 
< Figure 3: Three kinds of Work-sharing between Patent Offices > 
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2. The First Work-Sharing: Search-Sharing 
 
All national patent laws and TRIPS Agreement require novelty to obtain a patent.  
When an applicant seeks patent protection in multiple jurisdictions, each of the Patent Offices 
performs a separate and independent novelty search on the same invention.160  Each Patent 
Office performing such a search would examine all documents available before the latest filing 
date, thereby covering any document that is relevant in any territory.161  And, subject to a few 
exceptions162, prior art that would defeat novelty in one jurisdiction will also defeat novelty in 
others, which means that each of the multiple offices is searching roughly the same body of prior 
art and comparing it to the same invention.163   
On this background, search-sharing means mutually exploiting the strategy and results of 
a search.  The second office can fully recognize the first office’s search result, or it can just 
refer to the result in its own search of prior art.  Search-sharing has a limited role only in prior-
art search, and Patent Offices still retain the ultimate responsibility and discretion to decide 
granting patents.164  Thus, search-sharing could be a fair starting point for broader work-sharing 
because it only provides information necessary for decision-making, and differing national laws 
                                                          
160 ICC, supra Note 157, at 4. 
161 id. 
162 NEVIN CARMICHAEL, ABSOLUTE NOVELTY AND FOREIGN GRACE PERIOD PATENT PROVISIONS 1, available at 
http://inhousecommunity.com/controlPanel/download.php?id=476&download=1. (the majority of jurisdictions 
around the world adopts an absolute novelty standard when defining prior art. Notable countries that adopt such 
general statutory grace periods are for example the United States (twelve months) and Japan (six months). Other 
countries include for example Malaysia (twelve months), Australia (twelve months), South Korea (six months), 
Taiwan (six months), Canada (twelve months), Mexico(twelve months), Brazil (twelve months), South Korea (six 
months), Russia (six months), and Panama (twelve months).). 
163 id. 
164 ICC, supra Note 157, at 2. 
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would present no barrier to such a search.  Also, even if the search examiner lacks experience in 
the appropriate field of law of one or other countries, search-sharing most likely does not pose a 
significant technical problem.165   
Moreover, the language is not a big impediment of patents search-sharing.  As a 
practical matter, examiners depend on the universal language such as drawings, pictures, and 
math formulas to find relevant prior art, rather than reading the full description of publications.  
Thus, for patent examiners, extensive databases of prior-art, advanced searching strategies, and 
trustworthy relevant information are useful and important.  These can be supplemented by 
search-sharing.  Search sharing can effectively reduce the costs for applicants and Patent 
Offices, considering that the cost of a comprehensive and coordinated search that is conducted in 
two or more offices will inevitably be greater than the search cost of a single office.166  
Furthermore, search-sharing can alleviate the problem of later-invalidated patents caused by 
different prior-art search.167 
In fact, this search-sharing is already realized within the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) structure. Signed in 1970, the PCT greatly streamlined and simplified the process for 
securing patent protection in multiple countries,168  as many as 142 countries in 2010.169  
Specifically, PCT created a uniform legal route to file an international patent application in 
                                                          
165 See id, at 6. 
166 id. 
167 id. 
168 Wendy H. Schacht and John R. Thomas, Patent Reform: Innovation Issues, CRS Report RL32996 at 8, July 
15, 2005, at 19. 
169  World Intellectual Property Organization(WIPO), PCT Contracting States, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/ guide/en/gdvol1/annexes/annexa/ax_a.pdf. 
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several countries by a single domestic filing.  It also allows filing a single application, 
performing an international prior art search, and giving international publication.170  
In particular, the PCT procedure consists of two main phases: the “international phase” 
and “national phase.”171  The first step of the international phase consists of (1) the applicant’s 
filing of the international application and its processing by the “receiving Office”, (2) the 
establishment of the international search report and written opinion by one of the “International 
Searching Authorities (ISA)”, and (3) the publication of the international application and the 
international search report by the International Bureau of WIPO.172  Optional steps include (1) 
the establishment of a supplementary international search, which may be carried out by one or 
more of the ISAs resulting in a supplementary international search report, and (2) the 
international preliminary examination, which concludes with the establishment of the 
international preliminary report on patentability by one of the “International Preliminary 
Examining Authorities (IPEA)”.173   
On completion of the international phase, an applicant must carry out further actions in 
each of the national Offices where the applicant wishes to receive a patent on the basis of his 
international application.174  In particular, the applicant must pay the national Offices the 
required national fees, furnish them with any requisite translations, and appoint a representative 
                                                          
170 Mengistie, supra note 135, at 18. 
171 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), THE PCT APPLICANT'S GUIDE, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol1/pdf/gdvol1.pdf (The expression “national phase” is used even if the Office 
before which it takes place is a regional Office. The expressions “international phase” and “national phase” are not 
actually used in the PCT, but they are convenient, short expressions which have become customary and are therefore 
used in this Guide.). 
172 id. 
173 id. 
174 id. 
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(patent agent) where required.175  An applicant must take these steps within a fixed time to 
move the application forward in the national phase.  
The drafters of the PCT expected that Examining Offices or International Searching 
Authorities (ISA) would create substantial economies, since the system renders all or most of the 
work involved in searching superfluous and help Patent Office decide by issuing an international 
preliminary examination report.176  This process also helps the applicant by eliminating the 
need to apply for multiple patents in multiple jurisdictions.  In fact, the PCT is considered the 
most successful mechanism in international patent cooperation, as reflected in its growing 
number of patent applications.177 
However, under the current system many designated and elected Offices do not consider 
the international search as of high enough quality, and repeat the search when the application 
enters the national phase. 178   To overcome this problem of PCT, it is necessary to 
institutionalize the exploitation or recognition of search reports by Patent Offices.  This requires 
embedding trust and confidence in the quality of the examinations based on the examiner, data 
base, and search strategy of other Patent Offices.  As trust and credibility improve, so will the 
utility of search-sharing, from mere reference to full recognition of the prior-art search report.  
Accordingly, more efficient and reliable work-sharing is plausible. 
                                                          
175 id. 
176 id. 
177 id.; Cumulative number of PCT application reached one million in 2005, two million in 2012, three million 
in Feb 2017; WIPO, Cumulative number of PCT application 1978-2017, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pct/images/pct_3million-animation.gif (last visited Feb 03, 2017) 
178 UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (UKIPO), INFORMAL CONSULTATION ON REFORM OF 
THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) 7, available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-pct.pdf. 
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These aspirations are widely supported by international organization and practitioners.  
In agreeing with the necessity and viability of search-sharing, International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) argues that “continued and improved cooperation between patent offices of an 
early coordinated comprehensive search would create efficiencies for patent offices.” 179  
Former Commissioner of the Japan Patent Office, Hisamitsu Arai, also supported this argument 
by maintaining that “the first stage [toward global patent] is to get agreement on the sharing and 
mutual recognition of prior-art search results.”180  Emphasizing the necessity of search-sharing 
among three countries – U.S., EU and Japan, Arai wrote this:  
“There is, for example, an application pending in the U.S. for a patent on a DNA 
sequence.  This is a single patent, but it is expected that it will cost the patent office about 9,100 
dollars to ascertain whether or not the same basic application has already been filed, or the 
information is already commonly known.  It would be very wasteful to have to duplicate this 
effort in Japan and Europe.  If one patent office has conducted a prior-art search, it would make 
sense for the other jurisdictions to recognize those search results.  An ordinary filing in Japan 
currently costs 191 dollars, and it is impossible for the JPO to hope to break even if it has to 
spend about 9,100 dollars just for ascertaining patentability.  Likewise, business would prefer 
not to spend the time and money filing the same application in three different regions.”181   
In reality, many international efforts are underway to improve search-sharing.  Since 
2005, UK Intellectual Property Office contracted with the Danish Patent and Trade Mark Office 
                                                          
179 ICC, supra Note 157, at 2. 
180 ARAI, supra Note 60, at 60. 
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and the Netherlands Intellectual Property Office for mutual exploitation of search results.182  
And within the framework of Trilateral Cooperation183 by three major patent offices in patent 
application – the European, Japanese, and the U.S., the “Triway” project suggested by USPTO is 
targeting the promotion of search-sharing by eliminating certain timing issues.  Specifically, it 
provides applicants and Offices with the Trilateral Offices’ search results within a short period of 
time in order to give applicants and Trilateral Offices an opportunity to share and consider all of 
the Trilateral search results.184  The pilot program was tested among three countries from 2008 
to 2009.   
Later on, as South Korea and China gained leverage in the patent field, the five major 
patent offices with high filing numbers have started a meeting called “IP5.”  Since October 
2008, the Five IP Offices (IP5) have been engaged in ten collaborative projects known as the 
Foundation Projects, which include projects of “Common Access to Search and Examination 
Results (One Portal Dossier)”.185   
                                                          
182 UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (UKIPO), THE PATENT OFFICE CORPORATE PLAN 2005 
23 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about-plan2005.pdf. 
183  See id; See also Trilateral Cooperation, The objective of Trilateral Cooperation, available at  
http://www.trilateral.net/about/objectives.html: This long lasting co-operation is aimed at; 
• Improving the quality of examination processes and reducing the processing time of patent applications 
• Improving the quality of incoming applications 
• Developing common infrastructure and compatible data for electronic business systems and search tools 
• Solving common problems related to the protection of industrial property rights;  
• Harmonizing practices of the three Offices 
• Promoting the dissemination of the technical information contained in patents;  
• Deepening awareness of the benefits of the patent system; and  
• Exploiting the full potential of work performed by the other Trilateral Offices in search, examination, 
documentation and electronic tools 
184 USPTO, Triway Pilot Among USPTO, EPO, and JPO, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/ 
triwaypilot.html. 
185 Five IP Offices, available at http://www.fiveipoffices.org/obj.html, The Foundation Projects of the Five IP 
Offices are (http://www.fiveipoffices.org/projects.html): 
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In summary, search-sharing is the fair starting point for further harmonizing efforts.  
Based on the successful operation of search-sharing, countries can advance to more cooperation 
such as decision-sharing and action-sharing, which will be discussed below. 
 
3. The Second Work-Sharing: Decision-Sharing 
 
Decision-sharing refers to the second office’s sharing of the final decision of the first 
office, and using it as a basis to decide whether the second office will grant a patent.186  This is 
often called “mutual exploitation of examination results.”  Many advantages arise in the Second 
Office when its patent examiners can use the prior examiner’s opinion, information on 
examination, prior-art search, and office action as reference materials.  Even though the final 
decision on patentability remains solely with the Second Office, and the information from the 
initial Office can be of somewhat limited use due to differences in substantive patent law, the 
initial Office’s examination is helpful in constructing a rationale for granting or rejecting an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
• Common Documentation (lead: EPO) 
• Common Hybrid Classification (lead: EPO) 
• Common Access to Search and Examination Results (lead: JPO) 
• Common Application Format (lead: JPO) 
• Common Training Policy (lead: KIPO) 
• Mutual Machine Translation (lead: KIPO) 
• Common Examination Practice Rules and Quality Management (lead: SIPO) 
• Common Statistical Parameter System for Examination (lead: SIPO) 
• Common Approach to Sharing and Documenting Search Strategies (lead: USPTO)   
• Common Search and Examination Support Tools (lead: USPTO) 
186 KIPO, supra Note 126, at 33. 
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application.  Thus, when applications are filed in multiple patent offices, decision-sharing could 
significantly reduce the amount of work required in examinations.187 
A powerful example of decision-sharing is the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), 
which is a set of initiatives that provide accelerated patent prosecution procedures in second 
patent offices by sharing information about decisions.188  Specifically, under the PPH, an 
applicant receiving a ruling from the Office of First Filing (OFF) that at least one claim in his 
application is patentable, may request that the Office of Second Filing (OSF) fast track the 
examination of corresponding claims in corresponding applications filed in the OSF. 189  
Overwhelming evidence proves that international applicants such as multi-national corporations 
can enjoy quicker and reliable patentability determinations in multiple jurisdictions through 
PPH.190  In addition, the application costs to “enter the highway” is approximately only 20 ~ 
                                                          
187 LONDON ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC STUDY ON PATENT BACKLOGS AND A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION – 
FINAL REPORT TO THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE 77 (2010). 
188  American Intellectual Property Law Association, Patent Prosecution Highway: A Key Strategy for 
Reducing Patent Backlogs (May 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?Section=Press_Releases &Template=/ 
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=25150; See also http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ 
init_events/pph/index.jsp (As of October, 2010, USPTO made an PPH agreement with 13 countries: Austrailia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, United 
Kingdom.); See also http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e/t_torikumi_e/patent_highway_e.htm (JPO (Japan Patent 
Office) made with 13 countries: the United States, South Korea, the United Kingdon, Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
Russia, Austria, Singapore, Hungary, Canada, EU, and Spain.); See also http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-pph-kipo-agree 
(The UKIPO (United Kingdom Intellectual Property office) has only 3 agreements with the United States, Japan, 
and Korea.). 
189 United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPOT), Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) - Fast Track 
Examination of Applications (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/pph/index.jsp. 
190 AIPLA REPORTS, AIPLA MEETING OF PATENT FILERS, USPTO, AND JPO CONFIRMS GREAT SUCCESS OF 
PPH 1 (May 20, 2010), http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/About_AIPLA1/AIPLA_Reports/20106/ 
100520AIPLAReports.pdf (Representatives of Microsoft and IBM confirmed the performance statistics of the 
USPTO and JPO.  Microsoft’s statistics for its use of PPH in Japan as the Office of second filing showed: 73% 
allowance rate for PPH cases, 1.25 Office Actions from PPH-request to allowance, 1.9 months from PPH request to 
first Office Action, and 8.7 months from PPH request or examination to allowance.  Consistent with Microsoft’s 
numbers was IBM’s experience in Japan: 86.7% allowance rate for PPH cases, 1.3 Office Actions from PPH-request 
to allowance, 49 days from PPH-request to first Office Action.). 
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30% of the cost incurred in pursuing examination through its current program.  For the 
participating Offices, the PPH process avoids redundant works and reduces pendency.191   
However, the usefulness of decision-sharing is limited because multiple applications will 
not be examined until the First Office entirely finishes examination.  In other words, because 
the examinations in multiple Patent Offices are processed serially, not in a parallel manner, the 
total time for obtaining multiple patents might be longer. In addition, under a decision-sharing 
model, all claims in the office of second filing must be limited to the claim scope allowed in the 
office of first filing, which can result in narrower claims than if the applications were prosecuted 
separately in each country.192   
As a result, the utility of decision-sharing depends on several issues between two 
countries involved: congruence of substantive standards, trust of examination, and language.  
For the first, decision-sharing is useful especially when substantive patent law is harmonized.  
Understandably, decision-sharing is especially useful for patent examiners when they receive 
examination results from countries with similar rules and standards to their own.  If two 
countries share similar rules of patentability, the second office can dramatically reduce the need 
for further examination.  This is evidenced in a KIPO report, where a Japanese applicant who 
used a PPH to file his second application in Korea – where the substantive patent law is almost 
                                                          
191 See id (The USPTO statistics showed: 93% allowance rate for PPH cases, compared to a 44% rate for non-
PPH cases, 1.7 actions per disposal for PPH cases, compared to 2.7 actions for non-PPH cases, 20% reduction in the 
number of claims, and 18-month decrease in pendency for some technologies. JPO also cited the speed of the PPH 
process, noting that PPH applications in the JPO, as the Office of second filing, have averaged a 1.9 month 
pendency to first action, compared to 29.3 month pendency for non-PPH applications.  From first to final action, 
Niidome reported an average of 6.9 months, compared with 10.5 months for non-PPH applications.). 
192 Alicia Pitts and Joshua Kim, The Patent Prosecution Highway: Is Life in the ‘Fast Lane’ Worth the Cost?, 1 
HASTINGS SCI. AND TECH. L.J. 127, 141 (2009). 
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identical to that of Japan – gained huge benefits from using PPH.193  In one case, an applicant in 
Japan obtained a patent decision from Korea in only 28 days by using PPH.194  
Moreover, decision-sharing should be based on the same trust and confidence that is 
required in search-sharing.  The increased amount of information involved in decision-sharing 
requires the whole examination process to be viewed with wider and broader trust.  Even 
though countries might differ in their substantive law, a country could issue patents by decision-
sharing if it strongly believes and confides in the quality of patents granted by other countries.   
Israel is an excellent example of attempt to implement these principles.  If an applicant 
for an Israeli patent successfully obtained a patent on a parallel application filed in any other 
patent office on a published list, Article 17(c) of the Israeli Patents Law requires the Israeli 
Patent Office to “deem” the application compliant with the basic validity requirements of Israeli 
law (including novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement). 195   Currently, Israel’s list of 
acceptable Patent Offices includes the USPTO, the European Patent Office (EPO), and the 
national patent offices of Austria, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, 
Russia, Japan, and Canada.196  Thus, a party seeking an Israeli patent may choose one of eleven 
foreign patent offices within which most of the examination can occur.197  Without trust, 
applicants could abuse Israel’s decision-sharing as a backdoor to hastily obtain an Israeli patent; 
this would eventually result in a deterioration of the patent’s quality. 
                                                          
193 KIPO, supra Note 126, at 79. 
194 See id. 
195 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending The Patenting Monopoly, 157 UPENN L. REV. 1541, 1566 
(2009). 
196 See id; See also Posting of Michael Factor to The IP Factor, Israel Patent Office Relaxes Conditions for 
Modified Examination, http://blog.ipfactor.co.il/2009/01/14/israelpatent-office-relaxes-conditions-for-modified-
examination (Jan. 14, 2009). 
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The final consideration is language.  Language may be one of the most practical and 
fundamental hurdles in discussing harmonization.  Countries require patent applications to be 
written in their own language, and issue office actions and decisions in their own language as 
well.  To share decisional information, examiners must understand patent applications written 
in highly technical and specialized terms, and examiner opinions which define the legal rights 
and scope of patents.  Decision-sharing is impossible if examiners cannot understand the 
documentation.  Thus, to facilitate decision-sharing between countries using different 
languages, accurate translations should be elaborated in advance. In short, participating countries 
could enjoy the benefits of decision-sharing if they find similarities in their patent laws, 
demonstrate strong trust, and agree on a same language.  The effective use of decision-sharing 
will lead to mutual recognition of patents, which will be discussed later.  
 
4. The Third Work-Sharing: Action-Sharing 
 
“Action-sharing” defines the process in which offices share information about prior-art 
search results and office action.  In action-sharing, OFF (Office of First Filed) has priority to 
conduct the first action in searching and examining prior art.  Action-sharing is the sharing of 
information between searching prior-art and concluding examination, but it can be particularly 
helpful in cases where the examining speed of two offices is so different that it is difficult for the 
offices to timely use information to share the workload.  In this case, this structure of action-
sharing is helpful to synchronize examination.  
 58 
For example, a 2004 study conducted by the Trilateral Offices showed that for USPTO-
JPO/JPO-USPTO cross-filings, USPTO produced first action results prior to JPO first action in 
about 90% of cases, whereas JPO produced first action results prior to USPTO first action in 
only about 10% of cases.198  The study revealed that the timing of the availability of Office of 
First Filing (OFF) search and examination results relative to Office of Second Filing (OSF) 
pendency is far from optimal, posing a major obstacle to work-sharing.199  Given the high 
volume of JPO-USPTO filings, this disparity represented a significant loss to the USPTO in 
potential efficiency gains.200  To address this problem, USPTO proposed a program known as 
SHARE, or Strategic Handling of Applications for Rapid Examination.  Under SHARE, The 
Office of Second filing will use the search and examination results from the Office of First Filing 
“to the maximum extent practicable” to eliminate timing imbalances.201  This action-sharing 
synchronizes time for efficient examination and improves the quality of examination in the 
Second Filing Office by using the information from the First Office as a basis for its decision 
process, constructing other points of view or anticipating the result of patent decision or office 
action.202  As one can see in this case, action-sharing could be an additional consideration when 
there is particular time-difference or difficulties that make cooperation inefficient.   
 
 
                                                          
198 PETER N. FOWLER, INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND NORMS TO ADDRESS EMERGING IP CHALLENGES 16 (Mar. 
2010), available at http://www.oapi.wipo.net/edocs/mdocs/aspac/en/wipo_inn_tyo_10/wipo_inn_tyo_10_theme01b 
_04.pdf. 
199 id. 
200 id. 
201 See TRILATERAL OFFICE, supra Note 129. 
202 KIPO, supra Note 126, at 33. 
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5. Summary 
 
There are many promising measures of work-sharing available. First of all, search-
sharing is the most viable and practical way.  It only provides information and resources to 
decide patentability, and many Patent Offices may feel much more comfortable in joining this 
cooperation as long as they still retain their discretion and authority to administer the 
examination process.  To realize search-sharing, it is necessary to construct trust and confidence 
in the search results done by counterparts.  Second, decision-sharing should be built on the 
foundation of search-sharing.  In decision-sharing, examiners in the Second Office could enjoy 
a larger amount of reference data and record produced by other Offices.  However, unless the 
patent law is similar, the examination is trustworthy, and the examiners could understand the 
record, the availability of this information would be substantially limited.  In this situation, 
decision-sharing could be harmful by delaying the examining procedure until the end of the first 
office’s examination.  Finally, action-sharing functions as a supplementary tool.  If one could 
find specific conditions that fit its use, such as different examination speeds between two offices, 
it could be used on a case-by-case basis. 
These three work-sharing mechanisms are summarized in table 2.  Based on this 
analysis, a step-by-step approach is suggested.  Starting from search-sharing, countries with 
common backgrounds and interests could push towards decision-sharing.  In this process of 
harmonization, offices could consider the supplementation of harmonization by action-sharing.  
Former Commissioner of the Japan Patent Office Hisamitsu Arai introduced a 4-stage-approach 
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toward true harmonization and global patents: the first stage consists of countries’ agreeing on 
the sharing and mutual recognition of prior-art search results; the second stage is to recognize 
each other’s patents; the third stage is to implement trilateral patents between U.S., Europe, and 
Japan; and the fourth stage is to extend worldwide in order to provide a truly global patent 
system.203  This notion is well consistent with the arguments in this paper because it suggests 
that harmonization’s trajectory begins from search-sharing to decision-sharing, and from 
procedural to substantive cooperation. 
 
< Table 2: Three Kinds of Work-sharing > 
 Search-sharing Action-sharing Decision-sharing 
Applicability Universal Case-by-base Limited 
Condition to 
Enhance 
Usefulness 
Trust and Confidence of Work 
- Timing Imbalance Similarity of Law 
- - Language 
Shared 
Information 
Small Middle Large 
Advantage Broad cooperation Tailored application 
Maximum information 
sharing 
Disadvantage 
Small advantage and 
effect 
Need to investigate 
timing imbalance in 
examination procedure 
Serial, not parallel, 
examination 
Example Triway, IP5, UKIPO One-Route, SHARE PPH, Israel Patent Law 
                                                          
203 ARAI, supra Note 60, at 60. 
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE WORK-SHARING 
 
Currently, the U.S., EU and Japan are leading the discussion of procedural 
harmonization or work-sharing.204  It is understandable that these offices have direct interests in 
harmonization due to their high number of patent applications, duplicated filing, and patent 
backlogs; as a result, once harmonization is realized, its influence on these offices would be 
substantial.  However, work-sharing has universal applicability which can be applied more 
broadly and to other offices.  More offices can participate in this cooperation, and more diverse 
forms of cooperation can be considered.  Following are the suggestions which might represent 
useful and attainable cooperation based on the strategy of work-sharing.  
 
1. Language-based Cooperation 
 
Language may be one of the most fundamental impediments in achieving harmonization.  
For applicants, a substantial portion of application costs consists in the cost of translating files.  
When applying for a patent in the U.S. or Japan, the translation costs can consume up to 36% of 
the total application cost.205  Moreover, for Patent Offices, work-sharing assumes that the 
                                                          
204 FIVEIPOFFICES, Those countries are the main members of trilateral Cooperation or IP5 Cooperation, and this 
shows that the most important criterion for finding partners to harmonize is the number of applicants., available at 
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/. 
205 WIPO, supra Note 56, at 51. 
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shared information is written in a language that the patent examiner can understand.  If the 
material is written in a language that the examiner cannot understand, even a well-defined work-
sharing mechanism or database would not work.  In fact, the vast range of languages in the 
patent system most likely hampers harmonization: within the IP 5 circle, there are 6 languages – 
English, Japanese, French, Germany, Korean, and Chinese.206  And, there are 23 official 
languages within the European Union.207   
To confront this linguistic diversity that delays and impairs cooperation, countries have 
depended on machine translation.  In 2008, IP 5 offices announced a project for “Mutual 
Machine Translation” to help offices overcome the language barrier of patent information and 
allow greater access to each other’s patent information.208  In 2010, The EPO and Google 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to improve access to patent translations in multiple 
languages.209  But considering that patent applications and decisions are highly technical and 
sophisticated documents that should describe the legal rights and scope of patents, machine 
translations do not seem to be a prominent solution.  For example, Chisum and Farmer have 
expressed concerns that inventive steps can be lost in transition, and patent translation errors can 
affect the legal determinations of claim scope.210   
                                                          
206 European Patent Office, Filing an application, available at http://www.epo.org/patents/Grant-procedure/ 
Filing-an-application.html (Three official languages in EPO: English, French, and Germany) 
207 EUROPA, EU at a glance, available at http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/languages/index_en.htm 
(23 official languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish and 
Swedish) 
208 USPTO, Press Release (Oct 31, 2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/08-
38.htm. 
209 EPO, Topics –News (Nov 30, 2010), available at http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2010/20101130.html. 
210 Donald S. Chisum and Stacey J. Farmer, ‘Lost in translation’: the legal impact of patent translation errors 
on claim scope 289, PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF COMTEMPORARY RESEARCh, Edited by Toshiko 
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In view of this, pragmatic gains would result if countries with the same language could 
discuss harmonization with one another; for example, English groups (e.g. the U.S, England, 
Canada, and Australia), Spanish groups (e.g. Spain, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile), French 
groups (e.g. France, Canada, and Switzerland) and Chinese groups (China and Taiwan).  In 
addition, because countries with the same language tend to share common cultural backgrounds 
and legal heritage, it might be easy to find common denominators for cooperation in these cases.   
In fact, two kinds of inter-governmental institutions in Africa are discussing 
harmonization based on their common language.  OAPI (Organisation Africaine de la Propriété 
Intellectuelle: The African Intellectual Property Organization)211 is an institution composed of 
16 countries who use French, and ARIPO (African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization)212 is an institution that consists of 16 English-speaking countries.213  Another 
example is the “Vancouver Group”, where the UK, Canada, and Australia launched discussion 
group in 2008 to discuss mutual exploitation of patents.214  Based on the their recognition of 
common backgrounds for cooperation among them – similarly sized developed countries, similar 
legal heritage, and long standing relationships, they announced harmonization efforts to enhance 
efficiency of the intellectual property system and productivity of offices in the interests of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Takenaka, (Edward Elgar, 2008). 
211 There are 17 member states including: Benin, Burkina faso, Cameroun, Centrafrique, Comores, Congo, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinée, Guinée Bissau, Guinée équatoriale, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Sénégal, Tchad, Togo. 
available at http://www.oapi.int/ (last visited Jan 07, 2017). 
212 There are currently 19 States which are party to the Lusaka Agreement and therefore members of ARIPO. 
These are: Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (Total: 19 
Member States.) available at http://www.aripo.org/ (last visited Jan 07, 2017). 
213 KIPO, supra Note 126, at 12. 
214 FATIMA BEATTIE, VANCOUVER GROUP MUTUAL EXPLOITATION: COLLABORATION BETWEEN UK, CANADA 
AND AUSTRALIA, available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/beattie.ppt. 
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customers and the community.215  Even though their discussions are still in the primitive stage, 
they have enough potential to expect more meaningful results in the future.   
 
2. The Offshore Outsourcing of Patent Examination 
 
With search-sharing being recognized as the easiest and most realizable option to reduce 
work and cost, new forms of cooperation are emerging.  One is the offshore outsourcing of 
patent examination.  Outsourcing is the generic term used when companies contract-out certain 
business functions – usually in non-core areas – to an external supplier, eliminating the need to 
maintain an internal staff to perform that function.216  Offshore outsourcing is the contracting of 
these business functions to companies in other countries that can provide lower-cost services.217   
Management can consider offshore outsourcing to improve flexibility, reduce costs, and 
concentrate on core areas.  This principle can also be applied to patent examination.  From a 
Patent Office’s point of view, prior-art searching is not a core function because it provides patent 
examiners with preliminary information on which to base their examinations.  Thus, if another 
country can perform the prior-art search more efficiently with lower costs, both participating 
countries could benefit from the overall efficiency resulting from the cooperation.  The 
countries that are outsourcing their work can benefit from reduced costs and shortened 
                                                          
215 id. 
216 OFFICE OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING AND AMERICA’S COMPETITIVE EDGE: 
LOSING OUT IN THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY R&D AND SERVICES SECTORS (May 11, 2004), available at 
http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/off_shoring.pdf. 
217 See id. 
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examination times, which can lead to the improvement of patent quality.  The countries to 
whom the work is outsourced can expect fee income and improved expertise.   
Outsourcing in patent examination is already taking place in the real world.  For 
instance, UKIPO began outsourcing to India in 2011, with answering telephone inquiries at first 
and then expanding to search and examination.218  On the other hand, the Danish Patent Office 
is one of the leading Offices in the specialization of searching and providing information for 
examination.  The Danish Patent Office offers fast opinions on patentability of inventive ideas, 
and it also provides opinions on the validity of existing patents, which a patentee’s competitors 
or other Patent Offices might use when deciding whether to challenge an issued patent.219  Both 
services are extraordinarily fast, advertising ten working days as the normal benchmark for 
completing the services.220   
Moreover, the Danish Office advertises a general set of “business services” touted as 
“combin[ing] our search competencies with our knowledge about practices within the areas of 
rights and legislation.”221  Like a private law firm, the Danish Office urges potential clients to 
“[t]ake advantage of us being an authority” and having “more than a hundred experts at your 
disposal.”222  Also similar to a law firm, the Office charges its customers by the hour for its 
professional services. 223   Apparently, the development of information technology (IT) 
technology makes offshore outsourcing easier, faster, and more plausible.  As convenient and 
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220 See id, at 1571. 
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safe movement of vast information becomes possible with the help of IT technologies, patent 
examination’s quality and overall efficiency can be dramatically improved by offshore 
outsourcing. 
 
3. A Regional Patent System 
 
A regional patent system can be described as a regionally limited global patent system. It 
can be analogized to the comparison made between regional economic integration and global 
economic integration.  As regional economic integration is a realistic reaction to the wave of 
economic globalization, a regional patent system is the pragmatic solution to confront the 
problems of fragmented patent systems in the age of globalization.   
Theoretically, a regional patent system introduces a new patent which can be recognized 
in its member states.  In this sense, a regional patent system is not a mutual recognition system, 
but a multilateral form of unilateral recognition. EU and ASEAN are examples of this regional 
patent system.  The operation of the European patent and the on-going discussion in ASEAN 
suggest several prerequisite conditions in order to successfully introduce a regional patent 
system. 
In order to achieve a regional patent system, first and foremost, there should be a 
fundamental motivation and agreement to construct a common market and promote free trade.  
Intellectual property and patents have been long recognized as one of the most important features 
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of the common market agreement.  Differences between national laws in the intellectual 
property field may constitute protectionist barriers to the free movement of goods and services 
that distort competition and undermine the single market.224  For example, a member state with 
extremely strict counterfeiting laws could easily be harmed by counterfeiting products from a 
member state whose laws were less stringent.225  Accordingly, countries that initiated the 
regional integration agreement will subsequently have interests in a common patent system. 
Another important condition for the regional patent system is the existence of a common 
denominator and a higher standard of patentability.  In an optimal regional patent system, the 
regional patent should be fully recognized after translation, and the patentability rule should be 
the common denominator of national patent laws that can fully meet the requirement of national 
rules.  Also, the standard and quality of regional patents should be high enough to satisfy the 
national standards of all member states.   
A final and recurrent consideration to highlight in the regional patent system is language.  
Although the economic integration union will result in diverse languages, the regional patent 
system cannot support all languages.  Thus, it is necessary to set an official language which is 
interchangeable, universal, and easily translated in a reasonable price and speed.  For example, 
there are 26 official languages in the European Union, but the patent application should be 
written in three languages – English, French, and German.  Even though Spain and Italy 
                                                          
224  WEILER, AND KOCJAN, THE LAW OF EUROPEAN UNION, CHAPTER 12 (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) 1, 
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/eu/Units/index.html. 
225 See id. 
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strongly criticize this condition, it is established that works by these three languages are well 
processed and reviewed with excellent translations.226 
A notable example of the regional patent system is the European Patent Convention. 
Since the early stages of the European Community, the fear that national intellectual property 
rights would be abused to restrict trade within the European Community led the European 
Commission to seek solutions in the fields of patents, designs and trademarks.227  As a result, in 
1973, over twenty states met at the diplomatic conference in Munich to discuss the introduction 
of a European patent grant procedure, and the conference concluded with the signing of the 
European Patent Convention by sixteen participants.228   The convention declared that its 
purpose is to strengthen co-operation between the European states to protect inventions.229  
Furthermore, it was intended to ensure that the states could guarantee such protection through a 
single procedure and standard rules that issue and govern patents.230   
The proceedings in the European Patent Convention include not only a preliminary 
search but also a complete examination against a specific standard of invention for all 
applications filed in the European Patent Office.231  Upon completing the examination stage and 
determining patentability, a copy of the patent application is transferred to the Patent Office in 
                                                          
226  THOMAS BORECKI, MOVING TOWARDS REGIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS, 61, available at http:// 
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SOC’Y 118 128 (1978). 
 69 
each of the individual countries that were designated in the original application.232  The 
application is then translated (if required) and the national Office issues a patent.233  In effect, 
although an applicant files a single patent application, which is completed and prosecuted in the 
European Patent Office, it results in as many separate and distinct patents as the countries that 
were designated in the original application.234   
In December 2012, following an earlier European Council decision in June of that year, 
the European Parliament voted on the formation of a pan-European patent system which includes 
a Unitary Patent (UP) effective in all participating EU member states and a Unitary Patent Court 
(UPC) having jurisdiction over all such member states235. The coming into effect of this pan-
European patent system requires ratification of the UPC Agreement by at least 13 EU countries 
that must include Germany, France and the UK.236 As the UK Government announced its 
intention to ratify the Agreement on a Unitary Patent Court (UPC) on November 28, 2016, it is 
expected that the Unitary Patent in Europe may become a reality in 2017.237 
Another good example of the regional patent system is the ASEAN (Association of 
South East Asian Nations) Patent System.  In 1995, seven Member states of ASEAN declared 
the “ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.”  In this agreement, 
the member states recognized the importance and need for regional cooperation in intellectual 
property among the surrounding countries.  Moreover, according to Article 1(4), Member States 
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235 Reinhold Cohn Group, European Unitary Patent System and Unitary Patent Court After All, available at 
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can explore the possibility of setting up an ASEAN patent system, including an ASEAN Patent 
Office, if feasible, to promote the region-wide protection of patents and to develop a regional and 
international protection system for patents.  Based on this agreement, ASPEC (ASEAN Patent 
Examination Co-operation Programme) was established in 2008, with two announced objectives: 
the reduction of work and faster turnaround time; and the improvement of searches and 
examination procedures.  
 
4. Cooperation with Developing Countries 
 
Many developing countries have strongly opposed the position of a few developed 
countries driving patent harmonization forward.  Specifically, it is true that developed countries 
want to protect their inventive ideas and check the competition of developing countries.  In 
contrary, developing countries with low inventive capacity and unfamiliarity with intellectual 
property rights were unable to secure enough patents to guarantee the possibility of future 
development.  Thus, developing countries find little merit in participating in negotiations; they 
consider patent law harmonization as an attempt to solidify or even widen the technical barrier 
and economic gap among countries.   
These objections raise many difficult issues, which are considered at length in the next 
part of this work.  However, work-sharing is an attractive subject to start discussion of 
harmonization within developing countries.  First, developing countries can receive valuable 
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technical information from developed countries when they share information on application and 
prior-art search.  Most patent laws require the patent description to disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.238  
Similarly, prior-art searches by other offices will disclose all relevant patents, publications, or 
products that existed before.  If developing countries can take part in sharing such information 
and access an extensive database operated by developed countries, the resultant disclosure of 
comprehensive patent documents and research reports will be valuable resources for the 
developing countries’ technical development.  Shared information can also facilitate foreign 
investment in these countries, by advancing the identification, selection, negotiation, acquisition 
and transfer of foreign technology.   
Work-sharing will also alleviate the burden on national offices of developing countries, 
as they often lack the requisite manpower, information, documentation, and financial resources 
to complete the patents’ protection.239  Thus, shared information about prior art will help 
improve patent quality by avoiding duplication of local inventive efforts, and to reorient them to 
invent around any patented invention.240   
In summary, work-sharing can not only contribute the developing countries’ economic 
development, but it can also help developing countries overcome the problem of failing to 
maintain a competitive patent regime due to their lack of capacity and information on alternative 
sources of technology.241 
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5. Combination with PCT Reform 
 
Since its adoption in Washington in 1970, the PCT has achieved great success in 
meeting its objectives.  In particular, it has succeeded in simplifying and rendering more 
economical protection of inventions throughout the world.  An important factor in the PCT's 
success has been its procedural focus to obtain patent rights.  Even though this procedural focus 
is of limited helpfulness in solving the patent problems in the globalized age, its low degree of 
mandate could rather encourage countries to join this treaty. From the standpoint of work-
sharing, PCT can be a useful vehicle that implements the search-sharing mechanism. As 
discussed earlier, search-sharing mechanisms have already been implemented within the PCT 
framework, but it is possible to synthesize various practical measures of work-sharing in order to 
create synergy effects.  As WIPO Director General Francis Gurry suggests,242 there are several 
ways to reform PCT, as well as to strengthen work-sharing: (1) upgrade search-sharing, to make 
search report and preliminary examination more compliant and consistent; and (2) combine 
decision-sharing, to make international examination more complete, relevant and useful.243  
 
6. The Evolution toward Mutual Recognition 
 
 The ultimate and ideal cooperation of work-sharing, especially decision-sharing, is a 
mutual recognition of patents.  Mutual recognition of patents is based on the agreement 
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between two or more Patent Offices to validate each other’s patents, accrediting other Patent 
Offices that the methodology of the examination is sound and that the procedures are functioning 
accordingly.244  From the standpoint of harmonization, mutual recognition is a more advanced 
form of cooperation than that of mere information-sharing in the examination process, and can 
be considered as bridge toward substantive harmonization.  As mentioned in the previous 
discussion on decision-sharing, Patent Offices must build stronger relations of trust and 
confidence regarding examination, similarity of patentability standards, and interchangeability of 
language, if they are to realize mutual recognition.  Mutual recognition may or may not require 
a change in substantive law for its implementation; and mutual recognition might not be easily 
attainable, just as the substantive harmonization of patent law is hard to achieve.245   
Mutual recognition’s expected benefits in reduced costs and enhanced predictability 
would, however, undoubtedly be great.  Under a regime of mutual recognition, Patent Offices – 
theoretically – would not conduct any further examination of any application, where the same 
claims have previously been examined by another patent office.246   The UK Intellectual 
Property Office (UKIPO) estimated that the mutual recognition system reduces the amount of 
time spent on duplicate applications by 25%, which will reduce the backlog by 9 backlog months 
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(19%) after 5 years.247  As a result, it is expected that mutual recognition could achieve savings 
between £6 ($8.9) billion and £23 ($34.3) billion per annum in the U.K.248 
 
 
IV. THE Limitations of Procedural Harmonization 
 
Despite these sizable benefits, procedural harmonization cannot solve fundamental 
problems of fragmented patent system.  It is because these procedural frameworks are designed 
to efficiently grant a set of individual national patents that remain separately enforceable under 
local laws.249  Thus, as long as national Patent Offices finally has an authority to decide whether 
to grant a patent, the problems from a fragmented patent system – limited patent protection and 
unpredictability – cannot be solved.  At best, procedural harmonization can make patent 
granting process fast and convenient, especially for multiple applications. 
Many provisions in PCT clarifies this point: Article 27(5) expressly states that 
“[n]othing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be construed as prescribing anything 
that would limit the freedom of each Contracting State to prescribe such substantive conditions 
of patentability as it desires.”250  The “Notes on the PCT” further explain that “[c]onditions of 
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patentability’ include novelty, inventive step (non-obviousness), industrial applicability, certain 
subject matter (for example, foods and beverages, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, 
and plant or animal varieties, are not patentable in some countries).”251 
Moreover, economic benefits from procedural harmonization can be less than expected. 
For example, contrary to our intuitive expectation, an application through PCT is ineffective 
even in reducing costs and expediting the process.  For example, WIPO shows that the costs 
using PCT is higher than direct application, especially when only a few countries are involved 
(Table 3).252  The contributing factors behind the high costs include high default fees of 
international preliminary examinations compared to national examination fees, Offices’ failure to 
provide sufficient opportunity for discussion between the agent and examiner before a final 
report is established, and the fact that many elected Offices do not give significant attention to 
the international reports.253   
 
< Table 3: The Comparison of Costs between Direct and PCT Applications > 
 2 Countries254 7 Countries255 15 Countries256 
Application Direct PCT Direct PCT Direct PCT 
Costs $16,971 $19,406 $59,397 $60,481 $119,381 $118,339 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
FUNCTIONING OF THE PCT SYSTEM 19 (Third Session Geneva, June 14 to 18, 2010). 
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254 WIPO, supra Note 4, at 58 (The United States of America and Japan). 
255 See id (China, European Patent Office (validation in France, Germany and United Kingdom), Japan, the 
United States of America, and Republic of Korea). 
256 See id (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Patent Office (validation in, France, Germany and 
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Furthermore, the research by Korea Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) argues that PCT 
is relatively slow and the patent may have a reduced enforceable life span because the life of a 
patent is calculated from the date of its first filing.257  According to WIPO, in 2009, 26% of 
international applications were published without an attached International Search Report 
(ISR)258 because of delayed search.  Also, in the same year, over 6% of ISRs were delivered 
more than 30 months after the priority date.  International Authorities are mainly responsible 
for the delays because they often are unable to timely begin the international search or 
international preliminary examination as a result of difficulties in receiving information, 
documents or fees from the applicant or receiving Office.  Part of the delay is also due to the 
time expended in application processing within the Office, including any Office correspondence 
with the applicant.  Receiving Offices and International Authorities in different regions send 
documents in paper form and via surface mail, which also contributes to the delay.259 
These problems and limitations of procedural harmonization call for discussing 
substantive harmonization.  From next chapter, we are going to explore the issues of substantive 
harmonization, particularly focusing on its normative justification.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SUBSTANTIVE HARMONIZATION AND 
UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
I. SUBSTANTIVE HARMONIZATION 
 
Substantive harmonization is often called “deep Harmonization,” concerning not just the 
drafting, filing, and examination of patent applications, but also the cornerstone requirements of 
patentability.260  For example, “deep harmonization” includes the adoption of identical rules 
concerning the amount of information revealed by patent disclosure, and the criteria to determine 
a novel and useful invention when a technical advance meets the requirement for an “inventive 
step” (non-obviousness).261  It would also entail agreement on the priority of inventorship 
(whether a patent is awarded to the first to invent or the first to file), and whether inventors will 
be accorded a grace period permitting publication prior to filing.262  The anticipated advantage 
of this substantive harmonization is the simple and rapid procedures, simplicity of access, 
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proximity to courts, legal clarity and predictability.263  In this sense, substantive or deep 
harmonization is essential elements for the ultimate goal of harmonization – “One patent 
application and global protection.”   
The milestone for substantive patent harmonization was the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Agreements (TRIPs) in 1995.  After TRIPS, there have been numerous efforts by 
international communities, but there has been no additional step forward toward substantive 
harmonization.  Rather, there has been growing conflicts around it.  Developing countries who 
had agreed on TRIPs for expecting economic gains became very suspicious that the economic 
benefits of the international patent system were very unevenly distributed in favor of certain 
developed countries.  They have raised questions about justification and reason for further 
harmonization, and resisted the pressure from developed countries.  
The origin of this resistance and conflict can be that supporting countries have failed to 
provide satisfactory justification for patent harmonization. Conventionally, the utilitarian theory 
in connection with international trade has served to explain the necessity.  However, as 
discussed below, it is very doubtful that any of these perspectives can provide satisfactory 
justification for patent harmonization. 
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II. UTILITARIAN THEORY 
 
Arguably, the utilitarian theory is one of the most prevalent ways to explain patent 
harmonization.  This approach is based on two observations: (1) patent laws can be justified by 
the utilitarian theory; (2) patent harmonization is necessary for free trade, which eventually 
benefits all participating countries from utilitarian perspective.  
Because patent systems and international trade are both based on the utilitarian theory, 
patent harmonization can be construed through a unique utilitarian perspective. Namely, while 
country-specific patent systems are originally designed to maximize utility or economic benefits 
of one country, harmonizing each patent system can be helpful to further increase their utility by 
fostering free trade and lowering trade barriers.  
From below, we are going to scrutinize the whole logical chain of utilitarian justification, 
starting from fundamental theories of patent systems and international free trade.  Based on 
these theoretical foundations, we can evaluate the utilitarian justification for patent 
harmonization and its limitations in detail. 
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1. Theoretical Foundations 
 
(1) Theory 1: Patent Theory from Utilitarian Perspective 
 
From a utilitarian standpoint, patent laws are designed to maximize the utility of a 
country. It is undeniable that the utilitarian theory is one of the most common ideas to justify 
patent laws. For example, the Supreme Court, Congress, and many legal scholars consider 
utilitarianism the dominant purpose of American patent law.264  According to the utilitarian 
theory, patent law protects inventors’ exclusive rights in their technologically or scientifically 
valuable inventions for limited periods of time, in order to foster innovation.  
As Fromer confirms, “[t]he theory is that public benefits accrue by rewarding inventors 
for taking two steps they likely would not otherwise have taken: to invent, and possibly 
commercialize, in the first place, and to reveal information to the public about these inventions 
that stimulates further innovation.265 . . . [U]tilitarian theories of intellectual property rest on the 
premise that the benefit to society of creators crafting valuable works offsets the costs to society 
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of the incentives the law offers to creators.”266  Because this utilitarian framework entails a 
cost-benefit analysis, the leading scholarly analysis of patent has used economic 
methodologies.267 
Under utilitarian theories, “patent laws are intimately tied to a nation’s economic goals, 
especially to its industries’ technological potential and the types of innovations it hopes to 
foster.”268  Specifically, utilitarian theorists have generally endorsed the creation of patent rights 
as an appropriate means to foster innovation, subject to the caveat that such rights are limited in 
duration so as to balance the social welfare loss of monopoly exploitation.269  
In other words, patent laws are designed to strike a balance between incentivizing local 
inventors and hence benefiting society, and granting the exclusive rights of patents to reinforce 
monopoly. It follows that the consequential social utility of patents in a country is conceived as 
the difference between domestic invention and domestic monopoly. This can be expressed in the 
following equation: 
 
Social Welfare in a Country = Domestic Invention – Domestic Monopoly 
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Under the current patent law system, a domestic patent system is believed to produce a 
net social gain because the social benefits of this increased rate of invention are large enough to 
offset the costs of patenting.270 Moy elaborates this point as follows: 
“Each unit of increased cost imposed on domestic consumers provides a unit of increased 
revenue to domestic industry. Evaluating such a patent system therefore involves, in large part, 
estimating the amount of increased invention that will actually result from a given increase in 
expected revenue. In addition, the increased resources diverted to a domestic patent owner are 
not wholly lost to the domestic economy. Rather, the domestic patent owner generally will 
reinvest all or a part of those resources, thereby mitigating the cost of patenting to some 
degree.”271 
As a result, patent laws have resulted in divergent approaches,272 because “the diverse 
laws tailored to each jurisdiction better accommodate those individual preferences than would a 
uniform set of laws imposed across all jurisdictions,” 273  For example, countries where 
innovation is not a major source of economic activity and growth are likely to choose a less 
stringent IP regime than would countries whose economies are highly dependent on 
innovation.274  From this perspective, Trebilcock and Howse argue that “there is nothing 
suspect or unreasonable about the preference of many developing countries for a relatively lax 
system of IP rights.”275 
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(2) Theory 2: Trade Theory from Utilitarian Perspective  
International trade theory also grounds on the utilitarian justification. From utilitarian 
perspective, free trade is helpful to increase the utility for each country. This means that “further 
liberalization will, with certain defined exceptions, always be beneficial both to the domestic 
economic welfare of the liberalizing state and to global economic welfare.”276  This is also 
known as the theory of “comparative advantage”; through trade, a country can obtain goods and 
services with greater efficiency, given that each participating country specializes in activities in 
which that country has a comparative advantage.277  This means that “through imports, a 
country can acquire goods and services that it either cannot produce at home or can produce at 
home only at a cost that is greater than the cost of obtaining them indirectly by exchanging them 
for the exports it produces . . . And every country, no matter how inefficient in its overall 
production structure, can always profitably export some goods to pay for its most desired 
imports.”278 
David Ricardo, who conceived this comparative advantage theory, concluded that “a 
country would export the product in which it had the greater advantage, or a comparative 
advantage, and import the commodity in which its advantage was less, or in which it had a 
comparative disadvantage . . . Even when one country can produce commodities more efficiently 
than another country, both can gain from specialization and exchange, provided that the 
efficiency advantage is greater in some commodities than in others.” 279  As a result, the 
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classical economists concluded that “international trade does not require offsetting absolute 
advantages but is possible where a comparative advantage exists.”280 
 
(3) Theory 3: Patent Harmonization based on the Utilitarian Theory 
By combining two arguments above, utilitarian scholars argued that patent harmonization 
is necessary to promote free trade and prevent trade distortion.  As patent harmonization has 
been motivated by globalization and liberalization of the world economy, it is argued that a 
harmonized patent law can contribute to the removal of trade barriers and to the free movement 
of resources. For example, some developed countries claim that shortcomings in availability and 
enforcement of patent rights constitute barriers to trade, as potential exports by inventors or 
creators may be prevented or diminished through the circulation of illegal counterfeit products in 
foreign markets.281  
This viewpoint becomes clear by looking at WTO treaties regarding trade and intellectual 
property, such as TRIPs.  The preamble's chapeau of TRIPs highlights the reduction “of 
distortions and impediments to international trade” as the main target of the Agreement.282  This 
statement suggests that improving the protection of patents could contribute to the reduction of 
such impediments involved in international trade.283 
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 Consider, for example, that a country had no intellectual property protection, then 
presumably that country could be a source for the production and circulation of counterfeit 
goods.  Should some of these goods find their way into markets with patent protection, this 
would result in a heavier burden being placed on border monitoring of imports.  This 
monitoring would impose a cost on international trade that could have been avoided had there 
been a certain level of patent protection in all countries. 
The establishment of an international patent protection would allow patent rights holders 
to inhibit any efforts of counterfeiting at its incipience, eradicating the need for the inefficient 
and costly method of blocking the exports of goods to countries with patent protection. 
Supporting this argument, Correa stated that: 
“[T]rade distortions and impediments were resulting from, among other things: the 
displacement of exports of legitimate goods by unauthorized copies, or of domestic sales by 
imports of unauthorized copies; the disincentive effect that inadequate protection of intellectual 
property rights had on inventors and creators to engage in research and development and in trade 
and investment; the deliberate use in some instances of intellectual property right protection to 
discourage imports and encourage local production, often of an inefficient and small-scale 
nature; and the inhibiting effect on international trade of disparities in the protection accorded 
under different legislations.”284 
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2. Utilitarian Justification for Patent Harmonization 
 
It is clear that utilitarian arguments can support patent harmonization, if and only if patent 
harmonization can consequentially contributes to the increase of utilities.  At the outset, this 
argument seems plausible because a harmonized patent law would contribute to the removal of 
trade barriers and to the free movement of resources, which would benefit all countries involved.  
Under this theory, Stack argues that “harmonization would be well-founded if and only to the 
extent that the benefits of harmonization outweigh the costs of a loss of heterogeneity of patent 
laws.”285   
However, it is very hard to calculate ‘the benefits’ and ‘the costs’ in the global 
environment.  One might imagine the concept of “global welfare” as the total sum of utility of 
all involved countries.  However, such measure would not be ideal in representing global 
welfare, as this method would overlook the individual gains and – importantly – losses of the 
utilities of individual states. In other words, patent harmonization would not be satisfactory if 
any one participating country’s utility is consequentially worse off than before. No one country 
can force to sacrifice another country’s utility for the benefits of others. 
In sum, harmonization can be justified only when the utility of each country that joins the 
scheme of harmonization is increased as a result of harmonization.  Thus, one country can 
willingly consider the other’s patent law only if this harmonization can result in maximizing 
social utility for all participating countries.  Then, harmonization would be justified and 
realized effectively from utilitarian perspective.  
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(1) Patent harmonization and Pareto optimality 
Another way to express this point is this: patent harmonization can be efficient only when 
it consequentially increases the welfare of each country. In economics, this process is known as 
the “Pareto improvement.” Pareto improvement refers to changes in which no harm is done to 
any state, and where at least one state is improved through the increase or sustaining of social 
utility of all participating countries. In other words, if harmonization can lead to an increase of 
social utility in one country with no harm done to others, harmonization is justifiable in the 
utilitarian sense by realizing the Pareto improvement.  
However, in many cases, changes in a country’s patent law under the name of patent 
harmonization can change or sometimes decrease the social utility of that country.  This goes 
against the assumption that patent law is originally designed, itself, to maximize a nation’s social 
utility. The change of one’s patent law, as the result of considering other countries patent laws 
(under the name of patent harmonization), implies the deviation from this optimal status.  
Consider, for instance, the specific situations in developing countries.  As mentioned 
previously, it is reasonable for developing countries with low innovative capacity to maintain 
relaxed levels of patent protection.  Because these countries have little industries to use the 
monopoly rights given by patents, they rather choose to share the resources more broadly.  
Conversely, if they are required to make patent rights more stringent by agreeing to patent 
harmonization, this requires them to deviate from their optimal status – and results in welfare 
loss.   
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This result can become more serious when considering foreign applicants for patents.  
This is due to the fact that such individuals can often exercise their exclusive power without 
considering the effects on the local economy. For example, assume that an inventor from country 
B obtains a patent in country A, but produces or ‘works the patent’, not in country A, but in his 
or her own country B. In this situation, according to Moy, domestic industries in the inventor's 
own country, B, can receive increased profits from patenting and producing, such that higher 
prices are imposed on consumers buying the product in country A and B. 286  Such patent 
policy results in a clear economic loss for country A. 
By the late 1880s, national governments and economists realized that granting patents to 
foreign nationals generally resulted in a net outflow of national wealth.287 They think that 
international patent transactions reallocated wealth away from the granting country and into the 
country of the patent owner.288  
One can argue that there can be some utility gained by these countries by enhancing free 
trade, and exporting those products in which these countries have a comparative advantage (e.g. 
agricultural goods). Or there can be a gain in utility through other spill-over effects gained from 
attraction of foreign direct investment.  Unfortunately, in most cases, benefits of these kinds are 
rarely immediately realized.  This is because these benefits require the innovation of domestic 
industries, as well as reshuffling of economic structure.  It is hardly surprising that developing 
countries are commonly not export-driven countries and that their economies are basically self-
sufficient. For these countries, when it comes to changing patent laws, concerns about imminent 
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welfare losses take priority over potential long-term benefits. As a result, changes of substantive 
patent rights are unlikely to be accepted, and the prospect of implementing patent harmonization 
seems highly unrealistic in such developing countries. 
For example, it is unreasonable to expect Malawi (GDP per capital is $195 and 60.4% of 
its export is tobacco product289) to have the same level of patent protection as the United States.  
In Malawi, more than 90% of the population works in the agriculture or related industries, with 
90% of them actually living in suburban areas: In this situation, it seems very hard to expect 
innovation or spill-over effects by enhancing the level of patent protection. Arvind Subramanian 
makes this point, arguing that a strong patent system driven by patent harmonization negotiation 
is not an economic improvement in such countries considering its low innovative capacity.  He 
writes: 
“For developing countries, the economic calculus is different for two reasons. First, as net 
users rather than net exporters of R&D–intensive products, they do not benefit from the 
monopoly profits that are created by patent protection. On the contrary, their consumers suffer 
from the higher prices that result. Second, because their markets are small in relation to global 
demand . . . , actions taken by developing countries to strengthen patent protection have little 
impact on the incentive to undertake additional R&D. Thus, a combination of higher costs in the 
short run and the likely absence of dynamic gains over time means that raising levels of 
protection would not benefit developing countries.”290 
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However, there can be a special case of patent harmonization that might yield Pareto-
improvement: procedural harmonization. As discussed in the previous chapter, procedural 
harmonization is about the form and method of patent applications, and it does not deal with the 
standards and rules for the granting and enforcement of patents.  That is, with no substantive 
issues involved, inventors of developed countries gain easy access to multiple patents in many 
countries.  From the developing countries’ point of view, welfare loss would be minimal 
because governments only have to provide additional routes for their patents. Furthermore, 
procedural harmonization does not require changing laws, making it relatively simple to 
implement.  
In fact, the international community has been quite successful in realizing procedural 
harmonization.  For example, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) provided procedural 
enhancements to the international IP regime.291  Signed in 1970, the PCT greatly streamlined 
and simplified the process for securing patent protection in multiple countries including 
developing countries, resulting in patent protection in as many as 142 countries in 2010.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, PCT created a uniform legal route to file 
international patent applications in several countries by a single domestic file.292 It also allows 
filing of single applications, performing an international prior art search and providing 
international publication of the patent.293  By being a member of PCT, developing countries can 
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expect their industries to benefit by gaining easier access to the disclosed information of patents. 
Consequentially, each participating country can expect welfare gains with minimum welfare 
loss. 
 
(2) Kaldor-Hicks improvement 
The previous discussion has shown that substantive harmonization cannot be justified by 
Pareto improvement because it causes the deviation from the optimal status.  There can be 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as a result of patent harmonization.  Usually, winners are developed 
countries with high innovative capacities, namely creative industries and manpower.  On the 
other hand, losers are developing countries that lack in capacity and capability in such domains.  
In this situation, it is possible to conceive an additional means toward achieving 
consequential Pareto improvement, namely Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Borrowed from the 
economic theory of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a Pareto-optimal outcome can be reached by the 
better off state compensating those who are made worse off, to the degree that all would end up 
no worse off than before.294 Compared to the simple Pareto improvement, the Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement is a more complicated process, as it realizes maximization of social utility through 
compensation.  
Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, one state of affairs is preferred to a second state of 
affairs if, by moving from the second to the first, the ‘gainer’ from the move can, by a lump-sum 
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transfer, compensate the ‘loser’ for his loss of utility and still be better off.295  In this case, the 
compensation from the one who is better off to the other who is worse off will result in 
increasing the net social utility in each country.  Then, each country can agree on the 
mechanism of compensation and consequential improvement.  Under this theory, patent 
harmonization can be implemented efficiently if it results in consequential Pareto Optimal.  
This process is described in the following Figure 4. 
 
< Figure 4: Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Improvement296 > 
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In principle, patent harmonization can be justified by a utilitarian theory only when it can 
provide higher utility, and when the welfare change by patent harmonization falls into Pareto 
optimal or Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Because Pareto optimality is very hard to achieve in most 
cases as a practical matter, the compensation mechanism for Kaldor-Hicks improvement is 
crucial in discussing substantive patent harmonization. 
This argument can provide a reasonable explanation to the historic question why the most 
prominent substantive patent harmonization, TRIPs, was concluded in WTO (World Trade 
Organization), although the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) had undertaken 
tremendous efforts for a long time.  At first, WIPO, a specialized UN agency that deals with 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), initiated a discussion on IP harmonization beginning in the 
19th century and now administers two of the oldest IPR treaties: the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as revised up to 1967 (Paris Convention); and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 as revised up to 1971 (Berne 
Convention).297 
However, the substantive standard of patent law in the Paris Convention was considered 
to be weak by several developed countries such as the U.S.  For example, the Paris Convention 
only mandates national treatment and the recognition of a grace period for filing of industrial 
property applications.298  Otherwise, member countries are free to determine the standards of 
patent protection, such as the subject matter, the terms of protection, or some limited restrictions 
on compulsory licenses.299  
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Developed countries were unsatisfied with the lack of substantive standards in the Paris 
Convention and started negotiating a higher standard of patents protection. However, developing 
countries have been rather demanding a further lowering up the standards of industrial property 
which are applicable to them. 300 Due to the severe conflicts among countries, the revision 
process broke down during the third session in Geneva in 1982,301 and no further sessions were 
held after the fourth session in Geneva in 1984.302  
To overcome the deadlock, developed countries attempted to discuss IP issues within the 
WTO framework. Based on our previous discussion, this can be described as an effort to discuss 
‘patent harmonization’ and ‘compensation’, which pertains to the realization of the Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement. At first, in the Tokyo Round, there were discussions concerned only with 
counterfeiting.  During negotiations in the Uruguay Round, developed countries led the 
negotiation and successfully persuaded developing countries within WTO to sign on to the 
substantive IP law treaty, or TRIPs by using the compensation mechanism for Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement.  In explaining this mechanism, Arvind Subramanian argued that, 
“In the Uruguay Round, which offered scope for bargaining and the exchange of 
concessions between countries, developing countries sought compensation for the likely negative 
impact of TRIPS. Industrial countries agreed to liberalize their textiles, clothing, and agricultural 
markets to provide increased access to the exports of developing countries. Higher standards of 
protection for intellectual property in exchange for better access for clothing and agricultural 
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goods thus constituted the grand bargain in the Uruguay Round between industrial and 
developing countries.”303 
In other words, the problem of WIPO during the Paris Convention revision negotiation 
was that there were limited tools for compensation.  It is because WIPO’s scope of work was 
inherently limited only to IP issues. However, countries were able to negotiate compensation at 
the WTO, including trade concessions in other fields. For example, in the Uruguay Round, 
developing countries gained trading concessions in agriculture and textiles as compensation for 
the welfare loss caused by stronger IP rights.304  Unlike WIPO, representatives in the WTO 
have more flexibility to negotiate compensation for developing countries.  This made it easier 
to conclude negotiations for the Kaldor-Hicks improvement and help substantive harmonization 
within WTO, rather than WIPO. 
In summary, the conclusion of TRIPs within the WTO seems to be a good example of 
Kaldor-Hicks harmonization because it was realized through the compensation mechanism.  
When harmonization is expected to cause an overall welfare loss for given countries, those 
countries will be reluctant to participate in negotiations.  For example, if the local innovative 
capacity in certain developing country is very weak and the spill-over effects are expected to be 
very low, the substantive harmonization of patent law with states of higher technical capacity 
would cause negative effects on that country’s social utility.  In this situation, compensation 
mechanism should work to attract such developing countries to the negotiation table. The broad 
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and comprehensive coverage of WTO negotiation made this possible, and countries successfully 
made the package deal that resulted in the Kaldor-Hicks improvement.  
 
 
III. The Limitation of Utilitarian Argument 
 
The previous section explored the utilitarian justification of patent harmonization in 
detail.  This argument can be summarized that patent harmonization can be justified by 
utilitarian theory, if it can consequentially increase the benefits of all participating countries.  
The historical evidence of WTO and TRIPS revealed that compensation plays an important role 
to achieve the Kaldor-Hicks improvement.   
However, there are several limitations to this argument.  In fact, one of these limitations 
was already discussed above, that the benefits of free trade or comparative advantage are not 
immediately realized especially for developing countries.  Free trade or comparative advantage 
is achieved through specialization and exchange, but restructuring domestic industries in 
developing countries has not worked well, and the economic gap between developed and 
developing countries became wider.  In addition to this, there is a more fundamental limitation: 
it is suspicious about the validity of the assumption that patent harmonization is necessary for 
free trade. Trebilcock and Howse argue that “the conclusion that stronger intellectual property 
protection may benefit some countries but not others suggests a fundamental difference between 
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the theoretical case for trade liberalization and the case for mandating high levels of IP protection 
throughout the world.” Bhagwati supports this idea by arguing that “TRIPs has distorted and 
deformed an important multilateral institution, turning it away from its trade mission.”305   
The validity of this argument is very important because it underlies the assumptions 
associated with the utilitarian theory and the Kaldor-Hicks improvement.  The collapse of the 
former assumption can deny the whole logical chain regarding the utilitarianism-based 
justification.  
As discussed above, the argument that patent harmonization is necessary for free trade is 
based on the assumption that shortcomings in availability and enforcement of patent rights 
constitute barriers to trade, as potential exports by inventors or creators may be prevented or 
diminished through the circulation of illegal counterfeit products in foreign markets.306  
In fact, concerns in the multilateral trading system about counterfeiting and piracy 
predate the TRIPS Agreement.307  A proposal on trade in counterfeit goods was submitted as 
early as 1978, as part of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations.308  Subsequent work led to the 
inclusion of a specific mandate in the Uruguay Round negotiations, which explicitly called for 
the development of a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with 
international trade in counterfeit goods.309 
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But if preventing counterfeit goods was the main concern, countries had to focus on 
regulating and preventing counterfeit products, rather than harmonizing the other country’s 
patent laws.  However, TRIPs negotiation at the Uruguay Round primarily focused on 
substantive patent laws in all participating countries rather than on the regulation of counterfeit 
goods.  It is hard to understand how much harmonized patent rights can contribute to the 
prevention of counterfeit products.  The effect of harmonized patent laws by TRIPs on 
counterfeit goods seems to be vague or tenuous at best, because patent rights are not necessarily 
related to the international movement of goods or comparative advantages. 
This argument can be supported by the analysis on TRIPs agreement.  When we closely 
look at the treaty text, it is questionable whether TRIPs can contribute to the reduction “of 
distortions and impediments to international trade,” as described in the preamble.310  This 
suspect becomes more apparent when one compares the core provisions of national treatment 
(NT) and most-favored-nation (MFN) as articulated in the treaty governing free movement of 
goods (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: GATT) and the treaty of intellectual property 
(Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS). 
The comparison between two treaties obviously shows that intellectual properties are not 
related to the movement of goods or products, but to personal rights for nationals.  In GATT, 
these provisions are directly linked to the product or production. However, similar provisions in 
TRIPs do not have references to products. Rather, it is suggested that nationals of different 
countries should be treated as the same (NT) or most-favorably (MFN).  This means that TRIPs 
does not regulate or consider movement of goods, but rather that of people.   
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< Table 4: Comparison between GATT and TRIPs > 
 GATT TRIPs 
National 
Treatment (NT) 
Article III. 1. The contracting parties 
recognize that internal taxes and 
other internal charges and laws, 
regulations, and requirements . . ., 
should not be applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production. 
Article 3.1 Each Member shall 
accord to the nationals of other 
Members treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords to its 
own nationals with regard to the 
protection of intellectual property . 
. . 
Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) 
Article I. 1. With respect to customs 
duties and charges of any kind . . . , 
any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall 
be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting 
parties 
Article 4. With regard to the 
protection of intellectual property, 
any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by a Member to 
the nationals of any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of 
all other Members. . . 
 
In GATT, national-treatment (NT) and most-favored-nation-treatment (MFN) are the 
core of the WTO system, because it ensures the free movement of goods by guaranteeing non-
discriminatory treatment to all products.  Benefits of comparative advantage can be achieved 
only when the domestic and foreign products are treated equally by ensuring competition based 
solely on price.  However, TRIPs regulates people, rather than goods.  It is very hard to find a 
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logical foundation that the regulation of nationals in TRIPs agreement could contribute to free 
trade.   
One can argue that TRIPs provisions ensure that foreign nationals can easily secure 
patent rights in other countries.  This allows these people to export their products without much 
concern for piracy, and the flexible movement of goods in turn contributes to free trade.  
However, this is contrary to the basic assumptions of comparative advantage which takes price 
as the sole factor in decisions regarding competitiveness.  After all, even though one can have 
strong patent rights in foreign countries, one’s decision to export or import is based on the 
market condition of the country in consideration, such as costs and consumer preference patterns.  
Patent rights are one of the factors that should be taken into consideration for the actual 
movement of goods.  Hence, same or non-discriminatory treatment of people alone does not 
necessarily contribute the free movement of goods. 
Moreover, Article XX (d) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)311 
permitted contracting parties to justify trade restrictions imposed by intellectual property 
rights.312  Specifically, GATT Article XX, General Exceptions states: 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
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shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . 
. .  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to ... the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights . . .” 313 
The fact that patent protection can be an exception for free trade means that member 
states can impose restrictions in trade for the protection of patents.  Unlike the argument that 
patent harmonization of accessibility and enforcement is necessary to lower trade-barriers, the 
protection of patents is allowed to raise trade barriers under this provision in GATT.  This 
means that the harmonized patent laws – usually toward strong patent protection – does not 
necessarily reduce trade barriers when countries use this Article XX (d) exception.  This 
interpretation reinforces our suspicion that patent rights are not necessarily related to 
comparative advantage. 
Another serious problem with the utilitarian justification for patent harmonization is that 
it does not work properly to face new and difficult issues in the patent harmonization field. As 
discussed above, patent harmonization needs to be in association with other tools for 
compensations.  But countries made little consensus on dealing with a ‘compensation package.’  
The Uruguay Round in 1994 was one of the few international meetings that discussed package 
deals among member states with regards to compensations, and new Doha Round has been 
deadlocked since 2001. 
                                                          
313 GATT 1947, supra Note 311. 
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In this situation, there are growing concerns and conflicting issues around patent 
harmonization.  In establishing the forward work program for the WTO on TRIPS issues, the 
Doha Declaration referred to three distinct but closely interrelated issues, which have become 
known informally as the "triplets": biotechnology, traditional knowledge, and biodiversity.314  
Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration referred to the Article 27.3(b) review that was already 
required in the text of the TRIPS Agreement itself, and instructed the TRIPS Council: 
“[I]n pursuing its work programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the 
review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen 
pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by Members pursuant to 
Article 71.1.”315 
However, WTO process is very slow these days, and there are limited opportunities of 
discussing compensation processes internationally.  From 2001, WTO member states have been 
negotiating Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in vain for fourteen years.  There is growing 
criticism that multilateral trade system cannot provide any meaningful result.  Given that 
substantive harmonization cannot be achieved alone without other forms of compensations, the 
lack of a systematic means to discuss compensations leads to the inevitable result of patent 
harmonization being severely delayed or failed.  
 
                                                          
314 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (hereinafter WTO), MODULE X: CURRENT TRIPS ISSES 7, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/modules10_e.pdf 
315 id. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Reasoning patent harmonization under the utilitarian framework was the normative 
foundation that led the successful conclusion of TRIPs agreement. This utilitarian reasoning is 
helpful to connect patent harmonization with international trade, and reveal the reason why 
substantive patent harmonization was successful not by WIPO, but by WTO.  Historically, 
international society had accepted that utilitarian justification without much criticism.   
However, there are several problems in this argument. The logical weakness between 
patent harmonization and international trade make developing countries be suspicious about the 
necessities and reasons for harmonizing their patent laws.  In addition, as the multilateral 
negotiation within WTO has been deadlocked, it becomes very hard for countries to discuss 
compensation mechanism to make a progress in patent harmonization.  
In fact, in addition to those limitations described above, utilitarian theory has a 
fundamental defect.  It cannot provide satisfactory answers to the normative question of why 
we should harmonize domestic patent laws in the first place.  For instance, it has been stated 
that “this utility-measuring process looks simple, but this process is not easy and is, in fact, 
impossibly complex.”316  Specifically, it is difficult to empirically analyze the overall welfare 
effects of patent harmonization because the measurement would require direct comparisons (i.e. 
how much welfare would have occurred in the absence of harmonization?)  There is also 
difficulty involved in the calculation of long-term costs and benefits.317   
                                                          
316 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (Harvard University Press, 2011). 
317 STACK, supra Note 285, at 18. 
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In conclusion, as Merges argues, “th[is] sheer practical difficulty of measuring or 
approximating all the variables involved means that the utilitarian program will always be 
aspirational, at best.”318  Thus, based on this limitation of utilitarian theory, next chapter 
explores other strong theoretical or logical foundations to justify patent harmonization – property 
theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
318 MERGES, supra Note 316, at 3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUBSTANTIVE HARMONIZATION AND ITS JUSTIFICATION 
BASED ON PROPERTY THEORY 
 
 
I. NORMATIVE PROPERTY THEORY TO JUSTIFY PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
The fundamental reason for the conflicts around patent harmonization is attributed to the 
lack of justification that countries with diverse interests can agree upon. Utilitarian theory has 
been the dominant theory used to justify the patent system and patent harmonization, but the 
previous chapter revealed several limitations of the utilitarian theory. Thus, despite the 
dominance of the utilitarian argument, it is necessary to turn to other theories that scholars 
proffer in order to explain several issues around patent harmonization. These theories are 
typically grounded in property theories regarding natural or moral rights, based on the 
assumption that a patent is a kind of a property.319   
 
                                                          
319 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1753; See, e.g., 
Balganesh, supra note 7, at 1576–77; Brown, supra note 31, at 589–90. 
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It is true that many scholars think that theories of utilitarianism and moral rights are 
almost always incompatible.320  Typically, scholars choose just one of these theories on which 
to base their view of intellectual property, as American courts usually favor utilitarianism over 
other theories.321  Nonetheless, there is helpful scholarship which suggests that utilitarian and 
moral rights-based theories may simultaneously justify intellectual property laws. 322   For 
example, Alfred Yen observes that both utilitarianism and moral rights should guide the structure 
of intellectual property.323  He suggests that it is useful to supplement intellectual property rules 
with moral-rights interests in some cases.324  When he discusses copyright law, he sets forth 
two justificatory grounds:  
“First, American law, both historically and at present, views copyright as a tool to 
effectuate both utilitarianism and moral rights.325  Second, the economic thinking necessary to 
implement utilitarian intellectual property laws cannot answer all necessary questions, such as 
getting hold of reliable data on individual preferences necessary for calculating utilities.”326 
 
                                                          
320 id.; See, e.g., Brown, supra note 31, at 607; Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2007); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993–94, 1023 (1990); Jessica Silbey, The Mythical 
Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 319 (2008); See also Radin, supra note 43, at 
984–86. 
321 See id at 1761. 
322 id.; See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with 
Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 325–28 (2008) (providing a general model for incorporating 
threshold deontological constraints into economic analysis of the law). 
323 id. 
324 See id. at 170–72. 
325  Id; Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AUTHORSHIP 164-66 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
326 See id. at 169–71. 
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On a related note, Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli maintain that there can be 
economic reasons to support moral-rights legislation.327  For example, a right of integrity might 
be useful to society at large in ensuring that important artistic works are not altered or 
mutilated.328  In addition, Dreyfuss maintains the interaction of utilitarian and moral rights 
theories by arguing that utilitarian intellectual property laws ought to also be concerned with the 
quality of works produced, which had been a traditional focus of author-centered moral rights 
theories.329  
In sum, many scholars confirm the necessity to consider moral-rights theory in addition 
to utilitarian theory in analyzing certain issues.  In line with this observation, when we seek 
theoretical guidance to justify patent harmonization, it is desirable to discuss both utilitarian 
theory and moral rights theory.  There can be two reasons for this:  First, there is plenty of 
evidence that the legal system, both theoretically and by custom, views patents as a property that 
can effectuate both utilitarianism and moral rights.330  Second, the economic thinking necessary 
to implement utilitarian patent laws cannot address all necessary questions, such as patent 
harmonization.331  As such is the case, patent harmonization is a field where utilitarian and 
moral rights theories may complement their respective limitations.  Utilitarianism and moral 
rights can jointly structure the substantive justification of patent harmonization.  
                                                          
327 id. at 606. (For example, Dreyfuss reasons that granting copyright ownership to universities for academic 
writing might inhibit authors’ creativity by emphasizing the popular taste to which the university would likely want 
the work to appeal over perhaps more controversial topics.); See id. at 609–10. (Dreyfuss makes parallel arguments 
for control of academic works’ dissemination); See id. at 616–20 (arguing that university control of the timing of 
dissemination might dampen both the work’s quality and the author’s reputation, and the creation of derivative 
works.) 
328 id.  
329 See id. at 643. 
330 See id. at 1; id. at 12; Yen, supra note 325, at 164. 
331 id.; Yen, supra note 325, 169-72. 
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Now, in order to discuss patent harmonization based on these moral rights property 
theories, it is first necessary to investigate how the legal system, theoretically and in practice, 
views patents as property.  Then, we can continue on discussing several moral-rights property 
theories to justify patent harmonization. 
 
 
II. PATENTS AS PROPERTY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
1. Theory 
 
The use of ‘property’ in the patent law context is somewhat different from that of 
traditional context.  Historically, ‘property law’ originated with real property.  Based on this 
foundation, there are those who claim that the concept of property is and always will be a 
prisoner of its origin: it can never grow out of its formative association with physical things, 
most notably, in the Anglo-American tradition, land.332  For them, the idea of property contains 
certain historical-essentialist traits that may not be compatible with application to the intangible, 
such as intellectual property.333  
                                                          
332 MERGES, supra note 316, at 4-5. 
333 id. 
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However, the meaning of ‘property’ need not always be interpreted narrowly.  It used to 
mean the land or goods in the traditional age, but the scope of the definition has been expanded 
continuously to include newly developed objects that people consider valuable.  In supporting 
this argument, Merges says that “[o]ver its long history, the term ‘property’ has shown a restless 
capacity to jump from one arena into another, morphing and adapting as it goes.334  For 
example, property such as land, tools, trees, minerals, water, fractional ownership claims, legal 
obligations to pay money, and many others are subject to the wide embrace of the term 
“property.”335  In this sense, property can be interpreted as a broad and roomy concept. 
Under this definition of property, it has been argued that ideas or inventions, which are 
the objects of patent rights, can be a type of property.  Supporting to this argument, Spooner 
says that the ideas we have, as well as our feelings and our emotions, are our property.336  He 
argues that “[i]f the ideas, which a man has produced, were not rightfully his own, but belonged 
equally to other men, they would have the right imperatively to require him to give his ideas to 
them, without compensation; and it would be just and right for them to punish him as a criminal, 
if he refused.”337 
 
 
 
                                                          
334 Id.; See id. at footnote 140~142.  
335 id. 
336 Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 817, 822 (1990). 
337 id. 
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 2. Domestic Law 
 
This recognition of patents as property is also well recognized in several domestic patent 
laws and practices.  For example, in the United States, the Patent Act expressly declares that 
“patents shall have the attributes of personal property” and the Supreme Courts acknowledges 
them as such.338  In the James v. Campbell case in 1882, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted: 
“[T]he government of the United States when it grants letters – patent for a new invention 
or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention 
which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, any 
more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a 
private purchaser.”339  The concept of patent rights as inviolable private property rights, even 
against governmental appropriation, was reiterated in Hollister v. Benedict & Bernham Mfg. Co, 
as the Supreme Court state that: 
“[T]he right of the patentee, under letters patent for an invention granted by the United 
States, was exclusive of the government of the United States as well as of all others, and stood on 
the footing of all other property, the right to which was secured, as against the government, by 
the constitutional guaranty which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without 
compensation.” 340 
                                                          
338 Menell, supra note 42, at 37. 
339 WENWEI GUAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND PRACTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF CHINA’S 
TRIPS COMPLIANCE AND BEYOND 15 (Springer, 2014); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-8 (1882). 
340 id.; Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885). (.). 
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In addition, in the CCH Canadian Ltd. case, the Supreme Court of Canada directly 
grounds its position of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine on the Lockean property theory of 
deserts.341  Specifically, in comparison with the similar US Supreme Court case of Feist 
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Chief Justice McLachlin agreed with Justice 
O'Connor's assessment of the "sweat of the brow" approach.342  The French Patent Law of 1791 
also states, “[e]very novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to society 
belongs primarily to the person who conceived it, and it would be a violation to the very essence 
of the rights of man if an industrial invention were not regarded as the property of its creator.”343  
In addition, the European Patent Convention confirms this notion in a more conspicuous manner.  
Chapter IV deals with “the European patent application as an object of property,” and under 
Chapter IV, the convention defines the transfer and constitution of rights (Article 71), 
assignment (Article 72), and contractual licensing (Article 73).344   
 
3. An International Treaty 
 
Recognition of patent as property has been implicitly accepted internationally.  At the 
Paris Conference of 1878 which discussed the provisions for the Paris Convention for the 
                                                          
341 See id at 17. 
342 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339, para 16. 
343 A. Samuel Odd, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 267, 274 (1996); STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE- MARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., 
2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO.15 (COMM. PRINT 1958) (F. MACHLUP, AUTH.)  
344 CONVENTION ON THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS (EPC), 1973, available at https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ma1.html. 
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Protection of Industrial Property and was concluded in 1883, the following resolution was 
accepted: “The right of inventors and of industrial creators in their own work, or the right of 
manufacturers and businessmen over their trademark is a property right.”345  Although the 
sentence involving “a property right” was not included in the final draft, it reveals its 
international recognition at the time.346 
 
4. Custom 
 
Finally, it is already customary for businesses and governments to recognize a patent as 
property.  A patent is valued, transferred, assigned, and licensed in the market in the same way 
as a commodity.  The U.S. “patent market” was reported to have generated transactions totaling 
$500 million in 2006 alone.347  An October 22, 2005 the Economist article entitled “A Market 
for Ideas” stated, “[i]n America alone, technology licensing revenue accounts for an estimated 
$45 billion annually; worldwide, the figure is around $100 billion and growing fast.”348   
Many technology companies leverage patent rights and contractual licensing to create 
major revenue.  For example, IBM, which has obtained more U.S. patents than any other 
                                                          
345 Heinmich Kironstein & Imne Till, A Reevaluation Of The International Patent Convention, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 775 (1948). 
346 This spirit is partially reflected on the final text, by saying that “[i]ndustrial property shall be understood in 
the broadest sense and shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and 
extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural products.” (Paris Convention Article 1 (3)) 
347 Ashby H. B. Monk, The Emerging Market for Intellectual Property: Drivers, Restrainers, and Implications, 
Dec. 11, 2008, at 7, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092494. 
348 THE ECONOMIST, A market for ideas: a pioneering “innovation marketplace” is making steady progress, 
Sep 17th 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14460185. 
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company in the past 15 years, earned approximately $1 billion from its portfolio in 2007.349  
U.S. universities, hospitals, research institutions and technology management companies that are 
members of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) also have collectively 
earned $1 billion in annual licensing revenues every year from 2000 to 2007.350   
As a result, intellectual property assets have been considered one of the most valuable 
assets for business.  Independent research has demonstrated that in 2009, nearly 81% of the 
value of the companies comprising the S&P 500® stock index came from intangible assets, the 
largest component of which is IP.  As shown by these transactions, it is hard to deny that 
patents are treated as property in the real business world.  
  
 
 
 
                                                          
349 Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10 
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 10, 2006), available at 
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III. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PATENT AND CONVENTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
  Previous section explored several evidences that patents are recognized as a type of 
property. However, recognizing patent as a property does not necessarily mean that all the 
theories applicable to conventional property rights can be used in discussing patent issues.  
Some theories may need to be changed or adjusted, or cannot be even applied when discussing 
patent harmonization based on the property theory.  Thus, the next step in this section is to 
identify the characteristic of patents that sets it apart from conventional types of property and to 
check the applicability of property theories to the patent harmonization. 
 
1. Inexhaustible and Non-excludible Rights and Identical Qualities of Copied Objects 
 
The fundamental difference between a patent and conventional property originates in the 
unique characteristics of objects of rights. Knowledge, which is the object of patent rights, is 
inherently inexhaustible and non-excludable.351  Specifically, unlike a tangible item, knowledge 
is inexhaustible because sharing an idea with another person does not split up or deplete the 
shared idea. Moreover, even if someone claims to ‘own’ a piece of knowledge, it is very difficult 
to exclude others from using it. 352  As a result, knowledge can cause an ‘appropriability 
                                                          
351 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 6 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business) (2013) 
352 Menell, supra note 42, at 38. 
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problem,’ 353 which revolves around the ability of investors to reap the rewards of their 
investment without being taken by others.354 
The patent system was originally designed to address this appropriability problem, but it 
may not be effective in an international context where multiple owners claim rights to the same 
object.  Because the quality of copied knowledge is identical to that of its original, the patented 
knowledge can be presented anywhere in the world at the same time.  Therefore, due to the 
principle of the territoriality of patent laws, multiple people around the world can obtain 
legitimate property or patent rights granted by individual governments.  This can lead to a very 
precarious situation in which many people make legitimate arguments for different rights 
surrounding the same knowledge, invention, or other objects of intellectual property.  
 
2. Exclusionary Rights Created by Examination and Registration 
 
Under the current patent law system, patent right are created by a government after 
examination and registration.  To enforce a person’s patent rights, one has to register his or her 
rights after the government examines them.  For example, any foreigner who wants to protect 
his rights in other country has to apply for a patent in that country.  Each government grants 
patent rights after examining the invention’s ability to satisfy the national standard of 
                                                          
353 MUELLER, supra note 351, at 6. 
354 Yonatan Even, Appropriability and Property, 58:6 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2009). 
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patentability.  A government exercises its sole discretion to grant a patent, usually without 
being affected by the decisions of other countries.  
Another aspect of patent rights is that they grant exclusionary power only to one 
applicant.  In other words, once the patent applicant obtains a patent, he can prevent others from 
having patent rights over the same invention.  In this situation, the second applicant who 
invented the same item cannot make a valid claim for patent rights.  There are no so called 
‘safe-harbor’ provisions of copyrights to protect independent creation. The well-known example 
of Elisha Gray and Alexander Bell presents an extreme case on this problem.  In this case, Bell 
finally obtained an exclusive patent right over the invention of the telephone even though it was 
known that Gray and Bell invented it independently, and almost around the same time.   
 
3. The Scope of Rights Defined by Words 
 
The scope of property rights over a patent should be defined in writing.  Specifically, 
the claims in the patent application define the scope of the patent owner’s rights to exclude 
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing his or her invention.  It is as 
much of a deed to a plot of land to define the geographic boundaries of its owner’s rights as it is 
to exclude others from trespassing.355  Thus, in order for the patent system to function properly, 
                                                          
355 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
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it should be ensured that the patent claim provides a clear delineation of the scope on which 
other interested parties can rely.356   
However, in our complicated world of technology, it has become increasingly difficult to 
define the precise scope of a patented invention.  Frequently, patents fail to provide clear notice 
of the scope of its patents rights,357 because the description often does not define the clear 
boundary of the subject matter.  Innovators also find it increasingly difficult to determine 
whether an invention will violate existing patents, giving rise to inadvertent infringement.358  
Similarly, investors find it increasingly costly to negotiate the necessary patent licenses in 
advance of their technological development and adoption decisions. 359   Thus, clearance 
procedures that have worked well for tangible property are “undercut by a profusion of fuzzy 
patent rights.”360   
The problem of an unclear scope and subsequent inadvertent infringement is amplified by 
the potentially lengthy and costly litigation process.  The interpretation of the scope in a claim 
is also the focal point of any litigation involving a patent.361  For example, total litigation costs 
for a medium-risk patent infringement suit averaged an estimated $2.5 million in 2007.362  
Concerns over this blurred scope become greater in the international context when countries do 
not recognize the scope described by others and define the scope based on their own rules and 
standards.   
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357 id. 
358 id. 
359 id. 
360 id. 
361 MUELLER, supra note 351, at 25. 
362 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 355, at 46. 
 118 
IV. PROPERTY THEORIES AND PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
So far, we have discussed the characteristics that distinguish patent rights from 
conventional property rights. On the basis of this observation, this section will explore the moral-
rights property theories and its applicability for patent issues. 
 
1. Two moral-rights property theories 
 
There are many property theories that have been tried as a justification for patent rights, 
and they can be categorized as two – utilitarian and moral rights theory.  For example, William 
Fisher mainly explains the utilitarian theory, personhood, and labor theory.363  In addition to the 
three theories, he suggests that the last theory of social planning to explain the limitations of 
those theories.364  Also, Fromer confirms that moral-rights theories typically can be broken 
down into two kinds: labor-desert and personhood.365  Based on these arguments, here in this 
article, we will focus on both types of moral property theories – the personhood theory and the 
labor theory – to explore the additional justificatory grounds for patent harmonization.  
                                                          
363 WILLIAM FISHER, THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), available 
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First of all, the labor-desert theory is related to the Lockean argument of acknowledging 
the role of creation involved in labor in granting patent protection to creators that have worked 
sufficiently hard.366  Specifically, a person who labors upon resources that are either unowned 
or ‘held in common’ has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts – and that the 
state has a duty to respect and enforce that natural right.367 These ideas are widely thought to be 
especially applicable to the field of intellectual property, where the pertinent raw materials (facts 
and concepts) do seem in some sense to be “held in common” and where labor seems to 
contribute so importantly to the value of finished products.368 According to Wendy Gordon’s 
articulation in line with this idea, intellectual property rights cease to be justified when they 
“harm. . . other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting cultural matrix 
and scientific heritage.”369 
Personhood theories also establish intellectual property protection as a moral right of a 
sort, but unlike labor-desert approaches, they see creative works as a Hegelian extension of the 
author’s personality.370  Theoretically, personhood theory states that private property rights are 
crucial to the satisfaction of some fundamental human needs.371  Thus, policymakers should 
                                                          
366 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1753; See generally MERGES, supra note 316, at 31–67.; Wendy J. Gordon, A 
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strive to create and allocate entitlement to resources in a fashion that best enables people to fulfill 
those needs.372  This theory is based on Hegel’s claim that property reflects how human beings 
constitute themselves as people, that is, by extending their will to manipulate the objects of the 
external world.373   
According to Margaret Radin, “to achieve proper self-development – to be a person – an 
individual needs some control over resources in the external environment. The necessary 
assurances of control take the form of property rights.”374  There are related understandings of 
personhood by many scholars: Roberta Kwall sees “the [work’s] importance as a reflection of the 
author’s meaning and an embodiment of her message.”375  Sonia Katyal revealed the view that 
creative works may be seen as the expressions of a person’s individualism and freedom.376  And 
Stewart Sterk states that a theory grounded in moral rights “conjures up a genius irrevocably 
committed to his work.”377 
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2. Personhood Theory 
 
Between two types of moral theories – the personhood and labor theory, consider the 
personhood theory first.  It is because the personhood theory is contrary to the utilitarian theory 
in several aspects, and it can provide meaningful implications for patent harmonization.  First of 
all, the personhood theory is a typical kind of natural rights theory.  Basically, one can think of 
two types of rights – natural rights and legal rights.  At first, legal rights are those bestowed 
onto a person by a given legal system. 378 These rights can be modified, repealed, and restrained 
by human laws.379  Patent rights justified by utilitarian theory can be an example of legal rights, 
because the right is given by the law designed to maximize the utility of one nation.   
On the other hand, natural rights are not contingent upon the laws, customs, or beliefs of 
any particular culture or government, and are consequently universal and inalienable. 380 These 
rights cannot be repealed or restrained by human laws.381  Human rights or moral-rights 
property theories are examples of natural rights theory.  Specifically, moral-rights theories of 
patent rights are typically grounded in the notion of natural rights that inventors are entitled to by 
virtue of having created their works. 382  Originally, the term “moral rights” is a translation of 
the French term "droit moral," and refers not to “morals” as advocated by the religious right, but 
                                                          
378 DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW, legal 
rights (Cram 101, 2016). 
379 John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 449 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
380 CHAMPION, supra Note 61, at legal rights. 
381 Adams, supra note 62, at 449. 
382  Fromer, supra note 1, at 1753,; See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L.REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009); Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A 
Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 589–90 (1985). 
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rather to the ability of authors to control the eventual fate of their works.383  The concept of 
moral-rights theory thus relies on the connection between an author and her creation, and moral 
rights protect the personal and reputational, rather than purely monetary value of a work to its 
creator.384  Personhood theory, in this sense, is the typical example of moral-rights theory that 
supports natural rights, whereas the utilitarian theory is the case of legal rights given by 
legislation. 
 Second, the personhood theory is the ‘least’ frequently used theory to justify patents,385 
whereas the utilitarian theory is the ‘most’ popular.  Of course, according to personhood theory, 
knowledge or ideas can be the object of either personal or fungible property. To distinguish 
personal property from fungible property, and to determine whether certain property is personal 
or fungible property, Radin emphasizes the importance of consensus as a sufficient source of 
moral criteria.386  From the current consensus in patent law societies, one can say a patent is 
fungible property because it is held purely instrumentally and patent rights are not recognized as 
a part of individual personal identity.387  Thus, patent rights are considered purely economic 
rights,388  and a patent is arguably fungible property.   
                                                          
383  Betsy Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics (Mar. 1998), available at   
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html. 
384 id. 
385 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1754; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1031 (1997).  
386 Radin, supra note 370, at 969; See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punshment and Respectfor Persons: Super 
Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1176 n.109 (1980); Margaret Jane Radin, The jurisprudence of 
Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1030-42 
(1978). 
387 id. at 960. 
388 MULLER, supra note 33, at 2. 
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The personhood theory basically emphasizes the extent to which property is personal as 
opposed to fungible: the arguments justifying patent rights by this personhood theory is strongest 
when an object or idea is closely intertwined with an individual’s personal identity, and weakest 
where the “thing” is valued by the individual at its market worth. 389 As patent rights can be 
treated as fungible property, the personhood theory can provide little guidance for justifying the 
fungible property rights. 
In supporting this argument, Kwall suggests that personhood theories are seldom referred 
to in patent law because functional scientific and technological works are perhaps less likely than 
are artistic works to need modifications that may ultimately conflict with the creator’s artistic 
vision in order to serve their intended functions.390  Alternatively, Justin Hughes argues that 
most patented works have a different and smaller degree of personality than copyrighted works. 
391  In supporting this view, Hughes says:  
“[P]atentable inventions usually embody strongly utilitarian solutions to very specific 
needs. We tend not to think of them as manifesting the personality of an individual, but rather as 
manifesting a raw, almost generic insight. In inventing the light bulb, Edison searched for the 
filament material that would burn the longest, not a filament that would reflect his personality. In 
the same reason, Marconi chose to use a particular wavelength for his radio because that 
                                                          
389 PETER S. MENELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS: 
VOLUME II 158 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de Geest ed., Edward Elgar: Cheltenham) (2000). 
390 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1754; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 
874–75 (2007). 
391 id.; See Hughes, supra note 50, at 351. 
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wavelength could travel much farther than waves slightly longer, not because that wavelength 
was his preferred form of expression. "392  
On the other hand, we can find numerous opinions from academic literature which 
indicate that the utilitarian theory is the dominant theory in justification of a patent right.  As 
discussed above, in the U.S., the Supreme Court, Congress, and many legal scholars consider 
utilitarianism the dominant justificatory ground of American patent law.  These scholars support 
patent law’s protection of an inventor’s exclusive right in his technologically or scientifically 
valuable invention for a limited period of time.  The theory is that the public benefits from 
rewarding inventors for taking the two steps the inventor would otherwise have been unlikely to 
take: to invent, and possibly commercialize, in the first place, and to reveal information to the 
public about the invention that stimulates further innovation.393   
Third, personhood theories typically suggest a broader scope of intellectual property 
protection than one based on utilitarian theories.  Margaret Radin theorizes that once we admit a 
person to be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some constitutive sense, the person should be 
accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing.’394  This means that once we 
                                                          
392 id. 
393 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1754; Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 547–49 (2009). 
Utilitarian thinking comes in different flavors. One is the prospect theory, which suggests that inventors are 
rewarded with a patent right to centralize investment in the patented invention’s commercialization and 
improvement, which in turn benefits society. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977). A related theory advocates for encouraging commercialization because of its 
valuable role in diffusion of inventions. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy , supra Note 195, at 337. Another is the 
signaling theory, which proposes that patents are useful signals to financiers that the patenting firm is a worthy 
investment. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 636–37, 648 (2002); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. 
Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005).  
394 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1755; 
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think of an intellectual property right in connection with a person or personality, the person 
should be accorded broad rights over that intellectual property.  
In supporting this argument, Robert Merges says that rights based on the personhood 
theory are often designed to expand its rights until it reaches limits.395  It is because that they 
respect claims over creative objects that are bound up with the exercise of an individual’s will 
and thereby promote their personal freedom.396  In turn, such rights allow creative individuals 
the opportunity to seek to devote themselves professionally and fully to their talents.397  As long 
as property claims does not interfere with the freedom of fellow citizens as Kant suggests398, they 
need to be recognized as broadly as possible. 
Patent rights conferred by utilitarian theory, on the other hand, are designed to be limited 
and balanced in time and scope.399  If patent rights are provided too extensively, society would 
be hurt and social welfare diminished.400  Bottom line is that utilitarian theories on patents rest 
on the premise that the benefit to society of a creator crafting valuable works offsets the social 
costs of the incentives the law offers to creators.401  Thus, a balancing mechanism is necessary 
to craft the time and scope of the patent rights, and these rights need to be limited to a level that 
does not hurt social utility too much and break the balance. 
 
                                                          
395 id. at 1756; 
396 id. at 1755; 
397 id. 
398 ANNA STILZ, LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OBLIGATION, AND THE STATE 92 (Princeton University Press, 
2009). 
399 Fromer, supra note 1 at 1752; Lemley, supra note 66, at 997. 
400 id., at fn32; Lemley, supra note 66, at 996-97. 
401 id. 
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V. COPYRIGHT HARMONIZATION BASED ON PERSONHOOD THEORY 
 
 So far, we have discussed how the patent rights are different from the conventional 
property rights, and discovered that the personhood theory is positioned at the opposite side of 
the utilitarian theory. In order to investigate its implication on patent harmonization, it is helpful 
to study the similar case of copyright harmonization from the personhood theory’s perspective.  
 
1. Copyrights Harmonization based on the Personhood Theory 
 
Scholars acknowledge the historical and rhetorical uses of personhood theory in 
copyright law.402  These scholars typically view the process of creation as both personal and 
subjective.403  Thus, to authors, the artistic works they create are vehicle for their reputation or 
for esteem, which must surely relate to strong personhood interests.404  In theory, people 
experience possessory and self-concept effects with regard to their artistic creations, especially 
                                                          
402 id. at 1756; Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in 
Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 188 (2008); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455.  
403 id. at 1769, MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 38 (Harvard University 
Press, 1993) (1995); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1467 
(2010); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1881–86 (1990); cf. Rebecca 
Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522–27 
(2009) (arguing that creativity is often inspired by non-economic, intrinsic motivation).  
404 id. at 1770,; See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM: AN ESSAY ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY 13 (Oxford University Press 2004) (studying the central human desire for esteem, or 
prestige). 
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because they are self-made and far from fungible.405  They frequently believe in their works’ 
integrity, so that authors ought to be able to prevent their works from alteration.406  In fact, 
European countries, such as France, Germany, and Italy, provide authors with a broad – often 
perpetual and inalienable – range of protections based on moral-rights interests: principally, the 
rights of attribution, integrity, retraction of a work from the public, and first disclosure of a work 
to the public.407   
In this sense, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which is the major international treaty 
of copyrights, articulates the notion of “moral rights,” which protects the personal right of a 
creator, as distinguished from his economic rights.  These moral rights consist of the right to 
create, right to publish a work in any form desired, the creator's right to claim the authorship of 
his work, the right to prevent any deformation, mutilation or other modification thereof, the right 
to withdraw and destroy the work, protection from excessive criticism, and protection from all 
other injuries to the creator's personality.408 
Moreover, protection exists from the moment the author’s work is created and fixed in a 
tangible form and those rights are recognized throughout the world.  To obtain copyright 
                                                          
405 id. at 1767; See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: 
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 28 (Cambridge University Press 1981); Jon L. Pierce et al., The State of 
Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century of Research, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 86, 93–94 
(2003); accord HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 68- 69, at 54–56 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) 
(1821); see Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 87-88 (1998). On authors’ belief that their creations are personal and not fungible, see infra 
notes 130–42 and accompanying text. 
406 id. at 1768; See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
407 id. at 1756; Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 268 (2009); Henry Hansmann & 
Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 95, 95–96 (1997). 
408 Adam Moore & Ken Himma, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Intellectual Property (Sep 22, 2014), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intellectual-property/. 
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protection, authors need only create a qualifying work.409  There is no requirement that a work 
be published to be protected under copyright law,410 and protection is vested in authors without 
reference to any formality like patent registration.411 Registration in the national copyright office 
is an additional, voluntary act.412  In other words, copyright automatically exists throughout the 
world from the moment the work is created.  
In this sense, the Berne Convention in Article 5(2) and the TRIPS Agreement confirms 
that copyright protection – unlike most other forms of intellectual property rights – should not be 
subject to any formality of registration, deposit or the like.413  Thus, in the London Film case, 
the court reasoned that it is not required to second-guess the administrative decision of a foreign 
government.414  The courts also argues that “[a]lthough the United States is not a party to the 
multilateral copyright treaty known as the Berne Convention, American nationals obtain 
copyright protection under foreign laws by virtue of the Universal Copyright Convention. The 
principal of the U.C.C. is the same as that of the Berne Convention. Under both treaties ‘an 
author who is a national of one of the member states ... or one who publishes his work in any 
such member state, is entitled to the same copyright protection in each other member state as 
such other state accords its own nationals.’ ”415 
                                                          
409 id. at 1749 
410 id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring only that a work be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” to be 
copyrightable). 
411 id.; Registration of a protected work with the Copyright Office is permissive. id. § 408(a). To bring an 
infringement action, though, a copyright holder must in the ordinary case first have registered the copyright with the 
Copyright Office. id. § 411(a). 
412 United States Copyright Office, Copyright in General, available at http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-
general.html#what. 
413 TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 118, at 42. 
414 GOLDSTEIN, supra Note 25, at 37. 
415 580 F. Supp. at FN5 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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The close link between copyrights and the personhood theory can suggest the strong 
justification for international harmonization. As copyrights justified by the personhood theory 
are natural rights existing regardless of a legal frame, they can support the international 
harmonization of laws.  A person who has obtained a copyright in one Berne Convention 
country possesses automatic copyright protection in all Berne Convention countries.416  The 
Berne Convention eliminates many of the various formal requirements with which copyright 
owners were required to comply in the past.417  In this sense, as the U.S. Copyright Office 
notices, “one country (the United States) has copyright relations with most countries throughout 
the world, and as a result of these agreements, we honor each other's citizens' copyrights.”418  
As personhood theory highlights the universal value of property rights, it can be argued that 
copyrights should be recognized and harmonized regardless of domestic laws and policies. 
 
2. The limitation of personhood theory in patent harmonization 
 
Unlike the copyright that exists automatically from the moment the work is created, 
patent system is very different. A patent is granted by the national patent office based on its 
relevant domestic patent law.  A patent is granted after successfully undergoing examination by 
the patent office which ascertains that an invention meets the conditions for patentability and the 
                                                          
416 id. at 4.  
417 id. 
418 United States Copyright Office, Copyright in General, available at http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-
general.html#what./help/faq/faq-general.html#what. 
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description in the patent application satisfies certain disclosure requirements.419  Thus, the 
validity of a patent is confined to the country in which the patent is issued, and does not exist 
until the patent office has completed the process of patent examination. 
As a result, whereas the Berne convention has achieved the copyrights harmonization, the 
international patent agreement has failed to reach such a high level of harmonization. It is true 
that the Paris Convention, one of the international agreements in the patent laws, essentially 
allowed a person who has filed a patent application in one member country to file another 
application for the same invention in another member country, and to establish an effective filing 
date for the second application equivalent to that of the original application.420  However, 
because this is largely a procedural tool, it does not address each member country’s substantive 
patent laws much.421  Hence, patent owners must comply with various formal and substantive 
legal requirements in each of the countries in which they seek patent protection.422 
The previous discussion in copyright harmonization and personhood theory can provide 
the answer to the reason why patent harmonization has been unsuccessful. The personhood 
theory is a natural-rights theory, thus it can have strong implications for harmonizing copyrights. 
With this theory in mind, if international communities want to achieve patent harmonization, one 
possibility is that they reach a consensus that patent rights are rooted in the morally based 
personhood theory.  There is certainly support for this idea. For instance, some scholars have 
                                                          
419 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1750,; 35 U.S.C. § 131. The Patent Act requires disclosure of certain content 
within the patent by calling for a written description, enablement, and best mode. id. § 112. See generally Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546–94 (2009) (describing these requirements and arguing that 
they do not suffice for useful and clear disclosures). 
420  HARMONIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/documents/745350cd-5bca-4f48-8327-8a450138a2e7.pdf. 
421 id. 
422 id. 
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underscored a strong notion of the romantic inventor employing his or her particular brand of 
genius to create valuable scientific and technological works.423  Specifically, they argue that 
Radin’s characterization of the connection between personhood and control over one’s resources 
seems just as apt for inventions as it does for artistic works protected by copyright law.424  All 
in all, an inventor might maintain personhood interests in his or her creations, but perhaps in 
different ways that an author retains in his or her artistic works.  
However, excluding isolated cases related to personhood rights such as traditional 
knowledge or folklore, almost no country recognizes a patent’s personhood characteristic 
aspects.  In other words, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, the personhood theory is 
the “least” popular theory to justify patent laws because the patent system is particularly 
concerned with inventions’ functionality, a quality not necessary for artistic works.425  As a 
result, the personhood theory is rarely applied to explanations of patent laws and other policy 
issues, such as patent harmonization.   
In sum, the case of the copyrights harmonization provides us a guidance that international 
harmonization can be achieved based on the natural-rights theory, such as personhood theory.  
Thus, in order to find a normative justification for patent harmonization, it is worth employing 
natural rights theories.  Of course, that justificatory theory should be compatible with the 
current patent regime. 
 
                                                          
423 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1755. 
424 id. 
425 Fromer, supra note 1, at 1776. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
When the utilitarian theory fails to provide satisfactory justification for patent 
harmonization, it is worth studying a new approach based on the property theory. At first, 
distinction between legal and natural rights is useful to give an important implication on the 
international harmonization of rights. Natural rights can be harmonized internationally with ease, 
thanks to its universal feature.  On the other hand, legal rights can be modified, repealed, and 
restrained by domestic laws and policies, thus these rights are very hard to be harmonized among 
countries.  
In this sense, personhood theory provides interesting insights that the utilitarian theory 
cannot.  The discussion of copyrights harmonization based on the personhood theory confirms 
the usefulness of natural-rights theory to justify international harmonization of laws.  When we 
can ascertain that a given property right is personal, there is a prima facie case that rights should 
be protected to some extent against invasion by governments.426  But, personhood theory is 
rarely used to justify patent laws, as the patent system is particularly based on inventions’ 
functionality, a quality not necessary for artistic works.427  As a result, personhood theory 
cannot be used to justify the patent harmonization as it does in copyrights harmonization. 
To explore further, it is necessary to pay attention to Locke’s labor theory.  As we have 
briefly mentioned, Locke’s theory is a type of moral rights theory, like the personhood theory.  
                                                          
426 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 71 (University of Chicago Press 1993) (1993). 
427 id. at 1776; 
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Because it is a natural rights theory, with several exceptions and limitations, it could be a theory 
that supports international harmonization.  Also, we can find numerous scholars who explain 
the patent system based on Locke’s theory.  Thus, from the next chapter, we are going to 
discuss Locke’s theory and patent harmonization, and related policy issues in detail.  
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CHAPTER 6 
LOCKE’S THEORY FOR PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
 
The property theory on which we need to finally focus is Locke’s labor theory.  Locke’s 
labor theory stems from the propositions that a person who labors upon resources that are either 
not owned or “held in common” has a natural property right to the fruits of his or her efforts, and 
that the state has a duty to respect and enforce that natural right.428  Fundamentally, Locke 
famously understood individual rights, property rights in particular, as belonging to people in its 
“state of nature.”429  In this sense, Locke asserted that the property rights existed before 
communities were settled.430  He contended that s7uch civil societies are instituted voluntarily 
by individual right-holders because they are superior means to protect their pre-exiting rights.431   
                                                          
428 FISHER, supra note 363, at footnote 4; See, for example, Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 299-330 (1988). 
429 id.; Locke writes “want [lack] of a common judge, with authority, puts all persons in a state of nature” and 
again, “Men living according to reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between them, is properly the 
state of nature.” (Two Treatises 2.19) Many commentators have taken this as Locke's definition, concluding that the 
state of nature exists wherever there is no legitimate political authority able to judge disputes and where people live 
according to the law of reason. On this account the state of nature is distinct from political society, where a 
legitimate government exists, and from a state of war where men fail to abide by the law of reason. (Locke’s 
political Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-
political/#StaNat) 
430 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE, Sec. 45 (P. Laslett, ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970) (1970). 
431 MERGES, supra note 316, at 93. 
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It has been debated amongst scholars whether Locke’s theory can justify the patent 
system.  Some argue that the basic philosophy under intellectual property is to reward one’s 
labor.  They maintain that Locke’s theory highlighting labor and desert can provide important 
justification and provide meaningful implications to solve many patent law issues.  On the other 
hand, others argue that Lock’s theory cannot justify intellectual property, especially patents, 
because they are incompatible with the actual operation of the current patent system.  Modern 
patent laws, they argue, are exemplified by the first-to-file system, the lack of independent 
creation, and the limited duration of patent rights.432  They think those features cannot be 
explained by Locke’s theory and also criticize Locke’s vague expressions which do not make it 
clear whether the theory can be applicable to ideas or intellectual assets.  
However, in our path to find a normative foundation to guide patent harmonization 
issues, Lockean property theory can give us meaningful insights which the utilitarian discussion 
or personhood theory cannot. As discussed below, Locke’s theory is basically a natural and 
moral theory, and it sits in an interesting position between the utilitarian theory and the 
personhood theory.  While Locke’s labor theory can be one of the strongest arguments in 
support of patent rights, it can also, as a moral theory, justify the international harmonization of 
patent rights and provide meaningful guidelines to related issues.  
 
 
 
                                                          
432 id. 
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I. LOCKE’S PROPERTY THEORY AND PATENT RIGHTS 
 
Many scholars argue that, in addition to the utilitarian theory, Locke’s labor theory 
provides strong theoretical grounds for intellectual property, including patents.  In essence, the 
Lockean theory recognizes intellectual property rights in the same way, fundamentally as 
property rights in other type of assets – from personal goods to land, air, inventions and books.433  
Also, it is notable that Locke himself expressly labels copyright as a type of a property.434  He 
also wrote approvingly inventions and technical arts as exemplars of value-creating, productive 
labor that creates all property. 435   Moreover, as numerous commentators have observed, 
Locke’s theory of appropriation is, in fact, easily applied to defend in the context of intellectual 
property than it is in the domain of tangible property.436  Ayn Rand, for example, claimed, 
“patents and copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: a man’s 
right to the product of his mind.”437  Furthermore, Merge argues that Locke’s theory applies 
equally well, if not better, to intellectual property,438 and his reasons are as follows:  
“First, Locke's focus on appropriation from a ‘state of nature’ fits much more accurately 
the usual ‘origin story’ of our own time. . .  Second, it is well understood that for Locke, labor 
plays a crucial role in both justifying and bounding property rights.  Again, there are strong 
                                                          
433 Adam Mossoff, Why Intellectual Property Rights? A Lockean Justification (May 4, 2015), available at 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/why-intellectual-property-rights-a-lockean-justification/. 
434 id. 
435 id. 
436  Gregory S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENEVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 191 
(Cambridge University Press, April 9, 2012). 
437 id. at 192 
438 MERGES, supra note 316, at 32. 
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parallels to the world of IP rights. . .  Finally, . . . Locke recognizes the work required in 
researching and writing, and so implicitly at any rate legitimizes a labor-based property claim for 
the end product of this type of work.”439 
In fact, Locke’s argument for private property differs in fundamental ways from 
utilitarian approaches which highlight the instrumental value of property rights to some further 
extent, e.g., aggregate welfare or utility.  The argument for Lockean intellectual property rights 
would be a straightforward application of Locke’s theory of appropriation to the domain of ideas: 
(1) the inventor/creator owns herself; (2) she therefore owns her own labor; (3) invention and 
intellectual creation are the products of labor; and (4) consequently, she owns the 
inventions/creations generated through her intellectual labor.440 
In this sense, contrary to the utilitarian theory, Locke’s theory is built around notions of 
moral desert.441  The notion of desert remains a familiar and prominent feature of morality,442 
as Becker mentioned, “I took the trouble to make it; I deserve some reward for my efforts. . .”443  
In other words, the above notion safeguards intellectual property rights as they emanate from the 
natural law right to the fruit of one’s labor.444  Subsequent to such logic, it would be appropriate 
to state that, as one has a right to retain the crops he or she plants, so do those who generate their 
ideas and produce their art.  Therefore, when one has improved what was before unimproved 
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(or created what before did not exist), one is entitled to the result of one’s labor, because one 
deserves it.445 
 
 
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCKE’S THEORY 
 
This section is going to discuss Locke’s theory by comparing it with other justifying 
theories such as the utilitarian theory and the personhood theory, which was covered in the 
previous chapter.  The comparison will furnish us with a more comprehensive understanding of 
the Lockean theory and patent rights, and will provide insights and guidelines in discussing 
patent harmonization. 
 
1. Justifying the patent system, but not as frequently as the utilitarian theory 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the utilitarian property theory is, without a doubt, 
the dominant view of the concept of property today, at least among lawyers.446  However, it is 
true that Locke’s theory has also significantly influenced the crafting and interpreting of patent 
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 139 
laws. It seems clear that the utilitarian as well as Lockean theories offer robust normative 
justifications for intellectual property rights, and historically were both called upon by courts and 
commentators.447  In supporting this argument, Palmer even thinks that the Lockean argument 
and the utilitarian arguments are close cousins.448  He says this because the utilitarian theories 
are explicitly consequentialist (and welfarist), while natural rights theories usually contain, what 
Alan Ryan calls, “a buried utilitarian assumption.”449  
For instance, property rights by the labor theory were first defined by a mixture of 
statutes enacted by the British Parliament and later by American legislatures and common law 
court decisions.450  In line with this trend, legislators and judges alike were motivated by the 
Lockean property theory in securing intellectual property rights, including patent rights, as 
fundamental property rights.451  
 
2. Natural rights theory, but not as universal as the personhood theory 
 
As we have discussed above, Locke’s labor-desert theory is based on the natural rights 
property theory.  Locke argued that people have rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and 
                                                          
447 Mossoff, supra note 433.; See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 footnote 18 (2003) (noting the 
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450 id.  
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property, which have a rigid foundation independent of the laws of any particular society.452  
These characteristics of Locke’s theory as a natural rights theory become clear when discussing 
his definition of ‘the state of nature.’  Locke’s theory of the state of nature is tied closely to his 
theory of natural law that defines the right of persons and their status as free and equal 
persons.453 
In some sense, Locke’s argument of property is much related to the personhood 
argument.  It has been argued that the key moral insight in Locke’s Two Treatises of Civil 
Government is that all property arises from the fact that individuals must produce value required 
for a flourishing human life.454  Accordingly, property rights define the sphere of liberty 
required for an individual to create, use, and dispose of these values.455   
This means that Locke’s property theory can be justified at least by exercising labor, but 
only when that labor can add value for flourishing a human life. For example, Merges criticized 
Nozick’s famous anecdote of ‘tomato juice’ 456  for not fulfilling this human-flourishing 
requirement.457  According to his argument, a property right is assumed to one as a natural right, 
but they should not be given if, from the beginning, they cannot meet this human-flourishing 
requirement.458  In other words, one’s property or patent rights would be denied if one does not 
satisfy the purpose for a flourishing human life.  This argument shows that labor theory share 
the common grounds with the personhood theory. 
                                                          
452 Moore & Himma, supra note 408.  
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456 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (Oxford, 1974); Nozick writes “If I own a can of 
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Although Locke’s theory recognizes natural property rights and is closely related with 
personhood or human-flourishing theory, Locke’s theory is not as universal a natural-rights 
theory as the personhood theory.  The personhood property theory consistently recognizes 
rights regardless of any condition, just because they are necessary to realize one’s personnel.  
This is very universal, as it is built on the recognition that human rights have a higher value than 
any other economic sense.  As a result, personhood theory asserts its rights without any 
limitations or conditions.  
However, Locke’s natural property rights are subject to certain limitation by the 
government. Locke proposed the claim of social contract where people in the state of nature 
conditionally transfer some of their rights to the government in order to better ensure the stable, 
comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty, and property.459  Locke repeatedly makes clear 
throughout the Second Treatise that a person in a democratic government “consents” to the laws 
(including property laws) enacted by the governing majority.460  He states that, “every man, by 
consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an 
obligation to everyone of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be 
concluded by it.”461  This presumably means that a citizen’s property rights can be subject to 
the goals of the government, if and only if the majority of people consents it.  By consent of 
most, there can be some limits on one’s rights; and this is quite contrary to the personhood theory 
that posits no limit on rights. 
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3. Balancing mechanism to define rights, but not as strictly as utilitarian 
 
In addition to the control by governments and consents, property rights by Locke are 
primarily limited by certain conditions – three provisos. As Waldron observes, it certainly 
appears to be the unanimous opinion of Locke’s interpreters and critics that Locke intended a 
restriction on acquisition.462  Locke’s three constraints, or provisos, are as follows:  First, 
appropriation out of the commons is permissible where “there is enough, and as good left in the 
commons for others.” – this is known as the sufficiency proviso.  Second, no one may 
appropriate more than he can use before it spoils.463  Locke says that “[w]hatever is beyond this, 
is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or 
destroy.”464  It is often called non-waste proviso.  Finally, there is the charity proviso.  With 
strong echoes from Thomas Aquinas, Locke states that, “justice gives every man a title to the 
product of his honest industry and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so 
charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme 
want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.”465  
 Although Locke’s theory does not require the very strict calculation of costs and benefits 
that the utilitarian theory obliges, the provisos of Locke’s theories suggests that the rights 
justified by Locke’s theory are not as broad as that of the personhood theory.  Because property 
                                                          
462 Jeremy Waldron, Enough and as Good Left for Others, Philosophical Quarterly 29, no 117 (1979) 319-28. 
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rights by Locke are justified only when meeting these three conditions, the scope of rights should 
be limited in consequence.   
In this sense, satisfying the three conditions or provisos by Locke is a significant 
consideration in arguing for patent rights.  As Merges states that the provisos hold great 
promise for resolving some difficult issues in intellectual property law,466 it is necessary to look 
at three provisos in depth to discuss the patent harmonization issue. 
 
(1) Two Provisos: The sufficiency proviso and the non-waste proviso 
First, it is necessary to discuss two relevant provisos that have significant implications on 
patent rights – the sufficiency proviso and non-waste proviso.  Locke’s proviso appears 
immediately when he introduces labor and original appropriation, starting with paragraph 27467: 
“for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in 
common for others.”468 
The stricture to leave “enough, and as good . . . for others” is referred to as the sufficiency 
proviso.  The proviso works as a condition for granting property rights, patent rights cannot be 
justified – whether as a domestic or international matter – if they cannot satisfy the sufficiency 
proviso.  
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In addition, Locke argues with great emphasis that “an appropriator must not waste his or 
her property or take more than s/he can use.”469  In paragraph 31 in his First Treatise of 
Government, Locke adds what is generally called the spoliation or non-waste proviso: 
“It will perhaps be objected to this, That if gathering the Acorns, or other Fruits of the 
Earth, etc., makes a right to them, then anyone may ingross as much as he will. To which I 
answer, Not so. The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also 
bound that Property too. God has given us all things richly . . . But how far has He given it to us? 
To enjoy. As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much 
he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and 
belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”470 
 
(2) Two Provisos and Patent Rights 
Some scholars who think that Locke’s theory cannot justify the current patent system 
argue that patent rights cannot meet these provisos, particularly sufficiency proviso.  Nozick is 
one of those scholars.  He argues that the sufficiency proviso in the patent law context only 
requires that patents was not hindered from inventing it independently and should not last longer 
than – on average – the period it would have taken for someone else to invent the same device 
who had the knowledge of the invention.471  But, modern patent laws cannot meet this condition 
because they do not recognize the doctrine of independent creation or a safe harbor to protect 
                                                          
469 KARL WIDERQUIST, LOCKEAN THEORIES OF PROPERTY: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UNILATERAL APPROPRIATION 3 
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independent inventors. In other words, under the current system of awarding patents, only one 
inventor reaps the full benefits of his or her labor; other inventors are denied these benefits, 
regardless of the labor it took to invent.472 The compliance with Locke’s theory requires 
fundamental changes of patent system, and those cannot be accepted within intellectual property 
communities with ease.  
To confront this issue, it is necessary to investigate the sufficiency proviso in detail.  
There have been diverse arguments by scholars on the interpretation of this proviso.  Some 
scholars think that this sufficiency proviso should not be treated as a necessary condition.  For 
example, Nozick agreed that the sufficiency proviso poses a challenge to his entitlement 
conception of justice when it is interpreted as a necessary condition on acquisition, and attempts 
to defuse the treat by interpreting that concept differently. 473  In the same context, Waldron 
argues that sufficiency proviso should be a sufficient condition (in the logical sense) but not 
necessary one: meeting the sufficiency proviso is not a requirement of legitimate appropriation, 
but where satisfied, it justifies a claim to property.474  Waldron thinks that this proviso is better 
understood as a sufficient condition because Locke is saying that there is certainly no difficulty 
with unilateral acquisition (which satisfies the other provisos) in circumstances of plenty, but he 
is leaving open the possibility that some other basis might have to be found to regulate 
acquisition in circumstances of scarcity.475  Agreeing with the Waldron’s opinion, Merges 
argues as follows: 
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“If you can satisfy the sufficiency condition, you are home free; there is no further 
requirement that your appropriation avoid all spoilage. Appropriation that meets the sufficiency 
condition is necessarily modest, and hence, non-wasteful. So the prohibition on spoilage is 
automatically satisfied when appropriation leaves ‘as much and as good for others.’ Where 
spoliation enters the picture the sufficiency condition cannot be satisfied. Under conditions of 
scarcity, appropriation is permitted even though one is unable to leave enough and good for the 
others. But in such condition, appropriation is limited to the amount that the appropriator will not 
waste. Thus, only when the sufficiency condition is inoperative, the spoliation steps in to limit 
what one can take.”476 
Although many scholars disagree with Waldron’s formulation,477 his interpretation of 
Locke can provide an important idea to justify current patent system as well as to discuss the 
patent harmonization based on Locke’s theory.  It is true that the current patent system is not 
compatible with the strict interpretation of sufficiency proviso and substantial reform is 
necessary to meet this requirement.  However, if we follow Waldron’s argument, because the 
sufficiency proviso is a sufficient condition, there is a possibility that a person can obtain a valid 
claim over an object even if one fails to leave others with "enough, and as good."478  As a result, 
although current patent systems cannot meet the sufficiency proviso, patent rights still can be 
justified if we can satisfy other provisos, non-waste and charity proviso. 
This leads to a conclusion that non-waste proviso should be considered very importantly. 
This proviso is particularly significant because it ensures substantial equality by limiting the size 
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of holding to the amount a person can work directly.479  In the context of intellectual property, 
Merges interprets that, “[f]or spoilage to occur, it is necessary that . . . the owner of the item must 
truly not use it at all, must let it go completely to waste. . . The real key, the guiding principle 
that Locke was driving at, is not an unsatisfied demand, but a thing that has been appropriated 
and then put to no productive use at all.”480  
According to his argument, spoilage or non-waste proviso cannot be met only when the 
patent rights are completely useless.  Thus, as long as someone gets some use out of the mere 
concept or idea, spoilage proviso can be met and patent rights should be recognized.481  Until it 
is certain that yet undeveloped variants will never in fact be put into use, we should refrain from 
declaring spoliation and invalidating a portion of the patent rights.482  This means that if one 
patent is helpful to give ideas leading to subsequent invention, its usefulness and non-
wastefulness should be recognized.  In sum, non-waste proviso can be consistent with the 
current patent system properly. 
 
 (3) The charity proviso 
Locke believed in a strong duty of charity by which everyone is entitled to maintain 
subsistence.483  Although intellectual property scholars have not had much to say about the 
charity proviso in Locke’s second treatise, the charity proviso is absolutely central to Locke’s 
ideas.484 
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In paragraph 42 of his First Treatise of Government, Locke introduced the charity 
proviso, as follows: 
“God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children such a property in his 
peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the 
surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his pressing wants call for 
it: and therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property 
in land or possessions; since it would always be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother 
perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the 
product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so 
charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme 
want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.” 
In this paragraph, Locke suggests two important aspects regarding the charity proviso: (1) 
that property does not confer the right to deny relief to those in “pressing want”; and (2) that 
people in desperate need have an actual, binding right to the assets held by legitimate owners, 
and this right arises from the same source, and carries the same weight, as an initial 
appropriator’s right.485   
Even in Locke’s expansive theory of legislative power, the state cannot abrogate an 
owner’s duty of charity, since the beneficiaries of the duty cannot waive their own obligation of 
self-preservation.486  As Merges argues, “Locke says that people in desperate need have a claim 
                                                          
485 id. at 273. 
486 ALEXANDER & PENEVER, supra note 436, at 197.  
 149 
on the assets held by legitimate owners.487  For Locke, the destitute have title to the goods they 
need to survive, even when those goods are otherwise legitimately held by others, either through 
valid original appropriation or a subsequent transfer from an original acquisition.”488 
The inescapability of the duty of charity is clearly relevant for owners of intellectual 
property rights governing products necessary for human survival.  The most obvious example 
of this would be patents for life-saving medicines,489 which will be discussed later. 
 
 (4) Summary 
Applying Locke’s theory to the patent law system is not straightforward.  Locke sets 
three limitations or provisos – sufficiency, non-waste, and charity, but there was a problem that 
those provisos, especially sufficiency proviso, cannot be compatible with the current patent 
rights.  In this situation, some scholars’ arguments that sufficiency proviso is actually a 
sufficient condition is helpful to explain current patent systems and to continue discussing patent 
harmonization based on Locke’s theory.  From next section, we are going to discuss the 
theoretical framework to discuss patent harmonization from Locke’s perspective. 
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III. LOCKE’S THEORY AND PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
The previous discussion of the Locke’s theory in relation with patent rights reveals the 
interesting point that labor theory is positioned between utilitarian theory and personhood theory 
in many ways.  Specifically, utilitarian theory and personhood theory are two extremes, 
representing legal rights and natural rights, and Locke’s theory can be a compromise between 
two extreme theories.  As Locke’s theory justifies the natural-rights, it opens the possibility to 
support harmonization laws, similar to personhood theory.  As discussed in personhood theory, 
natural-rights theory highlights the universal feature of rights, and these rights should not 
influenced by individual governments’ policies.  Thus, it can provide strong justification for 
international harmonization.  But, unlike universal personhood theory, the scope of its rights 
should be limited, as Locke highlights the role of governments and three restrictions for the 
property rights.  
As Locke’s theory has the mixture characteristics of both utilitarian and personhood 
theory, it is meaningful to look at patent harmonization from Locke’s perspective.  At first, 
based on the basic features of a natural-rights theory, Locke’s theory can arguably provide a 
strong normative foundation for patent harmonization as the personhood theory does.  It is 
supported by Locke’s argument that, although positive law can give a precise form to the 
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indeterminate law of nature, the precepts of natural law must continue to operate in the civil 
society that is needed.490   
However, the mere recognition of natural rights does not necessarily mean that all 
elements of patent laws should be harmonized or more unified.  In fact, patent harmonization 
covers broader and more technical issues such as patentable subject matter, the scope of patent 
rights, and duties levied on the patentee.  It is true that natural rights theory can give theoretical 
grounds for the inevitability and necessities of international harmonization of patent rights, but it 
does not give us a detailed guidance or strategies on how individual patent laws should be 
harmonized. 
The project in this thesis is to provide a reasonable justification for patent harmonization 
based on the recognition of patents as property, and find practical guidelines for the related 
policy issues.  For this purpose, it is necessary to build an analytic framework based on Locke’s 
theory in order to analyze actual issues.  In doing this work, it is notable that Locke, unlike 
other typical libertarian theorists, highlights the role of government and the power of legislation 
for the citizenry.  Thus, from below, we are going to explore the role of government, which is 
the entity that makes law, and the abovementioned Locke’s three provisos in relationship with 
patent harmonization. 
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1. Lockean Property Theory and Governments 
 
It is apparent that Locke says much about individual property rights as well as the role of 
government.  In fact, from the beginning, Locke’s theory was not a theory of property, but of 
government.  As Alexander and Penever argue, “Locke did not write the Treatise as a defense of 
private ownership. The Treatise is the foremost defense of democratic self-government against 
pretensions of monarchial absolutism. Locke’s theory of property is instrumental, but ultimately 
subservient, to this project of constructing the basis for democratic political theory.”491 
However, in Locke’s view, a government can no more justly contravene the law of nature 
than individuals could before the formation of civil government.492  In the context of property 
rights, the state’s power is therefore limited by the natural rights of property which exist at the 
time the government is formed.493  These include the right to continue the possession of 
rightfully appropriated property unless the owner consents to lose it.494  This Lockean argument 
about natural property rights shares common ground with libertarian property theorists who 
argue that intellectual property rights are an example of natural property rights that pre-exist 
prior to formation of a government, and that the government is therefore naturally bound to the 
natural laws.495  
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For example, Daniel Webster, the famous Whig politician known as the Great Orator, 
introduced legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives 1824 to secure patent rights to all 
first inventors regardless of their national citizenship.496  Webster said that this was justified 
because: “at this time of day, and before this Assembly, . . . he need not argue that the right of 
the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his mind – it belongs to him more than any other 
property – he does not inherit it – he takes it by no man’s gift – it peculiarly belongs to him, and 
he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.497”  Even Webster’s opponent in this legislative 
debate agreed with Webster that the law should “protect the just rights of patentees” by securing 
“the property which an inventor has in that which is the product of his own genius.498”  
Although property rights are among rights derived from the state of nature that continue 
to constrain government, Locke thinks that the legislature has the power to interpret what natural 
law requires in this matter in a fairly substantial way.499  As a result, the scope of intellectual 
property rights justified within the state of nature would be subject to a great deal of revision 
within the civil society for a variety of reasons (including utilitarian concerns).500   
To summarize, under Locke's theory, patent rights should be recognized internationally 
because they implement what are natural property rights.  Of course, the three Lockean provisos 
should be met for individuals at the outset.  Furthermore, although a country or a government 
does not have the power to nullify patent rights once they are justified by Locke’s theory, a 
country or a government can have ample discretion in the implementation and interpretation of 
those rights.  
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The question remains what – under Locke’s theory – the government can do specifically.  
Regarding this point, Locke mentions that government can implement or interpret rights based 
on the people's consents.  Particularly, if a government regulates patent rights in the way its 
people desire, each patent law would consequentially diverge and fragmented.  Thus, in order to 
solve the conflict revolving around patent harmonization, it is necessary to look beyond existing 
work by focusing on government’s roles or its powers.   
 
2. The Analytic Framework for Patent Harmonization 
 
(1) The State of Nature and International Relations 
To discuss the government’s role in patent harmonization with insights from Locke’s 
thoery, it is first necessary to apply Lockean property theory in the international environment.  
Surprisingly, perhaps, the state-of-nature idea in Locke’s original model is well applied to the 
international context.  As Alex Tuckness has observed, Locke describes international relations 
as the very same way as the state of nature, and so in principle “states should have the same 
power . . . in the international community that individuals have in the state of nature.”501  As a 
result (in discussing international crime), he concludes that “the most common interpretation has 
been that the power to punish internationally is symmetrical with the power to punish in the state 
of nature.”502  
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Moreover, in the international relations context is well compatible with Locke’s state of 
nature in the sense that both are rooted in consents or agreements.  As Michael Sendel 
observes, “[the international dispute on what the rules of intellectual property] should be, [is] . . . 
, in a way, . . . the last frontier of the state of nature . . . [A]mong nations where there is no 
uniform law of patent rights and property rights, it's up for grabs until, by some act of consent, 
some international agreement, people enter into some settled rules.”503  This argument is 
symmetric with Locke’s argument that consent is the major factor in the establishment of a 
regulation or government.  It has been extensively argued by scholars that international laws are 
basically based on consents of each country.504  As a result, one can conclude that ‘consent’ is a 
common feature to infer that international relations are very similar to the concept of Locke’s 
state of nature. 
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(2) Property Rights and Sovereign Rights 
The previous assumption on the symmetry between Locke’s definition of state of nature 
and the international environment is a starting point to link Locke’s labor theory with 
international patent harmonization.  As Alex Tuckness argues, one can assume that an 
individual country acts like an individual in this international model.505  Then, a country can 
claim the property rights that were originally given to an individual by Locke’s theory.  Of 
course, in order to make this analogy work, a country’s claimed property rights must involve a 
country should exercise labor and satisfy the three provisos. 
Yet, recognizing this symmetry leaves an important question.  What are the property 
rights that a country can acquire?  Until now, we have argued that individuals can have property 
rights or patent rights justified by the Lockean theory.  Does a country “acquire” patent rights 
owned by the government?  Maybe not.  Patent rights are given to individuals, not to 
countries.  Thus, the question continues, what are the property rights that a country has in this 
international model? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to find the rights of a country that is well 
recognized in the international relations. One possible example is the sovereign power. 
Specifically, sovereignty over natural resources is a well-established principle of international 
law recognized by the international community.506  As reflected in the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
                                                          
505 Moore & Himma, supra note 408. 
506 id. at 1. 
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Resources507, every state has the right of development and economic self; “1. The right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the 
State concerned.”  Ultimately, the principle determines the exclusive508 , absolute 509 , and 
inalienable510 right of every nation to explore and exploit the natural resources within its 
borders511 – both territorial and maritime512 – without interference of any other State.  It 
provides a country the exclusive option of choosing its own public policies according to its 
beliefs and what better suits a determinant community or the entire population.  The power to 
develop and explore its own natural resources is now a matter of domestic policy.513  
It is notable that the concept of ‘natural resources’ needs not to be limited only to tangible 
and conventional resources.  For instance, the 1968 African Convention of Natural Resources 
defines natural resources as “renewable resources, tangible and non-tangible, including soil, 
water, flora and fauna and non-renewable resources.” 514   (Emphasis added)  The 1992 
                                                          
507 See id. at 4; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (14 Dec 1962), 
available at: http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311.pdf?OpenElement. 
(last visited 19 July 2013) 
508 See id. at 2.; David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State 
Practice or Customary International Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 771, 774 (1999).   
509 See id.; A. D. Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The 
Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 37, 43 (1997).  
510 See id. at 4.; Peters P., et al., Responsibility of the States in Respect of the Exercise of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Netherlands International Law Review, issue 03, Vol. 36, (1989), p. 292   
511 See id.; PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I 187 
(Manchester University Press, 1995) (1995).  
512 See id.; Art. 193 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982), 1833 
U.N.T.S. (hereinafter UNCLOS), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf., (last visited 19 July 2013) (reaffirms 
the same principle: “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental 
policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment”) 
513 id.   
514 See id. at 3.; Art. V n. 1 of African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, (15 
September 1968), 1001 U.N.T.S. 4, available at http://www.africa-
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Biodiversity Convention refers to biological resources and defines it as “genetic resources, 
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual 
or potential use or value for humanity.”515  In line with this argument, one can logically expand 
the definition of “natural resources” into the inclusion of intellectual assets in the domain of 
intellectual property law. 
The analogy between property rights and sovereign rights are well supported by several 
international cases, which refer to state’s sovereignty rights in a similar fashion to property 
rights, by including the essence of property rights: the rights to exclude and use. It is often said 
that sovereignty implies the existence of a right to exclude other nation – states and foreign 
entities such as corporation,516 and the right to use; for example, it is mentioned in the Island of 
Palmas Case: “[t]erritorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to display the activities of 
a State.”517  Moreover, General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) by United Nations stipulates 
that States may exercise their right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources 
‘wherever deemed desirable by them for their own progress and economic development.’518 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/Text/nature%20and%20natural%20recesource.pdf. (last visited 19 July 2013).   
515 See id.; Art. 2 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf. (last visited 19 July 2013). 
516 GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INDIGINOUS PEOPLES AND TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS 109, (Sheldon Krimsky 
and Peter shorett Edit, 2005, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.). 
517 MIGUEL MORAIS AGUIAR, DOES SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTRAINS A STATE’S SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS 
OVER ITS NATURAL RESOURCES 3 (2013), 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/files.php?file=cepmlp_car17_67_370269315.pdf.; Island of Palmas Case, 
(Netherlands v. USA), Report of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, (4 April 1928), available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_ii/829-871.pdf, (last visited 19 July 2013)   
518 NICOLAAS JAN SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 254 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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(3) Labor and Legislation 
 In fact, a noted historian of political philosophy has popularized the extreme view that 
“Locke had no theory of sovereignty all.”519  It is true that Locke did not use the term 
‘sovereign’ in its technical meaning, perhaps because of its Hobbistic associations.520  Rather, 
Locke attains on the whole a sound theory of sovereignty that is the single supreme and yet 
limited legal authority in the state.521 
In other words, Locke does not characterize the highest authority in the state as 
‘sovereign’ perhaps, but he defines ‘political power’ as “a right of making laws with penalties of 
death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property” (which 
to Locke means life, liberty and property) and “of employing the force of the community, in the 
execution of such laws, and in the defense of commonwealth from foreign injury, and all these 
only for the public good.”522  This supreme power inheres in the legislature.523 
 This Locke’s theory of property and government is interesting in the sense that property 
rights as well as sovereign rights are not absolute. As discussed above, Locke argues that 
property rights is not unconditional natural rights, but is given on the condition that exercising 
labor.  Similarly, sovereign power or supreme political power to Locke is defined by exercise of 
legislative power of the government.  More specifically, for Locke, the sovereign must be 
directly answerable to the laws created by the legislature and it must be kept subordinate both to 
                                                          
519 Raghuveer Singh, John Locke and the Idea of Sovereignty 20 INDIAN J. POL. SCI. 320 320-334 (1959).  
520 id., at 321 
521 id. 
522 LOCKE, supra note 430, at Chapter 1 Sect. 3.  
523 Singh, supra note 519, at 321. 
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the legislature and to the people.524  As we build a similarity between international relations and 
the state of nature, and sovereign rights and property rights, it is possible to find the analogy 
between legislation for sovereign rights and labor for property rights.  
In summary, based on the analogy between Locke’s theory and international relations, 
when a country has sovereign power over subject matter, one can assume that a country has 
property rights over that subject matter.  As Locke argues that property rights is given on the 
condition of exercising labor, a government’s sovereign rights is given on the condition of 
exercising legislative power.  
In addition to stressing the role of government, Locke contends that property rights are 
not absolute, but conditional, justified by satisfying the three provisos.  In building an 
international model, it is necessary to explore the question about how a country should satisfy the 
three provisos in relation with sovereign rights.  
 
(4) Locke’s Three Provisos 
As with individual patent rights, a country should satisfy Locke’s three provisos in the 
exercise of sovereign power: 1) the enough-and-as-good proviso, or sufficiency limitation, 2) the 
no-waste proviso, or spoliation limitation, and 3) the charity, or subsistence requirement. 
If we apply the sufficiency proviso to the international model, a country’s property rights 
or exercise of sovereign power, would be valid, “at least where there is enough, and as good left 
                                                          
524 GARY B. HERBERT, A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF RIGHTS 121 (Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
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in common for other countries.”525  As discussed above, this paper has chosen to adopt the more 
conservative position that, as Waldron argues, this sufficiency proviso is a sufficient condition in 
a logical sense.  Thus, it is necessary not to further discuss this sufficiency proviso in detail, but 
to focus on non-waste proviso. 
If we apply the non-waste proviso to the international case, a country must not use its 
resources to waste or harm another country’s usage.  Even though it is not exactly the same, 
international principles repeatedly recognize that a country’s right should not be used in a way to 
harm its people and the rights of other countries.  For example, in the Trail Smelter Case, the 
tribunal stated that, “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”526 (Emphasis added) Moreover, in the Corfu Channel Case decision, it is 
stated that it is “every State's obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.”527 (Emphasis added) From this principle, it can be implied 
that sovereign rights over natural resources, or a country’s property rights, is limited if the 
actions or omissions of a certain state could cause damage or harm to another’s territory state.528  
                                                          
525 WIDERQUIST, supra note 469, at 9. 
526 AGUIAR, supra note 517, at 4; Trail Smelter Case, (USA v. Canada), Report of International Arbitral 
Awards, Vol. III, (16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_iii/1905-
1982.pdf. (last visited 19 July 2013); See also art 194 n. 2 of UNCLOS that reaffirms the same principle: “States 
shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not 
to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or 
activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in 
accordance with this Convention” 
527 id.; Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), ICJ Reports of 
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, (9 April 1949) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf.. (last visited 19 July 2013) . 
528 id. 
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Likewise, a State is only free to explore and exploit its natural resources if its action (or 
omission) does not interfere or cause damage to another state.529 This is, of course, very 
symmetrical to Locke’s non-waste proviso. 
If we apply Locke’s charity proviso in the international model, two important issues 
emerge.  First, sovereign power cannot confer the right to deny relief to those in “pressing 
want”; and second, that people in desperate need have an actual, binding right to the assets held 
by legitimate sovereign power holders.530  This issue will be analyzed in the next chapter in 
detail, when we discuss specific policy issues such as those involved in pharmaceutical products. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Starting from the similarity between international relations and Locke’s state of nature, it 
is possible to build an analytic model of Locke’s theory applicable to the international cases. In 
this model, sovereign rights over patentable subject matters can be regarded as property rights 
that are conferred on a government. This is based on the notion that sovereign power is about a 
government’s right over resources, which is very symmetrical to Locke’s theory on property 
rights.  More detailed analogy or the application of the Lockean theory to the international case 
is explained in the table 5 below. 
 
                                                          
529 id. 
530 MERGES, supra note 316, at 273.  
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< Table 5: Symmetry between the Original and International Model of Locke > 
Original Model International Model 
State of Nature International Relations 
Individuals Countries 
Property rights Sovereign Power 
Labor Legislation 
Three Provisos Three Provisos 
 
Based on this symmetry, in principle – by applying the Lockean theory – international 
property or sovereign rights should be given to individual countries that mix their labor with 
resources.  Just as an individual can acquire property rights by mixing his labor with resources, 
a country can claim sovereign rights when it mixes its labor with resources.  In the international 
model, one might say that a country’s legislative effort is ‘labor’ which justifies the recognition 
of its sovereign rights.  Specifically, a country’s effort to design and enforce patent law, such as 
defining patentable subject matter, duration of patents, and the scope of patent rights, requires a 
lot of resources and labors.  Under a Lockean theory, when a country mixes this legislative 
labor with something derived from the state of nature, it is theoretically justified to claim 
sovereign rights over that subject matter.  
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IV. TWO-LAYERS OF LOCKE’S THEORY TO JUSTIFY PATENT HARMONIZATION 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, harmonization is a process of ascertaining the admitted 
limits of unification but does not necessarily amount to a vision of total uniformity. 531 
Uniformity is the final goal of harmonization, but harmonization is any stage in the process 
toward realizing uniformity.   
Based on our previous discussion, it is possible to define the driving forces toward patent 
harmonization in two ways.  One is the argument for strong patent harmonization, or toward the 
uniformity of patent systems.  This is based on the natural rights theory, which says that 
property rights should be recognized regardless of the laws of any particular society.  The other 
driving force is toward a country-specific patent system, and is based on the sovereign power of 
a country having an exclusive right to use its resources.  
One can say that harmonization involves balancing activity between natural rights and 
sovereign power.  Among the theories that we discussed in Chapter 4, the utilitarian theory 
highlights sovereign power, whereas the personhood theory highlights natural rights.  These 
theories, however, are at two extremes, and therefore cannot provide a full explanation for the 
patent harmonization issue.  If one highlights the natural rights theory, it can strongly support 
the harmonization or even unification of patent laws.  However, if we place more weight on the 
concept of sovereign power, a country would have a comprehensive right to design its law, and 
would not be obligated to recognize a foreigner’s rights given by another government.  
                                                          
531 WERNER F. MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 
39 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) (2006). 
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What this paper would like to suggest is that Locke’s theory can provide balanced 
guidance between those extremes in the discussion of patent harmonization, by providing two-
layers of normative theories for both driving forces.  Specifically, Locke highlights the natural-
rights aspects of property, while recognizing a role for government.  Although Locke does not 
provide much guidance about the exercise of government, we can construct a symmetrical model 
by applying his property theory in the international domain.  Under this approach, the Lockean 
property would require the legislation efforts of a country, which is a holder of sovereign rights.  
 
< Figure 5: Locke’s Theory and Patent Harmonization > 
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In sum, international patent harmonization is a result of striking a balance between two 
tensions. However, applying the international model of Locke’s theory to real issues renders 
more complications. It is true that many issues around patent harmonization are rooted in a 
conflict between a country’s sovereign power and an individual’s patent (or property) rights.  
Traditional knowledge, pharmaceutical products, and biodiversity are typical examples.  
Developing countries argue the absolute sovereign rights, whereas developed countries defend 
the value of individual patent rights.  Because Locke’s property theory arguably supports both 
conclusions, it is possible to find some uniform guidance in dealing with those conflicts around 
patent harmonization.  From the next chapter, we will discuss important policy issues around 
patent harmonization based on Locke’s theory and our analytic frame. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLICY ISSUES: THE “TRIPLETS” 
 
In the above chapters, we have discussed a two-layer normative frame based on the 
property theory – in particular, Locke’s labor theory.  This chapter actually applies this analytic 
tool to real policy issues.  It is true that there are numerous issues that could be subsumed under 
the name of “patent harmonization.”  For example, when countries develop a uniform patent 
system, there are many complicated but difficult issues on which every country must reach 
consensus. Among many policy issues, this chapter particularly focuses on the normative 
questions, rather than practical questions, that can be analyzed by using property theories. 532 
To consider normative issues involved in patent harmonization, it is beneficial to refer to 
the current issues debated in the WTO TRIPS Council.  After the conclusion of the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1995, many countries – usually developing countries – have argued over the 
interpretation and revision of that agreement. Particularly contentious are those identified by the 
Doha Declaration as the “triplets”:533 biotechnology, traditional knowledge, and biodiversity.   
                                                          
532 Consider, for instance, the long historical debate in the United States about priority – between first-to-invent 
and first-to-file.  The main argument supporting the first-to-file system was to harmonize the U.S. patent law 
system with those of the rest of the world.  And, the reason to change to a first-to-file system was based on a very 
economic and pragmatic argument.  Although it is theoretically correct to give priority to the one who invents first 
and not the one who files an application first, most countries choose the first-to-file system because of its cost and 
efficiency.  Thus, while consequential harmonization might be one of the benefits for adopting the first-to-invent 
system in the United States, this was not based on normative choices.  Rather, saving costs and enhancing 
predictability as other countries do is the main reason for changing the system, with harmonization only a collateral 
benefit.  Thus, this issue is not a debate about normative questions, and it is out of the scope of our discussion. 
533 TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 118, at 205. (Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration instructed the TRIPS 
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First of all, biotechnology issue stems from the Article 27.3 (b) of TRIPS agreement. It 
concerns the scope of permissible exceptions to patentable subject matter in biotechnology 
patenting, and leaves open an option for Members to rule out patents on certain biological 
inventions within their national IP systems.534  As the TRIPS Council maintains this review on 
its agenda, discussions have included debate on: patentability of certain life forms and whether 
there should be exclusions for any such inventions; and how to strike a balance, in the protection 
of plant varieties, between private and community interests, and other issues such as farmers' 
rights and maintaining biodiversity.535 
In line with the instructions given in the Doha Declaration, the TRIPS Council has 
continued to work on the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore since 2002.536  The 
general issues covered, for instance, the question of why there is need for international action on 
the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore; and the international forums most 
appropriate to pursue such a work.537 
The third of the "triplets" issues concerns the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). Similar to the other two issues, this has remained on 
the agenda of the TRIPS Council as a distinct item since 2002, although it deals with issues that 
had earlier been raised under the Article 27.3(b) review.538 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Council “in pursuing its work programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12 of this 
Declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by 
Members pursuant to Article 71.1.”). 
534 id. 
535 See id. at 8. 
536 id. 
537 id. 
538 id. at 9. 
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As these are the central issues in the international community, it is meaningful to apply 
our analytic framework to these issues, and to explore solutions and their justifications.  Before 
proceeding to that task, it is necessary to clarify the definitions and relations of these three issues 
in detail. 
 
 
I. DEFINING THE “TRIPLETS” 
 
1. Biotechnology  
 
Proponents of patent law, primarily developed countries like the U.S. or EU member 
states, justify patents on drugs by arguing that removing or limiting patent rights will 
dramatically affect research and development in the pharmaceutical sector.  However, other 
developing countries argue that pharmaceuticals should be excluded from the purview of patent 
law, due to the possibility of abuse of monopoly rights and the taking of unfair advantage of the 
absence of competition that results from the grant of a patent. 539   This gets especially 
problematic in the case of life-saving medicines, since it is possible that the inventor can raise 
the price of a patented drug to the point that it is inaccessible to poor people.  The life-saving 
                                                          
539 Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How far it addresses public health concerns in 
developing nations, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. R. 357 358 (2010). 
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medicine can become very expensive as a result of the granting of a patent, so people in 
developing countries cannot afford it.  
Developing countries oppose the idea of harmonization because they think it will 
consequentially lead to a strong control over life-saving medicine all around the world. Such a 
harmonized patent regime allows the patentee to exercise larger control over both availability 
and accessibility (in terms of price, quantity, etc.) of the life-saving drug.540 In fact, they argue 
that the TRIPS Agreement puts countries with poor capacity to develop essential drugs at a 
disadvantage.541 They also claim that limiting patent rights can help to bring down prices and 
facilitate the entry of generic products.542  For example, India’s adoption of price control and a 
process-only patent regime transformed the country’s drug prices from among the highest in the 
world to one of the lowest.543   
 
2. Traditional Knowledge (TK) 
 
Traditional Knowledge (hereinafter TK) can be defined as a living body of knowledge 
that is developed, sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, 
often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity.544  Traditional knowledge represents the 
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oldest form of "cumulative and sequential innovation" known to man.545 Traditional knowledge 
is more intuitive, not bound by formal technical paradigms, and, guided by instinct, and it often 
takes place by slow accretions of experience over long periods of time.546 Like present-day 
applications of know-how to industry, it proceeds mostly by trial and error.547 Recently, this 
traditional lore has become commercially valuable, as the applications of know-how to industry 
generally represent one of the most valuable forms of commoditized information in today's 
knowledge-based economy.548   
Traditional knowledge is not easily protected by the current intellectual property system, 
because traditional knowledge belongs to, or is devoted to a tribe, or a community, or even a 
nation.  Moreover, patent laws at the national and international level do not recognize the 
patentability of traditionally developed and indigenously used knowledge, because the long-time 
existence characteristic of TK cannot meet the well-established standard of novelty for granting 
patent rights.549  
For this reason, in recent years, indigenous peoples, local communities, and governments, 
mainly in developing countries, have demanded equivalent protection for traditional knowledge 
systems.550  They argue that the current international system for protecting intellectual property 
                                                          
545 JEROME H. REICHMAN AND TRACY LEWIS, USING LIABILITY RULES TO SIMULATE LOCAL INNOVATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: APPLICATION TO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 356 (International Public Goods and Transfer 
of Technology under a Globalization Intellectual Property Regime, Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman Ed. 
Cambridge University Press). 
546 id. 
547 id. 
548 See id, at 356. 
549 SUN LEI, PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, FOLKLORE AND GENETIC RESOURCES: FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4, http://www.bioin.or.kr/fileDown.do?seq=3289. 
550 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property – 
Background Brief, available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/briefs/tk_ip.html. 
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was fashioned during the age of industrialization in the West, and was developed subsequently in 
line with what were perceived to be the needs of technologically advanced societies.551 
To a great extent, the significant contribution of TK to modern technology and the little 
recognition of it in modern intellectual property regimes has subjected TK to a free-riding 
situation.552  In practice, some TK has been commercially used without authorization and 
payment, or even legitimately monopolized by others using intellectual property rights, while TK 
holders and original countries have received nothing.553  The “Turmeric” case in India is the 
very example of such piracy.554 
The growing trend towards the commercialization of TK and the threat of encroachment 
coming from the tech-advanced world has gradually awakened TK holders and original 
countries, and stimulated them to protect their TK in the context of trade globalization.555  The 
main voice can be heard from developing countries, such as India and Brazil, which have both 
fallen behind in the race of to develop modern technologies,556 and have a huge amount of 
TK.557 
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Those developing countries complain that current international agreements such as 
TRIPS do not mention TK at all. The TRIPS Agreement only requires a review of 
Article 27.3(b), which deals with patentability or non-patentability of plant and animal 
inventions, and the protection of plant varieties.558 Countries had felt the necessity to reflect this 
concern in the current WTO negotiations, and finally agreed on the Paragraph 19 of the 2001 
Doha Declaration.  Specifically, Doha Declaration says that the TRIPS Council should look at 
the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) with regard to the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.559  It also adds that 
the TRIPS Council’s work on these topics must take development issues fully into account.560  
However, there has been little progress in the WTO and TRIPS negotiations as the Doha Round 
has been deadlocked. 
 
3. Biodiversity: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
 
Third issue is about the biodiversity, or the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(hereinafter “CBD”).  CBD is the only legally binding international treaty in force that touches 
the protection of traditional knowledge and genetic resources.561   The objectives of this 
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convention are: 1) the conservation of biological diversity, 2) the sustainable use of the 
components of biological diversity, and 3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources.562 CBD Article 8(j) requires signatory members to 
“respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of 
the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices”.563  
This CBD issue may not be an independent issue, but is important and meaningful 
because it covers the previous issue of traditional knowledge within the legal framework.  
Unlike TRIPS agreement, CBD says much more about genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. For example, Article 18(4) of CBD reinforces the status of TK by requiring state 
members to “encourage and develop models of cooperation for the development and use of 
technologies, including traditional and indigenous technologies, in pursuance of the objectives of 
this convention”.564  In fact, Article 8(j) and Article 18(4) of CBD leave rooms for members to 
legislatively build a regime for bio-related TK protection.565   
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
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As the CBD entered into force on December 29 1993, there are growing concerns with 
respect to the implementation and enforcement of the CBD and its possible conflicts with 
TRIPS.  With regard to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, the WTO 
identified two general issues:566  (1) whether or not there is conflict between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD; and (2) whether something needs to be done, at least on the TRIPS 
side, to ensure that the two instruments are applied in a non-conflicting and mutually supportive 
way. 
A number of proposals on these issues have been put forward and extensively debated.  
Some proposals were intended to preclude possible conflicts in the practical implementation of 
the two treaties, or deal with claimed areas of conflict or tension between them.  For example, 
proposals include amending the TRIPS Agreement to introduce a mandatory requirement for 
patent applicants (1) to disclose the source and country providing genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge used in inventions, and (2) to demonstrate that they had obtained prior informed 
consents from the competent authority in the country of origin, and entered into fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing arrangements or that they followed national legal requirements. 
Proposals of this sort have actually been made and negotiated. For example, a WTO 
negotiating proposal, tabled in the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) in 2008 by a number of 
Members (TN/C/W/52), suggested negotiations to amend the TRIPS Agreement to introduce a 
mandatory disclosure requirement concerning the country providing or the source of genetic 
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, and also referred to prior informed consent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
knowledge innovations and practices.); CBD, supra note 532, at Article 18(4). 
566 WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The Relationship Between The 
Trips Agreement And The Convention On Biological Diversity (IP/C/W/368/Rev.1) available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ipcw368_e.pdf. (last visited Dec.26.2016) 
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and access and benefit sharing.567  Other Members disagreed that such a disclosure mechanism 
was the best way to ensure compliance with prior informed consent and equitable benefit sharing 
obligations. 568 
More recently, as part of the April 2011 stocktaking exercise, a group of active 
proponents of the disclosure approach tabled in the Trade Negotiations Committee of the WTO, 
presented a new formal proposal to revise the TRIPS Agreement.569 This would have introduced 
a mandatory disclosure mechanism, and linked this issue with the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, 
which was concluded in October 2010 under the aegis of the CBD.570 
 
 
 
                                                          
567 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DRAFT MODALITIES FOR TRIPS RELATED ISSUES 1 (TN/C/W/52, 19 July 
2008), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/tn/c/w52.pdf (last visited Feb 
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570 Along with the issue of geographical indication(GI) extension, the TRIPS-CBD relationship has also been 
considered in the consultative process convened by the Director-General. As noted above, while these consultations 
are informal, their proceedings have been reported periodically, including a report by the Director General as part of 
the general stocktaking of Doha-related work in April 2011. Reports from the consultations have noted the 
continuing differences between Members on the choice between these options, although general consensus has been 
reported concerning the principle of equitable benefit sharing and the need to avoid erroneous patenting. Reports 
have described how the consultations have focused on the analysis and clarification of the technical and legal 
aspects of the questions of erroneous patenting and misappropriation, and the different approaches that have been 
put forward in the general debate – the tailored disclosure mechanism, greater use of databases to preclude 
erroneous patents on genetic resources and traditional knowledge subject matter, and the national contract-based 
approach to enforcing access and benefit-sharing obligations. 
 177 
II. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY (DRUG PATENTS) AS A SEPARATE ISSUE 
 
It is true that those three issues are very important and heated topics around international 
patent harmonization.  However, it should be noted that the first issue – of biotechnology – be 
distinguished from the other two issues.  Granting patents to medicine and giving exclusive 
rights to pharmaceuticals, which result in the high price of medicine making it unaffordable to 
poor people and poor countries, is not a matter of harmonizing international patent systems but 
rather of making a strong patent system.  To put it another way, expensive life-saving medicine 
as a result of granting strong patents can happen in a domestic as well as international situation.  
This problem will not be solved even if the patent laws are unified into a single system.  Rather, 
it might be solved only if granting a patent over a medicine were completely prohibited.  But 
the validity of this solution is questionable because it will threaten the incentive system to 
research and develop new medicines that require huge investments.  In theory, harmonization 
does not necessarily mean stronger patent system and cause this drug patent issue.  Although it 
is true that patent harmonization supported by developed countries has been directed toward 
stronger patent protection, patent harmonization and this issue of biotechnology needs to be 
discussed separately. 
Although this biotechnology issue is rather unrelated, it is worth discussing this issue of 
biotechnology as a threshold matter, because conferring monopoly patent rights over life-saving 
drugs is highly contentious.571  It seems that Locke’s property theory generally does not support 
                                                          
571 Gupta, supra note 539, at 358. 
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the idea of excluding pharmaceutical products from the patent system.  Locke’s theory is a 
natural rights theory, and it dictates that one deserves property rights when he exercises labor, 
and satisfies the provisos.  Prohibiting one’s property rights in a certain sector, therefore, is 
generally contrary to Locke’s basic spirit of natural rights.  Locke’s theory suggests no reason 
for denying property rights because they are (or would be) acquired in a certain field.  
Moreover, there is no obvious reason under Locke’s theory why we should deny property rights 
for economic reasons, which would include that the patent system raises the price of medical 
products so high that developing countries and poor people cannot afford them. 
This spirit has been reflected in TRIPS 27.1, which obliges Members to make patents 
available for inventions in all fields of technology without discrimination.572  This means that 
those interested in obtaining a patent for their invention must have the legal means to do so in 
every Member’s jurisdiction, irrespective of the field of technology.573  Thus, Members cannot 
exclude from patenting classes of inventions for example those pertaining to the field of medical 
technologies, unless there is a specific exclusion allowed under the TRIPS Agreement.574  
However, there has been continuous discussion to limit the patent rights for life-saving 
medicines, and it is reflected in Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration.  It concerns the scope of 
permissible exceptions to patentable subject matter in biotechnology patenting, and leaves open 
an option for Members to rule out patents on certain biological inventions within their national 
IP systems.575   
                                                          
572 TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 118, at 97. 
573 id. at 98. 
574 id. 
575 TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 118, at 205. 
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One possible justification by Locke’s theory is based on the charity provisos when it 
comes to a life-saving medicine.  In Paragraph 42 of his First Treatise of Government, Locke 
says two important things regarding the charity proviso: (1) that property does not confer the 
right to deny relief to those in “pressing want”; and (2) that people in desperate need have an 
actual, binding right to the assets held by legitimate owners, and this right arises from the same 
source, and carries the same weight, as an initial appropriator’s right.576  A straightforward 
application of Locke’s charity proviso would seem to obligate owners of these sorts of life-
saving patented inventions to make them available to those who cannot afford to purchase them 
at monopoly prices.577  And, when individual owners appear inclined to shirk this duty, it is – 
for Locke – well within the legitimate power of civil government to enforce it through a coercive 
mechanism like compulsory licensing.578 
Compulsory licenses are “involuntary contracts between a willing buyer and an unwilling 
seller imposed or enforced by the state.” 579  According to TRIPS, compulsory licensing and 
government use without the authorization of the right holder are allowed, but are made subject to 
conditions aimed at protecting the legitimate interests of the right holder.580  The conditions are 
contained, primarily, in Article 31 of TRIPS. And, a model patent law proposed by WIPO 
includes detailed provisions for the compulsory licensing of patents that take into account the 
rules of Article 31.581  These include the obligation, as a general rule, to grant such licenses 
only if an unsuccessful attempt has been made to acquire a voluntary license on reasonable terms 
and conditions within a reasonable period of time; the requirement to pay adequate remuneration 
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in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the license; and a 
requirement that decisions be subject to judicial or other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority. 582 
There have been complaints from developing countries, however, that TRIPS has 
unnecessarily limited the usage of compulsory licenses.  When the Paris Convention originally 
authorizes the grant of compulsory licenses, it sets out limited conditions to be applied in cases 
of non-working.583  This means that the origin of compulsory licenses is linked to the obligation 
to work a patent.584  The Paris Convention does not otherwise establish specific conditions or 
restrictions on the granting of compulsory licenses.585  
TRIPS raised the bar. The most significant clause in TRIPS is subparagraph (f) of Article 
31 which says that “such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member authorizing such use.”586  Developing countries argue that this provision 
effectively limits the benefits of compulsory licensing to member countries which have good 
manufacturing capacity.587  As most countries needing to make use of the patent exceptions are 
economically troubled nations with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities, the exceptions 
in TRIPS fail to satisfy the needs of those countries that the exceptions were designed, in fact, to 
benefit.588   
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As this complaint became more serious, some amendments were proposed. In 2001, the 
Doha Declaration sought to resolve the issue of the use of compulsory licensing to export drugs 
to developing countries.589  Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration recognized the problem that 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector have in 
making effective use of compulsory licensing, and directed the TRIPS Council to recommend an 
expeditious solution.590  On August 30, 2003, following nearly two years of negotiation, the 
General Council adopted the Decision591 that is intended to allow countries with manufacturing 
capacity to make and export pharmaceutical products to countries with public health needs, 
notwithstanding Article 31(f) of TRIPs that limits compulsory licensing predominantly to the 
supply of the domestic market.592  It does this by establishing a mechanism under which the 
restriction of Article 31(f) is waived for the exporting country, and Article 31(h) (remuneration) 
is waved for the importing country.593 
This Decision can be normatively justified as it well reflects Locke’s charity provisos. 
First of all, Locke’s charity proviso 2nd prong says that “people in desperate need have an actual, 
binding right to the assets held by legitimate owners, and this right arises from the same 
source.”594 This expression clearly supports the rights of the compulsory licensee in case of life-
saving medicine. Locke also says that “this right [of people in desperate need] arises from the 
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same source, and carries the same weight, as an initial appropriator’s right.” 595 Thus, it is 
against the Locke’s theory to have additional requirements, such as demanding manufacturing 
facilities, only when they grant compulsory license. 596  In this sense, original TRIPs provision 
that prohibits the export of products manufactured under the compulsory license cannot be not 
normatively justified by Locke’s theory. Rather, Locke theoretically supports the Decision in 
2003 that waivered this additional prohibition and allowed countries with manufacturing 
capacity to make and export pharmaceutical products to countries with public health needs. 
In conclusion, exercising compulsory licenses can be a way to implement the charity 
proviso, but current provisions in TRIPS unnecessarily limit the usage of accessing to life-saving 
medicines to countries with manufacturing facilities.  Access to life-saving medicine should be 
available based on Locke’s charity proviso, regardless of whether that country has manufacturing 
ability or not. Locke’s theory suggests that it is desirable to follow the Doha Declaration and 
Decision in 2003 with a more relaxed standard for compulsory licensing, which allows countries 
with manufacturing capacity to make and export pharmaceutical products to countries with 
public health needs. 
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III. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASSOCIATED WITH GENETIC RESOURCES 
 
As discussed above, the issue of biotechnology can be analyzed independently. But, this 
issue becomes more important when linked with the other issues, such as traditional knowledge.  
Usually, traditional knowledge can be found in a wide variety of contexts, including agricultural, 
scientific, technical, ecological and medicinal knowledge, as well as biodiversity-related 
knowledge.597  But its overwhelming significance in modern industries exists in the field of bio-
pharmaceuticals.598 Increasingly, biotechnology has used traditional knowledge in developing 
medicines.  It is because, over thousands of years, “appropriate bio-species for medicinal use 
and their locations, the proper time for their collection, the parts of the plant to use and methods 
for preparing, storing and administering the medicine” have been identified and employed in 
traditional medicinal knowledge.599  
Numerous advantages – such as increasing the efficiency of plant screening for medicinal 
use – can be enjoyed, provided bio-pharmaceutical companies use local traditional knowledge as 
a guide to lead them towards medicinal biological resources.600  Without traditional medicinal 
knowledge, “bio-pharmacological researchers have to perform a ‘needle in a haystack’ search, 
randomly screening countless plant species in the hope of finding one useful chemical 
compound”601.  Currently, it is assessed that “74% of all plant-derived drugs in the world have 
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the same or related use as they first did in traditional medical applications”.602  The economic 
contribution of traditional medicinal knowledge to the modern pharmaceutical industry is 
astonishing. 603   The estimated market value of pharmaceuticals derived from traditional 
medicinal knowledge in 1995 was U.S. $ 43 billion worldwide.604 
As many pharmaceutical products use traditional knowledge, defining who has the right 
over those products and how to share the benefits can be a very serious problem.  Because 
patents protect new biotechnologies, not traditional knowledge, developing countries have been 
posing serious concerns about patent harmonization that would facilitate the use of their 
traditional knowledge in the development of biotechnologies without any compensation to them.   
Their complaint has grown officially as CBD took effect as the only international treaty 
protecting their rights on traditional knowledge.  
 The above analysis leads us to focus on single merged issue: traditional knowledge 
associated with biotechnology within the CBD frame.  Three different subjects of ‘triplets’ can 
be discussed in this single issue.  The two issues – traditional knowledge and the relationship 
with the CBD – are in fact dealing with same issue, as the CBD is the only international treaty 
for discussing traditional knowledge.  And, this issue of traditional knowledge becomes more 
debatable when it comes to biotechnology.  Although it has been argued that biotechnology is 
an unrelated issue, one cannot avoid touching this issue while discussing traditional knowledge, 
considering its economic impact and political conflicts. 
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It is fair to start discussing this single issue from analyzing the legal platform – 
international agreement of CBD.  Within this CBD frame, two issues have been raised with 
regard to the traditional knowledge: (1) access to the traditional knowledge, and (2) benefit-
sharing.  To provide a transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of these 
issues, countries agreed on supplementary agreement named as ‘The Nagoya Protocol on Access 
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity,’ which is often called ‘the Nagoya 
Protocol.’ 
The Nagoya Protocol further addresses genetic resources where indigenous and local 
communities have the established right to grant access to them.605  Contracting Parties are to 
take measures to ensure these communities’ prior informed consent, keeping in mind community 
laws and procedures as well as customary use and exchange.606  In addition, Article 5 in the 
Nagoya Protocol about fair and equitable benefit-sharing says; “5. Each Party shall take 
legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, in order that the benefits arising 
from the utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in a 
fair and equitable way with indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.”  In the Annex, examples of monetary and non-
monetary benefits are enumerated.  Among these are fees, payments, royalties for monetary 
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benefits, 607  and strengthening capacities for technology transfer or institutional capacity 
building for non-monetary benefits.608 
From the next section, we are going to discuss two key issues that international 
communities discuss with regard to traditional knowledge associated with biotechnology within 
CBD frame: (1) access to the traditional knowledge and (2) benefit-sharing by using the 
traditional knowledge. After analyzing these issues, we are going to evaluate them on the basis 
of Locke’s property theory and our analytic model that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
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IV. TWO ISSUES OF CBD 
 
1. Access to Traditional Knowledge 
 
Some countries argue that states have sovereign rights over their natural resources, 
including traditional knowledge. Thus, they argue that they have the right to exclude regarding 
traditional knowledge, which is a kind of natural resources, and to require consents to use it. This 
is the principle known as the “prior informed consent” (hereinafter PIC). This argument is 
reflected in the text of the Nagoya Protocol.  Article 6(1) of the Nagoya Protocol states that 
access to genetic resources for their utilization is subject to the prior informed consent of the 
Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party.  The formulation 
“subject to the prior informed consent” seems to imply that access requires PIC, which is the 
permission given by the Party providing the genetic resource to a user prior to access. 
This principle of PIC is applied in some national TK protection systems and is often 
present in regimes regulating access to genetic or biological resources. 609    The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Committee has reviewed PIC as a “key principle” of 
TK protection,610 and it is generally agreed that PIC is fundamental for the effective protection 
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of TK.611 The principle enables the regulation of the use of TK by third parties and ensure a flow 
of benefits to the knowledge holders, in a way that may be consistent with the collective nature 
of TK.612   
Under the CBD, the concept of PIC has two meanings.  First, it is meant to protect the 
Party that provides genetic resources and not the one that acquires them.613  Second, it requires 
consent for access to genetic resources and their subsequent export from the providing Party.614  
For this, the provider country (represented by its competent national authority) must be informed 
in advance and in detail about the planned research or bio-prospecting activity (that is, the access 
activity).  It is the basis of the information that a potential user furnishes before the providing 
Party makes a decision whether to allow access.615 
Although there are negotiations to implement PIC in the international treaties of patent 
harmonization, developed countries are reluctant to agree on PIC as it can limit the accessibility 
to resources. In this conflicting situation, it is necessary to review this access to traditional 
knowledge and PIC from Locke’s perspective.  It is apparent that PIC grounds on the principle 
of sovereignty over natural resources.  Not surprisingly, the Nagoya Protocol Preamble 
reaffirms the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources in the chapeau of the 
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Protocol.616  As discussed in the previous chapter, it should be noted that this sovereign rights 
of government is not absolute, but conditional, according to Locke.  Our analytic model 
interprets that sovereign rights are contingent on exercising a government’s labor, or legislative 
power, so that governments are required to have legislative measures in place to argue sovereign 
rights. 
This argument is supported by common implementation of PIC.  WIPO says that any 
direct access to TK from TK holders is subject to the relevant national laws.617  They also 
confirm that TK holders are normally entitled to grant PIC for direct access to TK, or to approve 
the grant by an appropriate national authority, depending on applicable national legislation.618  
As a result, PIC is granted by a competent State authority;619 or by an indigenous/local 
community or TK holder directly.620  In practice, the manner, extent, and procedure in which 
PIC should be obtained are governed by national regulations.  For example, the providing Party 
usually certifies its PIC by issuance of a permit of access according to its national laws.  The 
issuance of a permit or its equivalent becomes a mandatory requirement under the Nagoya 
Protocol where access is subject to PIC (Article 6(3) (e)). Sometimes, national laws can regulate 
that PIC may be obtained also from other stakeholders, for example from Indigenous and Local 
Communities (hereinafter ILCs), if access is requested to genetic resources for which the ILCs 
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have the established right to grant access (see Article 6(2)) or to traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources (see Article 7).621  
In sum, it can be inferred from Locke’s theory that a country that wants to exercise 
sovereign rights should establish related laws to regulate the manner, extent, and procedures by 
proper legislation processes.  In this manner, a country can acquire sovereign rights to exclude 
or use their traditional knowledge.  
However, there can be a problem when the country do not consent the use of traditional 
knowledge which is already used to develop a product, for example, a medicine.  In this case, 
the strict application of PIC principle to recognize the country’s sovereign rights can result in 
denying the property rights of the inventor.  This can be problematic for the Locke’s theory that 
highlights the importance of labor and the according property rights.   
For example, this case can happen when indigenous providers keep specific traditional 
knowledge, whether in absolute or relative secrecy, or perhaps in some geographically defined 
public domain, but foreign entrepreneurs commercialize that knowledge without authorization. 
622  So long as providers prefer to keep their traditional know-how in its raw or inchoate state, 
there is little room for formal intellectual property protection.623  It should be discussed under a 
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theory of unjust enrichment.624 The CBD provides some legal foundation to support such a 
claim in the international context; local legislation sounding in unjust enrichment may explicitly 
regulate these unauthorized uses; and there is a pattern of customary practice forming to support 
such claims against foreign entrepreneurs. 625   Under the local laws regulating unjust 
enrichment, any claim for compensation may arise from an improper violation either of the 
relative secrecy in which the know-how was held or of the social and religious constraints upon 
its use that the relevant community imposes.626 
 
2. Benefit-sharing 
 
It has been emphasized that the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources – including through appropriate access to genetic resources, 
transfer of relevant technologies, and funding – is at the core of the CBD (Article 1).  Through 
benefit-sharing, the CBD seeks to ensure that the benefits of biodiversity – both monetary and 
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625  id.; See e.g., Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential Diversity in the 
International Protection of Traditional Knowledge [this volume]; Graham Dutfield, Legal and Economic Aspects of 
Traditional Knowledge [this volume];  
626 id. (The legal anthropologist, Rosemary Coombe, astutely observes that the construct of a public domain is 
itself a product of the observers' own social and cultural mores.) See Rosemary Coombe, Protecting Cultural 
Industries to Promote Cultural Diversity: Dilemmas for International Policymaking Posed by the Recognition of 
Traditional Knowledge [this volume]; See also Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential 
Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge [this volume]. 
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non-monetary – provide biodiversity-rich countries and communities with the incentives and 
financial support required for conservation and sustainable use.627  
Benefit-sharing principle can do little to help any indigenous groups who are determined 
to keep their traditional knowledge secret or who, for one reason or another, prefer to opt out of 
an emerging worldwide scheme of intellectual property protection.628 However, the holders of 
traditional knowledge would voluntarily make it available if that can help them obtain the 
economic benefits.629  In such cases, the most that international law can provide is some legal 
framework to reinforce the principles of prior informed consent and equitable sharing of benefits 
set out in the CBD, which, as Correa points out, logically translate into measures to protect 
holders of traditional knowledge against specified forms of misappropriation.630  
Benefit-sharing can be seen as a logical consequence of the recognition of the rights of 
communities over the traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  It also follows 
from the application of the principle of equity, which would demand that benefits be shared with 
all those who contributed to the management, research, and development processes that 
generated these benefits.631 
 As a general matter, one can say with confidence that a Lockean theory of intellectual 
property offers support for only qualified property rights in the product of intellectual labor.632  
In other words, according to Locke, a person is entitled to own the increment of value she creates 
                                                          
627 GREIBER ED. AL, supra note 621, at 95. 
628 REICHMAN & LEWIS, supra note 545, at 355.  
629 See id, at 355 and fn 101. 
630 See id, at 355 and fn 100. 
631 GREIBER ED. AL, supra note 621, at 95. 
632 ALEXANDER & PENEVER, supra note 436, at 195.  
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through her intellectual work.633  Although highly romanticized accounts discuss discourses 
“emerging out of nothing that came before,” a more sophisticated and accurate description of 
intellectual creation will admit that, in virtually every case, the inventor or creator builds to some 
extent on the intellectual accomplishments of her predecessors.634  At the most basic level, any 
intellectual activity depends upon activities carried out for thousands of years by countless 
human beings.635  No one person who employs those systems to create a new idea or product 
can claim total credit for her creations.636  Thus, one has to admit that all intellectual creation 
draws at least to some extent on the prior intellectual labor of others.637   
Thus, using Locke’s theory, it is reasonable that an inventor has property rights only over 
the portion to which she has added her labor, not over the entire result of the invention.  This is 
known as the legal principle of proportionality. Thus, it is justifiable for the community or 
government who has the right to traditional knowledge to have the right to claim partial property 
rights.  Based on this foundation, it is necessary for international communities to agree on 
guidelines that will divide a property right between an inventor and country in proportion to the 
relative amount of labor provided.  If the inventor receives the economic benefits for a property 
or patent right over a final product by utilizing traditional knowledge, proper compensation 
should be given to the community providing it.   
Notwithstanding this justification, fair and equitable sharing of the benefits – in spite of 
its fundamental role in the CBD – has been largely overlooked in legal and policy 
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implementation.638   Most legislation, policies, and studies on traditional knowledge have 
considered only one side of the equation, focusing on asserting access rights over genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge associated with those resources and establishing access 
procedures and requirements.639  Now, an urgent task in discussing Article 5 of the Nagoya 
Protocol640 was the clarification of the triggers, obligations, and possible approaches towards the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits, as well as of the link between many obligations and access 
requirements.641  One possible solution, named as ‘a compensatory liability regime,’ will be 
discussed below. 
 
3. A Compensatory Liability Regime 
 
There are some scholars that express concerns about the trend that developing countries 
have restricted access to their traditional knowledge for virtually all uses, including public 
research uses, and to assert ownership claims to resources held in the public collections of 
developed countries.642  In a related articles, Reichman discussed the high social costs of these 
trends and the risk that, by making inputs into future innovation too costly and difficult to obtain, 
these could ultimately destabilize the national systems of innovation that rely on them to 
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excess.643  Specifically, this proprietary tendency undermine and risk defeating the research 
potential of university research scientists everywhere because academics depend on their ability 
to screen large collections of raw materials against leads developed in their laboratories either by 
phonotypical observations or by genetic analysis, or by some combination of the two.644   
In fact, the proliferation of exclusive property rights is not helpful even for developing 
countries or local communities in seeking economic benefits from their traditional knowledge.  
They have worried that the current discussion for international protection on inventions can incur 
the under-protection of their own traditional knowledge.645  Rather, they want to establish a fair 
mechanism to guarantee proper profits or compensations, and hope to best utilize their traditional 
resources for their economic prosperity.  Thus, it is beneficial for both sides of researchers in 
developed countries and local communities in developing countries to improvise principles that 
can facilitate the use of traditional knowledge and the share of benefits.   
In this sense, Reichman suggests to formulate a rational set of rules between exclusive 
intellectual property rights and free competition.”646  It is so-called “compensatory liability 
rule,” yielding equitable compensation for the providers or their designate representatives under 
international law, while fulfilling international obligations under the CBD.647 A liability rule 
means that one may freely take the materials for any research purpose, without need of any 
permission to use, on condition that a duty to pay equitable compensation arises if and when the 
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645 Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
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application itself accrues commercial gains.648  This rule gives providers a means of securing 
equitable compensation from future commercial applications, unknown or unlikely at the time of 
deposit, that ultimately resulted from research uses of the deposited materials.649   
Compensatory liability concepts for TK have been proposed by think tanks, 
governmental research services, 650  and Committee members. 651  They suggest that the 
compensatory liability approach can be used in cases where TK has already been published and 
publicly available for some time, so as to balance equitable benefit-sharing with prior use of TK 
undertaken in good faith.652  Publication or publicly available sources of TK mean that holders 
of TK, usually countries or communities, agree the use of TK for the commercial use.  For 
example, the sui generis law of Peru applies this approach ‘in cases where the collective 
knowledge has passed into the public domain within the previous 20 years,’ when a payment is 
made into a common fund based on “a percentage of the value, before tax, of the gross sales 
resulting from the marketing of the goods developed on the basis of that knowledge”.653  
Moreover, several suggestions have also been made for TK-specific innovation laws, 
based on this liability principle.  Such laws would entitle TK holders to compensatory 
contributions from those who make industrial use of traditional know-how during a specified 
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period.  Some sui generis regimes utilize similar rules to reward TK holders for the 
conservation and development costs invested by the communities in certain elements of TK, 
without endowing exclusive property rights to control such uses.654  They would combine the 
equitable reallocation of benefits without constraining open access to know-how, and avoid the 
division or atomization of the community’s shared TK base into ever-smaller parcels that are 
withdrawn from the TK holding community’s own intellectual commons through the vehicle of 
private property rights.655  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter covered the application of Locke’s theory to actual policy issues.  Policy 
issues were chosen based on the current debate on the WTO, which involves the “triplets”: 
biotechnology, traditional knowledge, and biodiversity.  In fact, these issues can converge on 
one critical issue: the use of traditional knowledge in the development of biotechnology within 
the CBD treaty. Based on Locke’s theory and the international analytic framework, one can 
conclude that requiring informed consent can be justified based on the Locke’s property rights.  
Also, it is justified by Locke’s theory to share the benefits with the group who has that traditional 
knowledge.  Thus, it is desirable that member states in the WTO and WIPO consider the 
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implementation of this benefit-sharing mechanism.  For example, both institutions can 
cooperate to develop model contracts that can be used to implement benefit-sharing principle.  
In addition, a compensatory liability regime would affect a compromise between these two 
positions,656 which include the prevalent view in developed countries that TK belongs in the 
public domain and the aspirations of many developing country governments for a strong 
exclusive property right in TK.657   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Globalization is a double-edged sword for innovation.  It can give innovative 
companies the opportunity to go beyond national boundaries, but at the same time can jeopardize 
their innovations without proper protection.  It can even destroy the virtuous cycle of patents, 
incentives and innovation.658 
This worry is actually intensified in the United States.  Traditionally, with its relatively 
experienced patent office, excellent trial courts, specialized appellate courts, and Supreme Court 
poised to add a generalist perspective, the United States uniquely possesses the kind of 
institutional infrastructure needed to build and maintain a strong patent law system.659  Even so, 
all the proponents for change can agree that its patent law badly needs reform660 in this age of 
globalization.  The risk and cost of litigation is rising rapidly, creating a drag on innovation and 
imposing disincentives to invest in creative production.661   Two studies by the National 
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Academies,662 a publication by the Federal Trade Commission,663 criticism from numerous 
legal and economics scholars,664 and a number of judges665 have offered various diagnoses and 
asserted prescriptions for change, often in contradiction to one another.666   
One of the suggested solutions to confront this serious crisis is greater international 
collaboration.667  For example, A 2004 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report concluded 
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that the United States, Europe, and Japan should further harmonize patent-examination 
procedures and standards to reduce redundancy in the search and examination functions, and – 
eventually – to achieve mutual recognition of results.668 
This suggestion can be an example of various opinions toward patent harmonization.  
Harmonization basically refers to efforts to bring the patent systems of different countries into 
alignment by reducing or eliminating the differences between them.669  In this sense, patent 
harmonization can include any measure that forces the diverse patent system to work in 
harmony.  From a government’s point of view, patent harmonization involves the consideration 
of other countries’ patent laws when designing its own patent system, and negotiating to change 
the others’ patent laws if necessary.  From a business point of view, harmonization is usually 
the argument that patent holders can enforce property rights over a patent in other countries in 
the same way that they can in their own countries. 
Most developed countries recognizing the problem caused by globalization expect that 
patent harmonization will eventually provide an answer. To fundamentally solve this problem of 
fragmented patent system, the international community should cooperate toward deep 
harmonization – substantive and legal harmonization.  However, for the reasons discussed in 
this work, the effort toward deep harmonization is hard, expensive, and time-consuming.  
Rather, as preliminary steps, it is practical to recognize that “there is room for effective, quality-
enhancing collaboration between Patent Offices, without substantive patent law 
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harmonization.”670 Administrative and procedural harmonization, i.e. work-sharing, can be a 
relatively easy, economic, and viable first focus. 
However, procedural harmonization has limitations. As long as national Patent Offices 
operate their own laws and finally have an authority to decide whether to grant a patent, the 
problems of fragmented system cannot be resolved completely.  Thus, several developed 
countries have exerted political pressure to implement substantive harmonization.  But, 
developing countries are opposing that idea because they are not sure whether it is beneficial or 
right.  In other words, the fundamental reason for the conflicts around patent harmonization is 
the lack of justification that countries with diverse interests can agree upon.   
Several attempts, notably a utilitarian argument, have been tried to justify harmonized 
international patent system, but this utilitarian argument cannot explain the long and debated 
history of patent harmonization.  Developing countries have opposed the expansion of free 
trade regime, and patent harmonization meets with greater levels of hostility in these countries.  
It is further argued that “[p]atent harmonization cannot be justified from the trade theory 
perspective, and political pressure to implement patent harmonization would result in a growing 
belief among developing countries that the international patent system and patent harmonization 
is a coerced agreement that should be resisted rather than embraced.”671  
Rather than depending on inconclusive empirical data to show that countries are 
economically better off with patent harmonization, this paper have focused on a doctrinal 
approach based on property theories. This shift from a social utility to a fundamental right 
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standpoint, as Merges argues, is “an important one because the hallmark of a right is that social 
utility alone is not reason enough to override it.”672  Waldron also supports this opinion when he 
distinguishes between mere interests and true rights.673 Starting from personhood theory, this 
paper has investigated patent harmonization from the property theory’s perspective.  Specially, 
Locke’s theory provides a meaningful explanation to justify a country’s sovereign power and an 
individual’s patent rights, and delivers a fresh analytic framework to investigate conflicting 
policy issues, such as biotechnology, traditional knowledge, and biodiversity. 
The journey to true harmonization will be a long and twisted way.  Many strategies to 
achieve a global patent system will be difficult to implement, such as negotiating new treaties, 
amending national laws, harmonizing examination standards, fostering the mutual confidence of 
search results, creating interconnected computer systems, and providing more international 
training for examiners.674  However, international communities as well as many countries are 
recognizing its value and taking actions.  The European Community has long been debating the 
merits of instituting a Community Patent and other regions are considering similar projects.675  
The United States, Europe, Japan, and other industrialized countries have discussed the 
possibility of creating a “limited package” instrument.676  If such arrangements were to move 
forward, broader harmonization might eventually trickle down.677   
                                                          
672 MERGES, Supra Note 316, 3. 
673 See id.; See JEREMY WALDRON, INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF RIGHTS 15 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) 
(distinguishing "three ways in which the special force of rights may be understood" : (1) a right is a "particularly 
important interest" that can be outweighed by other interests; (2) a right is to be "protected and promoted to the 
greatest extent possible before other interests are even taken into consideration," but may be balanced against other 
rights; and (3) a right is a "strict constraining requirement[ ] on action"). 
674 id. 
675 id. 
676 Reichman & Dreyfuss, Supra Note 5, at 126.; See also Industrialized Countries to Seek Deal on Global 
Patent Treaty Outside WIPO, 72 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1788, at 606 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
677 id. 
 204 
Globalization is an undeniable trend evidenced by the global expansion of international 
transactions.  The important implication in patent harmonization is that there are no mutually 
exclusive strategies, and conducting a “policy-mix” to better fit the interests of countries and its 
partnering communities.  Many strategies and proposals could complement other harmonizing 
efforts.  Specifically, it is necessary to combine procedural with substantive, legal with 
administrative, and bilateral with multilateral harmonization.  In this era, international 
harmonization of patent law can be a natural, reasonable, and ultimately required step which will 
benefit all participating countries.  While starting with a single steps in a limited ways, it is 
necessary and important to move forward consistently towards the direction of global patent 
protection. 
 
